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Languages spoken around the world show enormous variety at all levels of their struc-
ture. However, some features appear to be universal, or at least more common than
would be expected by chance. In this thesis, I discuss two such universals, namely
monotonicity and extremeness. To understand what monotonicity is, consider the
concept expressed by the word “tall”. That “tall” expresses a monotonic concept
(on the scale of height) means that if a person is tall, then any person taller than
them, i.e. higher than them on the scale of height, will also be tall. “Short” is also
monotonic, because a person shorter than a short person is also short. Crucially,
this is not a necessary feature of concepts. For instance, it is easy to imagine a word,
“schmall”, that expressed a non-monotonic concept: a person is schmall if and only
if their height is within 50 centimetres of the population mean. I call a category
extreme if it only includes an extreme of a domain. For instance, the word “full”
expresses an extreme category because for a container to be literally full it has to
be filled to the maximum. The first part of this thesis characterizes which classes
of words express monotonic and extreme concepts, and develops a unified cognitive
account of these concepts. The rest of the thesis is an attempt to understand why
and how monotonic and extreme categories evolve.
Previous work in evolutionary linguistics has shown that languages evolve in
response to various pressures, the two most important ones being a pressure for
languages to be easy to learn and a pressure for languages to be useful in commu-
nication. I rely on this work to argue that monotonicity evolves in response to a
combination of these two pressures, and support the proposed picture with a com-
bination of computational modelling and experiments. I also investigate how the




Concepts can be thought of as regions of geometrically structured conceptual do-
mains. Of all such possible regions, only very few are lexicalized, i.e. expressed
by natural language in a morphologically simple fashion. In the thesis, I discuss
lexicalized concepts on conceptual domains that are scalar, more specifically the
concepts expressed by gradable adjectives and quantifiers. I consider two generaliza-
tions about such concepts. The first generalization is that lexicalized scalar concepts
are monotonic, i.e. they can be defined in terms of a single threshold on the scale.
The second is that if the conceptual domain has a maximum or a minimum, the
threshold is often positioned at one of the extrema. I show that these two properties
are non-trivial, in the sense that some scalar concepts, while semantically coherent
and cognitively plausible, fail to have these properties.
The main of this thesis is to develop an account of how these two properties of
monotonicity and extremeness evolve. I focus first on monotonicity, and show with
a computational model that its emergence can be explained as an adaptation of lan-
guage to two pressures, namely a pressure favouring languages that are easy to learn
and a pressure on languages to be useful in communication. This explanation of
monotonicity relies on the assumption that language users are pragmatically skilful.
Moreover, the model makes assumptions about the cognitive biases of the language
users. These assumptions are tested in a series of six category learning experiments.
The results of three of these experiments are analysed with a Bayesian cognitive
model. Overall, the experimental results are inconclusive. I present an agent-based
model where learners are neural networks, which provides evidence that monotonic
categories are easier to learn than non-monotonic categories. Finally, I turn to the
evolution of extremeness. Previous literature has focussed on the role that com-
municative accuracy plays in the evolution of extremeness. In contrast to previous
approaches, I study the role of learning. I show with an evolutionary computational
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model that extreme categories evolve more often than chance even under a pressure
from learning alone, as long as the language teachers and learners are pragmatically
skilful.
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Introduction: Two universals of
scalarity
’Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.
Lewis Carroll
How brillig was it? How slithy were the toves? And how mimsy the borogoves?
Despite the fact that these are not English words, we can say a great deal about
their meaning. This thesis is an attempt to explain why we can expect the meaning
of some words—including the ones we have never seen before, from languages we
have not encountered—to follow certain regularities, called universals of language
(Christiansen, Collins, & Edelman, 2009). The main aim of the present thesis is to
study how some universals might emerge in response to the fact that language is a
cultural artefact, one of whose aims is communication.
We will look at two universals. First, if in Carroll’s world a tove a is slithier
than a tove b, and a is slithy, then b is also slithy. Second, if there is an extreme
degree of mimsiness—i.e. a maximum or a minimum of mimsiness–then to check
if a borogove is mimsy only requires us to check its mimsiness with respect to an
extreme. I call the former generalization monotonicity and the latter generalization
extremeness.1 Overall, this thesis is an attempt to identify some classes of words that
1I am ignoring some subtleties for the moment. I give a fuller explication of monotonicity and
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express monotonic and extreme meanings, develop an account of the shared cognitive
underpinnings of their meaning, and explain where the two semantic patterns of
monotonicity and extremeness come from.
Monotonicity and extremeness are not properties exclusive to adjectives such as
“mimsy” and “slithy”, but can be found in any word class that expresses categories
on scalar conceptual domains. As I argue in section 1.1, monotonicity and extreme-
ness can be observed in the meaning of quantifiers. Despite the fact that the scalar
categories that developed in natural language are monotonic and often extreme, it
is easy to construct possible scalar categories that are neither extreme nor mono-
tonic, and indeed most such possible categories are neither monotonic nor extreme.
Therefore, the fact that these two universals are so common calls for an explanation.
In this thesis, I develop an account of the evolution of monotonicity and extreme-
ness in terms of pressures that act to shape language, and I support the account with
a combination of computational modelling and experiments. I consider two evolu-
tionary pressures. First, a pressure that favours languages that are easier to learn.
An account of learning requires a theory of the cognitive underpinnings of scalar
language. The second pressure favours languages that lead to successful communi-
cation.
The main purposes of the present chapter are to define the thesis’ explanans and
present the state of the literature. First, I analyse monotonicity and extremeness in
detail (section 1.1). Then, I argue that monotonic and extreme categories are not
necessitated by the semantics of the relevant word classes (section 1.2). This raises
the empirical question of where these two universals of scalar meaning come from.
I discuss previous attempts to explain monotonicity and extremeness (section 1.3).
While the question of how universals of scalarity evolve is approached from various
directions in previous literature, some points have not been satisfactorily explained.
First, most work on the evolution of monotonicity focuses on quantifiers, and it is
unclear how it can be extended to other scalar conceptual domains. Second, previous
models of the evolution of extremeness do not deal satisfactorily with the fact that
for (at least some) extreme categories, true instances are never encountered in the
real world. Moreover, previous explanations do not consider the role that learning
might have in the evolution of extremeness of scalar categories, but rather focus
on communicative efficiency. In the remaining chapters, I develop an account of
extremeness below.
18
the evolution of scalar categories that makes progress over previous literature with
respect to these points.
1.1 Monotonicity and extremeness
In this section, I introduce the topic that will be investigated throughout the thesis,
namely the structure of scalar categories. I call scalar any category that can be
thought of as a region of a scale. For instance, the category of “tall” can thought
of—given a context—as a region of the scale of tallness. What constitutes a scale
is a topic of debate in the literature, and I return to the topic in more details in
the next chapter. For the purposes of the present section, a scale can be thought
of as an ordered set of degrees. For instance, the set of heights ordered by tallness
constitute the scale of tallness. This section has two aims. The first is to rigorously
define two universals of scalar semantics, namely monotonicity and extremeness. The
second aim is to consider specific classes of words that express scalar, and therefore
monotonic and extreme, meanings.
Notably absent from the discussion will be the theories of scales and degrees
developed in formal semantics and philosophy. While the concepts of scale and degree
are discussed in depth in the philosophical and semantics literature, the discussions
are not directly relevant for the present purposes. The aim in much of the semantics
literature is to provide a compositional account of truth conditions. However, here
I am not interested in the conditions that determine the truth value of a sentence,
since truth conditions do not have direct causal effect on language. Rather, I am
interested in the cognitive underpinnings of scalar language, which influence language
evolution. What is needed is therefore a cognitive account of scalarity. In light of
this, I do not discuss much of the literature on the metaphysics of scales and degrees.
On the other hand, I return to the way scales appear in cognition in chapter 2.
The present section is structured as follows. I start by defining and discussing
two properties of Boolean-valued functions—monotonicity and extremeness—that
require only that their domains are total orders. I discuss two classes of words where
lexicalized meanings on total orders tend to satisfy these two properties, namely
gradable adjectives and quantifiers.
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1.1.1 Monotonicity
Monotonicity is the first universal of scalar meaning I look at. In this section, I first
give a general definition of monotonicity that only assumes the structure of a total
order and discuss some properties of monotonic functions. Then, I show data that
indicates that terms belonging to some word classes are monotonic.
A general characterization of monotonicity
A binary relation ≤ is a total order on a set X iff for any a, b, c ∈ X:
a ≤ b ∧ b ≤ a =⇒ a = b Antisymmetry (1.1)
a ≤ b ∧ b ≤ c =⇒ a ≤ c Transitivity (1.2)
a ≤ b ∨ b ≤ a Connexity (1.3)
Antisymmetry says that if two elements are lower than or equal to each other, then
they are equal to each other. Transitivity says that if a is lower than or equal to b
and b is lower than or equal to c, then a is lower than or equal to c. Connexity says
that any two elements of X are comparable with each other in terms of the order.
The concept of monotonicity comes from mathematics. Assume X and Y are
two sets ordered by ≤X and ≤Y respectively.
Definition 1. A function f : X → Y is monotone increasing (decreasing) iff
for all x, y ∈ X if x ≤X y then f(x) ≤Y f(y) (f(y) ≤Y f(x)).
A function is monotonic iff it is monotone increasing or decreasing. While defini-
tion 1 is the most general characterization of monotonicity, in the following I will
mainly consider functions that have truth values as their range, called Boolean-valued
functions. Moreover, I will only discuss function with a totally ordered domain. I
assume, in line with previous literature (Shramko & Wansing, 2018), that the set
of truth values is fully ordered with false (or 0) as its infimum and true (or 1) as
its supremum. With these restrictions, the definition of monotonicity above can be
simplified.
Intuitively, an element t in the domain of f is a transition of f iff f changes truth
value at t. More technically,
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Definition 2. An element t of the domain of f is a true transition from true
to false iff (1) f(t) = true and (2) there is some y > t such that f is false for all b
with t < b ≤ y.
Definition 3. An element t of the domain of f is a false transition from true
to false iff (1) there is some x < t such that f is true for all a with x ≤ a < t and
(2) f(t) = false.
Similarly for transitions from false to true. An element is a transition from true to
false iff it is a true or false transition from true to false, and similarly for transitions
from false to true. An element is a transition iff it is a transition from true to false
or a transition from false to true. The type of a transition is whether the transition
is from true to false or from false to true.
Note that the definition of transition is such that a bounded domain can have
a transition that affects only the infimum or the supremum. For instance, f might
evaluate to true everywhere except for the supremum, where f is false. In this case
the supremum would be a false transition from true to false. Moreover, it correctly
excludes the possibility of a transition on a boundary to the same truth value, e.g.
a true transition from true to false on a supremum. The definition will therefore be
useful when discussing the monotonicity of categories that only cover the extrema
of a scale. In the following, I assume that f has at most countably infinite many
transitions in its domain. This, together with the assumption of density of the
domain, implies that between any two transitions there are points in the domain
that are not transitions. The definition of transition leaves open the possibility of
a point that is surrounded by points with a different truth value. In that case, the
same point would instantiate two transitions, e.g. a true transition from false to true
and a true transition from true to false.
Next, I show the following intuitive fact about transitions:2
Lemma 1. If there exist two distinct x, y such that neither x nor y is a transition
and f(x) 6= f(y), then f has a transition between x and y.
Next, define the concept of adjacency:
Definition 4. Any two transitions ti and tk are adjacent iff there is no transition
between ti and tk.
2The proofs for this and all following lemmas are contained in appendix A.
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Figure 1.1: An illustration of monotonicity. Each line represents a function from
some scale (x-axis) to the ordered set {0, 1}. The left function (blue) is monotone
increasing, with a single transition on point a. The central function (red) is monotone
decreasing with a transition on point b. The right function (green) is non-monotonic,
as it has two transitions on points c and d.
Lemma 2. If t1 and t2 are adjacent, then they are of different types.
The important consequence of lemma 2 is that if one knows that there are only two
transitions and the type of one of them, then one can infer the type of the other
transition. This in turn has consequences, which I explore further below, on the
amount of information needed to encode transitions.
Given the lemmas above, it is possible to show a simple and intuitive connection
between monotonicity and Boolean-valued functions:
Lemma 3. A Boolean-valued function f is monotonic iff it has one or fewer tran-
sitions.
Figure 1.1 shows the difference between monotonic and non-monotonic functions in
a visual way.
Lemma 4. The number of transitions, their order, and the type of one of them
implies the type of all other ones.
It is worth considering the relation between two or more monotonic function in the
same domain, because some substantial things can be said about their relations.
Start by defining the relation of inclusion between functions:
Definition 5. A Boolean-valued function f includes a Boolean-valued function g
iff everywhere where f is true, g is also true. If there are x such that f(x) = true
and g(x) = false, then f strictly includes g.
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Some facts about inclusion can be inferred from type:
Lemma 5. If two functions f and g with a single transition each are on the same
domain and are of the same type, then f includes g or g includes f (or both).
This lemma will be relevant when considering the role that monotonicity plays in
making a system of categories efficient for communication.
Up to this point, I have discussed monotonicity for a Boolean-valued function.
Rather than functions, in the following I will mostly be interested in categories, i.e.
sets of individuals, expressed by words in natural language. Categories are generally
modelled as subsets of a universe set. For instance, the category of people is often
defined as a subset of set of individuals. Conveniently, the connection between
Boolean-valued functions and categories is easily expressible as follows:
Definition 6. A Boolean-valued function f : X → {true, false} is the character-
istic function for a category C ⊆ X iff for all x ∈ X, f(x) = true ⇐⇒ x ∈ C
In words, this means that a Boolean-valued function corresponds to the category of
objects for which the function is true. In the following, I will talk interchangeably
about categories and Boolean-valued functions, sometimes in a slightly imprecise
way. The context should clarify in each case what is meant.
In the discussion of transitions above, I put few requirements on the domain of f .
For instance, I did not assume a well-defined notion of distance on the domain of f .
Moreover, I made some assumptions that can be weakened while keeping a reasonable
definition of transition, for instance the assumption of density of the scale and that
the domain of f is totally ordered. In the following, I discuss semantic phenomena
that requires scales with sometimes more and sometimes less structure than was put
on the domain of f in the discussion above.
Any account of the meaning of natural language categories defined based on
transitions has to deal with the phenomenon of vagueness. The definitions above
do not straightforwardly apply to many linguistic phenomena because they assume
a crisp transition in the function, meaning that every point either clearly belongs
in the category or it clearly does not. On the other hand, categories expressed by
natural language expressions are often vague, meaning that at least some points
neither clearly belong nor clearly don’t belong in the category. For instance, some
individuals are neither clearly tall nor clearly not tall. The model of categories based
on transitions as defined above can be made more similar to real linguistic categories
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while keeping the proofs substantially unmodified. A classic strategy for doing so is
supervaluationism.3 I do not discuss supervaluationism in details, but rather sketch
how it could be applied to the situation at hand. Supervaluationism as a strategy
will appear again when discussing contemporary versions of prototype theory.
The supervaluationist approach (van Fraassen, 1966; Fine, 1975; Kamp, 2013)
starts with the concept of partial model, i.e. a model where predicates are assigned
true to some objects, false to other objects, and are undefined for other objects.
For instance, “tall” will be true in the partial model for the clearly tall individuals,
false for the clearly-not-tall individuals, and undefined for the individuals that are
neither clearly tall nor clearly not tall. The truth of sentences can be evaluated
as usual for the clear cases. To deal with the unclear cases, consider the possible
completions of the model, i.e. the possible ways of extending the partial model by
attributing either true or false to each of the unclear cases, for all the predicates in
the partial model. The degree of membership of an individual in a category can be
supervaluated in the following way. If the individual belongs to the category in all
completions, then it clearly belongs to the category. If it does not in any completion,
then it clearly does not belong to the category. If it does in some completions and not
in others, its degree of membership can e.g. depend on the proportion of completions
in which it belongs to the category. Since categories are, in my model, defined
by their transitions, different completions for a category will differ with respect
to the position of the transitions. The supervaluation analysis of vagueness for
transitions-defined categories has the crucial advantage of being compatible with the
definitions and lemmas above. While for crisp categories the discussion above applies
straightforwardly, for vague categories it applies for all completions. Therefore, the
lemmas above are true in the supervaluation.
From a modelling point of view, instead of starting as I did above with a function
f that characterises a category directly, I start with a set T = {t1, t2, . . . , tn} of
random variables, distributed as unimodal probability densities such that for any
two indices i < j, the expected value µi of ti is lower than the expected value µj
of tj. Unimodality ensures that the corresponding cumulative distribution functions
are strictly monotonically increasing. Each t ∈ T models the position of one of the
category’s transitions. Each realization of a t ∈ T is a completion for that transition.
How is degree of membership in the category defined in this formal framework?
3Thanks to Brian Rabern for discussions on the literature on vagueness and for suggesting the
connection to supervaluationism.
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First, define the set C = {c1, . . . , cn}, whose ith member is the cumulative distribu-
tion function of ti. The function ci models the probability that the relative transition
is below any specified point. Next, t1 is associated with a type of transition w, either
−1 to define the type from true to false or type +1 to define the type from false to
true. All other transitions wi are associated with the same type as t1 if their index
is odd and with the opposite type if their index is even. The function f , which can
be interpreted as describing the probability that each point of the scale belongs to a





If there is no transition, then f is directly specified as being 1 everywhere or 0
everywhere, representing respectively a category that certainly applies everywhere
and one that certainly applies nowhere. Definition 1.4 is effectively approximating
the probability that the closest transition below any point is a transition from false to
true. If the transitions are far enough from each other (compared to their variance)
that there is little chance of them having a different order than their index order, the
ci become close to 1 for all transitions lower than the one immediately below x, and
become close to 0 for all transitions above x. Therefore, if the transition immediately
below x is from false to true, the cumulative distribution function locally gives the
probability of x being true. If the transition immediately below x is from true to
false, the cumulative distribution function locally gives the probability of x being
false. Figure 1.2 shows the effects of multiple transitions on f .
Note that this way of setting up the model allows for some intuitively implausible
categories if the transitions are close to each other. It is however unclear whether
the f that are implausible should be excluded by the model itself. A natural way
of making f have a more plausible shape would be to restrict the functional form
of the distributions in T , and to put constraint on how close their means can be.
In the larger context of this thesis, the idea expressed by equation 1.4 will come
up again in section 2.2.3. However, the interaction between multiple thresholds will
not constitute a problem as discussion will be limited to categories with a single
threshold. Therefore, I leave a more complicated elaboration of the model of non-
monotonic vague categories to future research.
In the remainder of this section, I present familiar data that suggests words in
various classes are monotonic with respect to salient scales. To show that a term is
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Figure 1.2: Category with vague transitions modelled by a function f . Each column
shows the distribution over transitions positions (top), the cumulative probability
functions (center) and the function obtained by combining them (bottom). The
categories in both the left and right columns have three transitions, t1, t2, t3. In
each case, t1 is a transition from false to true, which implies that t2 is from true to
false, and t3 from false to true. The left column of plots shows a category where the
transitions are far enough that equation 1.4 is a good approximation. Transitions
are distributed normally, parameterized by mean and standard deviation. t3 has a
smaller standard deviation than the other two transitions. This has the effect that
the increase in the cumulative density function is sharper (middle left), and therefore
there is less vagueness about its position on the scale (bottom left). The right column
shows a pathological category, where the vague areas of different transitions overlap
substantially. As a consequence of definition 1.4, f has a local maximum not at 1.
monotonically increasing, I show that for any two individuals a and b, if a falls in
the extension of the term and b is higher on the scale than a, then b also falls in the
extension of the term. Similarly for monotonically decreasing. This test corresponds
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to definition 1. The only requirement for this strategy is that it should be possible to
compare two individuals with respect to a scale. In section 1.2, I show that for each
word class I considered independently motivated semantic analyses define a suitable
scale.
Gradable adjectives
Gradable adjectives are those adjectives susceptible of gradation with (at least some)
modifiers such as “very”, “slightly”, “almost”, “half”. They are used to convey
information about the degree to which individuals have properties. In the predicative
position, they mainly appear in two contexts, so-called measure and bare contexts.
Measure contexts are used to convey the precise degree to which an object has a
property. An example of a measure context is “Mary is 181cm tall”, which asserts
that Mary has a very specific height. In bare contexts, gradable adjectives are used
to communicate that an entity has a property to a degree that falls within a certain
range. An example of a bare context is “Mary is tall”, which conveys information
about the height of Mary, but not Mary’s exact height.4
To find out whether Mary satisfies the bare predication of the adjective ”tall”,
all we need to do is check whether Mary is tall enough. For instance, in a certain
context we might say that Mary is tall if she is taller than 180 centimetres. The bare
predication of a gradable adjective if verified by every individual that has the relevant
property to a degree greater than some degree called the standard of comparison
(with the proviso of contextual sensitivity explained below). I argue below that
standards of comparison play the role of transitions in a formal account of adjectival
semantics. Consistently with the formal analysis above, the existence of a unique
transition/standard of comparison suffices to show monotonicity. The comparison
test confirms the conclusion:
(1.5) If N1 is ADJ and N2 is ADJ-er than N1, then N2 is ADJ.
Where N1 and N2 are nouns and ADJ is a gradable adjective. Instances of this
pattern are:
(1.6) If John is tall and Mark is taller than John, then Mark is tall.
(1.7) If Russia is cold and Iceland is colder than Russia, then Iceland is cold.
4In the following, I will refer to the bare use of gradable adjectives unless stated otherwise.
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A sentence of the form “N1 is ADJ-er than N2” is true iff the degree to which N1
has the property referred to by ADJ is greater than the degree to which N2 has
that property.5 The validity of the inferences in examples 1.6 and 1.7 indicates that
having the relevant property to a degree higher than a degree that verifies a bare
predication suffices to also verify a bare predication. This in turn implies that in bare
contexts every degree greater than a degree that falls in the adjective’s extension also
falls in the adjective’s extension. Bare predications of gradable adjectives therefore
refer to monotonic categories on the respective scales.6
Quantifiers
Quantifiers are determiners that are used to convey information about magnitudes.
Intuitively, quantifiers express a quantitative relation between the sets referred to
by two common nouns. For instance, the sentence “Most ducks quack” conveys a
quantitative relation between the set of ducks and the set of quacking things. Call
the first argument—“ducks” in the example—the restrictor argument and the second
argument the scope argument.
Two important classes of quantifiers are proportional quantifiers and numerical
quantifiers. Proportional quantifiers such as all, some, none, most convey informa-
tion about the proportion between the sizes of restrictor and scope. For instance,
all conveys that the proportion of individuals in the restrictor set that belong to
the scope set is 1, while most conveys that the proportion is greater than 0.5. Each
proportional quantifiers can therefore be expressed as a portion of the scale of pro-
portions. Proportional quantifiers include the Aristotelian quantifiers (all, some, no)
as well as the proportional quantifiers sensu stricto (half, most, three quarters of ).7
Numerical quantifiers such as more than five convey information about the num-
ber of elements in the restrictor set that also belong to the scope set. For instance,
5See Lassiter (2015) for a review of the relevant literature on comparison.
6It is debated whether there are adjectives that are monotonically decreasing, or whether all
adjectives are monotonically increasing on a scale that is structured by an order inversed with
respect to the intuitive direction. For instance, “cold” could be monotonically decreasing if ≥
tracks increasing temperature, or monotonically increasing if ≥ tracks decreasing temperature. See
Heim (2006) and Heim (2008) for a classical proposal to this effect.
7Throughout the thesis, I disregard the presuppositional content of quantifiers. For instance, I
treat “the”, “both”, “either”, and “neither” all as proportional quantifiers, because once the respec-
tive presuppositions are satisfied they reduce to other proportional quantifiers—respectively, “a”,
“two”, “one”, and “no”. This disregard for presuppositional content works under the assumption
that the asserted meaning and the presuppositions are stored and encoded independently.
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five cats sleep says that five elements of the restrictor set of cats belong to the scope
set of sleeping things. The meaning of each numerical quantifier can be expressed as
a set of numbers, namely the sizes of the intersection of restrictor and scope set that
verify the quantifier. Numerical quantifiers include the cardinality quantifiers (one,
five) as well the parity quantifiers (an even number of, an odd number of ).
Quantifiers can be divided into morphologically simple and complex. Morpho-
logically simple quantifiers (such as some, all, and no) consist of a single morpheme,
while complex quantifiers (such as an even number of ) have internal morphologi-
cal structure. A great deal of literature, starting with Barwise and Cooper (1981)
supports the claim that simple quantifiers are monotonic. Therefore, I refer to the
literature for support of the claim that quantifiers are monotonic. While the classic
definition of monotonicity for quantifiers differs from the definition I gave above, I
show below that the two are equivalent with some plausible assumptions. This allows
the conclusion that simple quantifiers are monotonic according to definition 1 above
in the respective scales, i.e. proportional quantifiers are monotonic on the scale of
proportions and numerical quantifiers are monotonic on the scale of numbers.
As an illustration of quantificational monotonicity, consider the proportional
quantifier “most”. The monotonicity of “most” allows for inferential patterns that
are analogous to the one in 1.5, as shown by the comparison test:
(1.8) If most N V1 and there are more V2ing N than V1ing N, then most N V2.
where V1 and 2 are any two appropriate verbs. Note that the comparison is on the
scale of proportions. If there are more V2ing N than V1ing N, then the proportion
of N that V2 is greater than the proportion of N that V1.
1.1.2 Extremeness
A general characterization of extremeness
The tools developed in the section on monotonicity allow us to easily give a general
definition of extremeness. First, define the concept of an extreme transition:
Definition 7. A transition t is extreme iff is it a supremum or an infimum of the
domain of f .
Then, define the notion of extremeness of categories:
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Definition 8. A category is extreme iff it has an extreme transition.
Note that this definition of extremeness for categories does not imply that an extreme
category is monotonic. A category with two transitions, one at the supremum and
one at the infimum, is extreme but not monotonic. In practice, this will not affect
the discussion because I will mostly consider monotonic categories below.
The universal of extremeness I propose is that there is a tendency for transitions
in natural language to fall on the extrema of scales when possible. To test whether
a category has a true extreme transition at the supremum, I test whether two things
can be predicated at the same time of an individual: (1) the individual falls in the
category and (2) it is possible for the individual to be above its actual position
on the scale underlying the category. If a category is not extreme, an individual
falling in the category does not need to be at the scale maximum, and therefore it is
possible for both conditions to be satisfied together. If the category is extreme, the
two conditions cannot be true together. On the other hand, to check if a category
is a false extreme transition at the infimum, I check if an individual can (1) have a
degree outside the category and (2) be capable of having a degree that is lower than
its current degree. If the only false point for the category is the infimum, the two
conditions cannot be verified together.
The universal of extremeness is weaker than the universal of monotonicity. While
the vast majority if not all terms discussed above are monotonic, there are many
exceptions to extremeness in each of the three groups of terms I consider. A model
of the emergence of extremeness should therefore not aim to predict that every
category will become extreme. Rather, such a model should aim at explaining the
surprising commonness of extremeness in scalar categories. Crucially, extremeness
is more surprising than monotonicity. Extremeness is prima facie maladaptive from
the point of view of both the learning and the communication pressures discussed
above. I return to this issue in chapter 6.
The discussion of vagueness above helps making sense of what is peculiar about
extreme categories. When taking transitions to be single points, the difference be-
tween vague transitions and sharp transitions cannot be modelled; all transitions are
modelled as sharp. However, sharpness is a non-trivial property of extreme transi-




In this section, I only consider a few examples of extremeness in the word classes
introduced above. Below, I give a fuller treatment of what extremeness is in each
case. Consider first gradable adjectives, which I analysed as categories on ordered
sets of degrees. There are numerous examples of gradable adjectives that are extreme
in the sense described. Consider “dry” as an illustration. The following sentence is
semantically incoherent:
(1.9) # The shirt is dry, but it could be more dry.
However, the same pattern is acceptable for other adjectives:
(1.10) The stick is bent, but it could be more bent.
This shows that some adjectives refer to extreme categories, while other do not.
Adjectives that refer to extreme categories are called absolute adjectives. They can
be divided into maximal, which have a true transition from false to true at the
supremum, and non-minimal, which have a false transition from false to true at the
infimum. Examples of the former are “full”, “straight”, “closed”, as can be checked
with pattern 1.9. Example of the latter are “bent”, “awake”, “visible”, “open”:
(1.11) # The stick is not bent (at all), but it could be straighter.
There are substantial generalizations that connect the structure of the underlying
scale with extremeness, which I discuss in the next section.
Similar patterns showing category extremeness can be constructed with quanti-
fiers:
(1.12) # All the cats in the room are sleeping, but more of the cats in the room
could be sleeping.
(1.13) # None of the students failed the example, but fewer of the students could
have failed the exam.
1.2 Universals of scalarity in natural language se-
mantics
In the discussion above, I described two striking properties of the semantics of scalar
terms. I considered classes of words that, to different extents, seem to verify these
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generalizations. However, I have not described in details the semantics of the classes
of words and exactly where scalarity is required. In this section, I make the treatment
of scalarity more precise by couching monotonicity and extremeness in independently
motivated analyses from the formal semantics literature.
The section is structured as follows. I start by discussing gradable adjectives.
First, I present a widely accepted account of their semantics. I then show how
monotonicity can be defined within this account, and discuss previous literature
concerning the monotonicity of gradable adjectives and related concepts. I also dis-
cuss extremeness for gradable adjectives. I then move onto quantifiers and introduce
generalized quantifiers theory as a commonly accepted model of quantificational se-
mantics. I show how monotonicity can be defined in generalized quantifiers theory.
Then, I discuss an alternative scalar approach to the semantics of quantifiers and
how to define monotonicity in it. I also briefly discuss extremeness in quantifiers. I
conclude the section with a discussion of some possible exceptions to monotonicity.
This section has three aims. First, it will show that a scalar analysis of the word
classes I discuss is independently motivated. Second, I will argue that the previ-
ous literature on formal semantics implicitly assumed the universal—monotonicity
for gradable adjectives—or explicitly argued for it—monotonicity for quantifiers, ex-
tremeness for gradable adjectives. This is important because the semantic analyses
encode considerations of large amounts of linguistic data. The third aim of the sec-
tion is to show that semantics alone is not sufficient to explain the universals under
discussion. This will motivate the search for an evolutionary explanation.
1.2.1 Gradable adjectives
The formal semantics of adjectives
In the rest of this section, I present a widespread account of the semantics of gradable
adjectives. According to Kennedy and McNally (2005) the meaning of a gradable
adjective makes use of a scale and a function. The scale is a partially ordered set
of degrees, like the one I introduced above. The function maps the scale’s degrees
onto sets of individuals, namely the individuals that have the property to the given
degree. Being functions from degree to sets of individuals, adjectives are of type
〈d, 〈e, t〉〉.
For instance, the adjective ‘tall’ comes with the set of heights ordered according to
tallness, and a function height which maps degrees onto the set of persons of the given
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I take the expression “180 cm” as simply referring to a degree on the height scale,
which implies that it is of type d. However, we get a type clash when we draw a





is 〈d, 〈e, t〉〉
tall
Kennedy and McNally (2005), following Stechow (1984), solve the type clash
by assuming the existence of a null morpheme POS that takes the adjective as an










POS takes the adjective as an argument and returns a function from individual
to truth values, or equivalently a set of individuals. This solves the type theoretical
8To keep explanation simple, I assume that degrees are points on a scale rather than intervals.
This simplification does not affect the present argument.
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problem but leaves open how to interpret POS. It is easy to see that the set returned
by POS should be the set of things that verify the bare predication of the adjective.
I consider three additional intuitive desiderata. First, the analysis should account
for the context sensitivity of bare predications of gradable adjectives. A given sen-
tence containing an adjective in bare use can be true or false of the same individual
in different utterance contexts. For example, consider Mary, a six years old who is
quite tall for a child, but still shorter than the average person. In a conversation
about people in her school class, the sentence “Mary is tall” is true. However, in
a conversation about the average human, the sentence “Mary is tall” is false. The
lesson is that the comparison population can, for some adjectives, shift the stan-
dard of comparison.9 Call relative standard those adjectives that shift standard of
comparison depending on the contextually given comparison population. Examples
of relative standard adjectives are “tall”, “intelligent”, and “big”. Not all gradable
adjectives are relative standard. For instance, “full”, “dry” and “straight” have a
standard whose position is insensitive to the comparison population. Call absolute
standard those adjectives with a fixed standard of comparison. At least for relative
adjectives, POS should be sensitive to the comparison population.
The second desiderata for POS is that given a comparison population the bare
predication should not discriminate between individuals that have the property to
the same degree. This means that whether an object falls or not on the set only
depends on the degree to which it has the property. Lastly, I want the analysis of
POS to provisionally make bare predications monotonic. The account I consider,
which is the one of Kennedy and McNally (2005), satisfies these restrictions.
A relation standard is introduced between a degree d, a function G of adjectival
type 〈d, 〈e, t〉〉 and a contextually given population C. C is a free variable that can be
given a value by the context. The relation standard(d)(G)(C ) is true iff d is greater
on the scale specified by G than a degree that depends on the comparison population
C :
standard(d)(G)(C) = dG,C ≤G d (1.17)
In the most typical cases, such as “John is (POS) tall”, dG,C is somewhere above the
average of property G in the population C.10
9The comparison population can also be set explicitly by adding “for a C”, where C is a set of
individuals.
10The issue of how dG,C is calculated in actual languages is orthogonal to the problem at hand.
Below, I discuss various proposals for how the position of the standard of comparison is set.
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POS is a function from a gradable adjective G and an individual x that is true
iff the degree d to which the individual has the property satisfies standard(d)(G)(C )
and false otherwise:
JPOSK = λGλx.∃d[standard(d)(G)(C) ∧G(d)(x)] (1.18)
Given this analysis, “John is (POS) tall” (sentence 1.15) is true iff:
∃d[standard(d)(JtallK)(C) ∧ JtallK(d)(JJohnK)] (1.19)
A complication in the semantics of gradable adjectives is that not all individuals
have every property, and therefore in formal terms taking “tall” as an example:⋃
d∈H
JtallK(d) ⊂M (1.20)
for the set H of degrees of height. M is the domain of individuals. This clarification
is needed to make sense of the fact that not all adjectives can be meaningfully
predicated of every object. For instance, the sentence “This rock is intelligent” is
hard to interpret, because there is no degree to which rocks have intelligence. This
type of failure has a particularly stark effect with adjectives that select or fail to
select for clauses:
(1.21) It is funny to see a clown.
(1.22) # It is fast to see a clown.
A plausible reason for the different acceptability of the two examples is that while
an event can be funny, it cannot be fast.
The monotonicity universal, formalized
I described a standard account of the semantics of gradable adjectives. The next
step is to connect it to the discussion of monotonicity in the previous section. I will
discuss the adjective “tall” for illustration. I want to characterise the bare use of
a gradable adjective as a category on a scale. There are two straightforward ways
of doing this, which are equivalent for the present purposes. The first is to focus
on the standard relation. Partial application of the gradable adjective “tall” and
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the context C1 to standard delivers a Boolean-valued function with heights as its
domain:
standardJtallK,C1 = λd.standard(d)(JtallK)(C1) (1.23)
The partially saturated standardJtallK,C1 is monotonic, because for all degrees of height
x, y:
x ≤height y ∧ standardJtallK,C1(x) = 1 =⇒ standardJtallK,C1(y) = 1 (1.24)
Expand with analysis 1.17:
⇐⇒ x ≤height y ∧ dJtallK,C1 ≤height x =⇒ dJtallK,C1 ≤height y (1.25)
Inference 1.25 is an application of transitivity (equation 1.2), which simply requires
that degrees of heights are ordered. Therefore, the monotonicity assertion in 1.24 is
verified by the analysis of standard above.
More generally, given any G and C, the following is true ∀d1, d2:
d1 ≤ d2 ∧ standardG,C(d1) = 1 =⇒ standardG,C(d2) = 1 (1.26)
Equation 1.26 means that any degree greater than a degree that satisfies standard
also satisfies standard . Equation 1.26 abstracts from specific adjectives and contexts,
and therefore asserts that all adjectives are monotonic. This follows from the analysis
of standard in equation 1.17. In the following, I abuse the terminology and say that
POS or adjectives in their bare use are monotonic when I mean that standard is.
The analysis in equation 1.26 expresses the monotonicity of bare adjectival cate-
gories with respect to degrees in the scale relative to the adjective. The second way of
characterizing bare adjectives as categories on a totally ordered set is with respect to
the individuals having the property themselves. This second characterization maps
more naturally onto the syntactic structure of the sentence. The category in this
case is the set characterized by the phrase JPOS ADJK:
JPOS ADJK = λx.∃d[standard(d)(JADJK)(C) ∧ JADJK(d)(x)] (1.27)
= λx.∃d[dJADJK,C ≤ d ∧ µADJ(x) = d] (1.28)
where µADJ(x) is the (maximal) degree to which x has the property referred to by
36
ADJ . The monotonicity property with respect to individuals rather than degrees
can be expressed as follows:
JPOS ADJK(x) ∧ µADJ(x) ≤ µADJ(y) =⇒ JPOS ADJK(y) (1.29)
for any x and y in M . Equation 1.29 follows from the definition of standard :
∃d[dJADJK,C ≤ d ∧ µADJ(x) = d] ∧ µADJ(x) ≤ µADJ(y) =⇒ (1.30)
∃d[dJADJK,C ≤ d ∧ µADJ(y) = d] (1.31)
While the definition with respect to degrees is a strict total order, i.e. there are
no ties between non-identical degrees in terms of the order, the definition in terms
of individuals is a weak order, i.e. there are (in principle) multiple individuals that
have the property to the same degrees. Despite the fact that not all individuals
have all the properties, the set of individuals should not be modelled as a partial
order. Any two individuals that have the property to any extent will be comparable
in terms of the property. Therefore, it is better to analyse µADJ as undefined for
many individuals.
The relation standard is ultimately responsible for the semantic behaviour of
bare contexts, since it determines which degrees are covered by the adjective in its
bare use. I have argued that standard is monotonic. The monotonicity of standard
is however not a semantic necessity. In general, standard could be any function
from a degree, a comparison population and a gradable adjective to a truth value,
and only some such functions satisfy equation 1.26. For illustration, consider a
language similar to English, Twinglish, such that standardTw is true iff d is between
the smallest and the greatest degree (excluded) of G in the set C. “John is (POS)
tall” when uttered by a Twinglish speaker means that John is not the shortest
nor the tallest person in the contextually relevant set (“John is tall” and “John is
short” are synonymous in Twinglish). It follows that standardTw is non-monotonic.
For any degree belonging to standardTw, there is one degree higher than it which
does not belong to standardTw (namely, the maximum of the scale) and one degree
lower than it which does not belong to standardTw (namely, the minimum of the
scale). Twinglish does not differ from English just in the meaning of bare adjectives.
Notably, the modifiers of bare adjectives that make use of standard in English also get
different meanings in Twinglish. An example is “very”, which according to Kennedy
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and McNally (2005) (following Klein (1980)) is equivalent to predicating the bare
adjective after restricting the population C to the individuals to which the simple
bare adjective applies. Formally,
JveryK = λGλx.∃d[standard(d)(G)(λy.Jpos(G)(y)K) ∧G(d)(x)] (1.32)
“John is very tall” in Twinglish means that John’s height is between the second
shortest and the second tallest person in the contextually relevant set. The crucial
point is that Twinglish is a prima facie conceivable and coherent language, which
shows that non-monotonic standard functions cannot be excluded a priori. Despite
languages with a non-monotonic standard function being prima facie possible, grad-
able adjectives in their bare use are dominantly monotonic. The monotonic standard
analysis has been applied cross-linguistically (Bogal-Allbritten, 2013; Grano & Davis,
2018; Liu, 2010; Sawada & Grano, 2011; Svenonius & Kennedy, 2006), which give
some evidence that adjectives are monotonic cross-linguistically. This is a striking
empirical pattern in the semantics of gradable adjectives, which raises the question
of where adjectival monotonicity originates. An answer to this question might also
shed light on the monotonicity of quantifiers, which I discuss below.
A critic could argue that monotonicity is entailed by the standard semantic ac-
count of gradable adjectives, and that the monotonicity pattern has therefore already
been explained. This criticism confuses the relation between data and theory. The
data tells us that adjectives are monotonic, and the semantic analysis is designed
to model this behaviour. Therefore, an explanation of monotonicity based on the
account’s predictions would be circular. The critic could answer that the semantic
analysis of gradable adjectives that entails their monotonicity is doing explanatory
work thanks to its theoretical virtues, e.g. by being elegant, simple, and parsimo-
nious. This type of argument is central to many areas of linguistics (Chater &
Christiansen, 2007). The idea that general semantic principles are explanatory if
they account for and predict apparently unrelated phenomena is plausible. More
specifically, these general principles are arguably explaining the behaviour of the
specific phenomena that fall under them, because if the general principles hold the
individual phenomena could not have been different without deep changes in the
language.
However, this type of explanation is irrelevant to the present discussion, for two
related reasons. The first reason is that we are interested here in an evolutionary and
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therefore causal explanation, which is not the type of explanation that theoretical
virtues can deliver (even though a causal story can itself have theoretical virtues that
make it better or worse). The second reason has to do with the difference between
general principles and individual phenomena. The question why a phenomenon is
not different from how it is in a way that breaks a general principle can arguably
be answered by appealing to the general principle that regulates it. However, it is
much less clear whether theoretical virtues can explain why the principles are like
they are. In this case, the account with explanatory virtues is the introduction of the
POS morpheme. The question why POS is not different from how it is in a way that
makes it more complex cannot be answered by appealing to its actual meaning, since
its actual meaning is precisely what is being called into question. The explanatory
value of theoretical virtues would come into play if we were considering alternatives
to POS that require a change in even more general semantic principles. However,
I showed above that a local change in the standard function is enough to make the
POS analysis of gradable adjectives compatible with non-monotonic extensions. The
change is confined to the lexical entry for standard in a way that does not affect the
semantic theory at large, e.g. by introducing new semantic types or compositional
rules. Therefore, the non-monotonic account only introduces complexity at the level
of the lexical entry for standard . In conclusion, the semantic analysis of adjectives
cannot explain why gradable adjectives are monotonic.
I have discussed only one of the various analyses of gradable adjectives in the
literature, namely the one proposed in (Kennedy & McNally, 2005). It is worth
mentioning some alternative analyses in the literature to show that they do not
change the space of possible meanings of adjectives in their bare use. This means
that the problem of explaining monotonicity remains for these alternative account
and that the solutions I will consider are equally applicable.
An analysis takes adjectives to be of type 〈e, d〉 instead of 〈d, et〉.11 Thus, ac-
cording to this analysis the lexical entry contains a measure that maps individuals
onto degrees on the relevant scale. An adjective like “tall” then has lexical entry
JtallK = λx.tall(x) ≥ dc (1.33)
where dc is a contextually determined standard of comparison. This analysis avoids
11S ee Vennemann (1972), Kennedy (2013). Moreover, see Lassiter (2015, p. 155) for an overview
of the debate.
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explicit quantification over degrees and instead uses contextual indices to store the
information relative to the adjectival thresholds (Lewis, 1970; Barker, 2002). The
assumption that can be relaxed in this approach is the comparison to a single stan-
dard. Within this picture, a non-monotonic language could add structure to the
index and add complexity to the comparison instead of adding structure to the POS
morpheme (the details of how this would work are irrelevant for the issue at hand).
This way, a comparison with any number of indices can be obtained, and therefore
the space of possible meanings is the same as the ones analysed above.
A third analysis avoids degrees altogether and takes both gradable and non-
gradable adjectives to have semantic type 〈e, t〉. One such analysis is developed in
Klein (1980).12 Klein argues that adjectives should satisfy the Principle of compo-
sitionality : If A is a gradable adjective, then the meaning of [AP A-er than ] is a
function of the meaning of A. The degree analyses presented above do not satisfy this
principle. Klein proposes a different picture in which adjectives are usual predicates
of type 〈e, t〉, and more specifically context-dependent, partial functions that divide
the universe set in three subsets:
• The positive extension of the adjective, {x | JAdj(x)K = 1}
• The negative extension of the adjective, {x | JAdj(x)K = 0}
• The extension gap of the adjective, {x | JAdj(x)K is undefined}
The context determines the universe set. Assume that it is essential to the semantics
of gradable adjectives that they do not distinguish between any two objects a and
b unless either a or b has the relevant property to a greater degree (Klein assumes
with Sapir (1944) that comparison is a psychological primitive and not something
that should be explained by the semantic theory). Then, it is easy to get the space
of possible meanings that can be encoded with transitions. It is sufficient to lift the
assumption that the set of degrees that are instantiated by the individuals in the
positive extension of the adjective is monotonic in the sense defined above. This
account is particularly compatible with the possibility of non-monotonic adjectives,
since it does not encode monotonicity in the formal analysis.
12Also see Doetjes, Constantinescu, and Součková (2009), Burnett (2016).
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Previous literature on monotonicity in adjectival semantics
It is worth discussing previous literature where monotonicity, sometimes in the sense
defined above and sometimes in a different sense, is considered in relation to gradable
adjectives. Kennedy (2001) talks about monotonicity of adjectives, starting from
slightly different data. Kennedy (2001) is mainly interested in giving an account of
cross-polar anomaly, namely the phenomenon that some comparative sentences are
uninterpretable:
(1.34) # Mike is shorter than Carmen is tall.
In a classic view where the degrees of tallness and shortness are both degrees of
height, 1.34 should not be problematic, as it is simply comparing two degrees of
height.
Kennedy (2001) explains the phenomenon by analysing adjectives as mapping
individuals to monotonic categories on scales rather than, as I have assumed until
this point, single degrees. Positive adjectives, such as “tall”, deal with monotonically
decreasing categories, while negative adjectives, such as “short”, with monotonically
increasing categories, which Kennedy calls positive and negative extents respectively.
More specifically, an adjective in bare use asserts that the property extent of some
individual is fully contained in some contextually determined (monotonic) extent.
Consider “tall” as an illustrative example. A sentence like “Martha is tall” asserts
that the extent to which Martha is tall, a monotonically decreasing category on the
scale of heights, is fully contained in some contextually determined monotonically
decreasing category es(tall). To make this work compositionally in the simplest case
of bare use “Martha is tall”, “tall” is analysed as follows:
JtallK = λx.tall(x, es(tall)) (1.35)
A comparative such as “John is taller than Mary” is true iff there is an extension
e on the scale such that the tallness extension of Mary is fully contained in e but the
tallness extension of John is not. The semantic oddness of example 1.34 can then be
explained by the fact that extensions of tallness and shortness are different kinds of
objects, and therefore cannot be compared.
The term “monotonicity” comes up in Kennedy (2001) in the discussion of the
relation between positive and negative adjectives. As an example, consider “tall”
again and its antonym “short”. The same individual can be described in terms both
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of tallness and shortness. In a classical view where adjectives map degrees onto sets
of individuals, a given degree of tallness and the same degree in terms of shortness
map onto the same set of individuals. Therefore, as Kennedy (2001) points out
the relation between the scale of height and the orders of tallness and shortness
is stipulated, rather than inferred from the lexical meaning of the involved terms.
Specifically, it is stipulated that if a is greater than b on the scale of height, then “a
is taller than b” and “b is shorter than a” are true:
a <height b =⇒ ιd.JtallK(d)(a) <tallness ιd.JtallK(d)(b) (1.36)
a <height b =⇒ ιd.JshortK(d)(b) <shortness ιd.JshortK(d)(a) (1.37)
This inferential pattern is what Kennedy calls monotonicity. In Kennedy’s account,
monotonicity in his sense is a natural consequence of considering extensions rather
than single degrees, which is independently motivated by cross-polar anomaly. If the
relation < for an extent is seen as full containment, then
a <height b =⇒ etall,a <tallness etall,b (1.38)
a <height b =⇒ eshort,b <shortness eshort,a (1.39)
Where eADJ,x is the extension of individual x with respect to adjective ADJ .
The crucial point for the the present purposes is that Kennedy’s analysis of
monotonicity does not imply that adjectives must be monotonic in their bare use in
the sense I defined above. Kennedy does briefly considers adjectives that can select
clauses:
(1.40) To see rain in July is odd. =⇒ To see snow and rain in July is odd.
With the assumption that to see rain and snow in July is more odd than it is to
see just rain in July. In view of the discussion above, this inference pattern can be
recognized as a consequence of adjectival monotonicity in my sense. Crucially, there
are possible adjectives compatible with Kennedy’s semantic analysis that fail to be
monotonic in my sense. For instance, Twinglish “Mary is tall” can be defined as:
λx.tall(x, ls(tall), us(tall)) (1.41)
which is true iff the extent of tallness of x contains ls(tall) but does not contain
us(tall), which are two contextually determined extents such that the former is strictly
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included in the latter. Therefore, Kennedy’s monotonicity is different from the notion
of monotonicity discussed in this thesis.
A second paper where monotonicity is discussed in relation to gradable adjectives
is Rett (2015). Rett discusses an asymmetry between monotonically increasing and
decreasing adjectives:
(1.42) The car is faster than allowed.
(1.43) The car is slower than allowed.
While the sentence with the positive polarity adjective “fast” is unambiguous, the
negative polarity adjective “slow” can be interpreted with respect to a minimum
or a maximum. Sentence 1.43 can be interpreted as saying that the car is slower
than some maximum allowed speed, or slower than a minimum allowed speed. Rett
observes that monotonic categories across different grammatical categories give rise
to this asymmetry. Rett’s discussion is orthogonal to the discussion at hand, as she
does not attempt to explain monotonicity in my sense.
The extremeness universal, formalized
I have shown above that at least for some adjectives, bare predication refers to
extreme categories on the relative scale. How would such categories be modelled
in the formal analysis of adjectival semantics I reported above? They are modelled
with the standard relation. When standard gets a maximal adjective, it compares
its argument with the maximum of the adjective’s scale (see section 1.1.2 for the
distinction between maximal and non-minimal adjectives):
standard(d)(JADJ+K)(C) = max(scaleADJ+) ≤ d (1.44)
where JADJ+K is a maximal adjective and scaleADJ+ is the adjective’s scale. Since
by definition no point is strictly greater than the maximum, equation 1.44 reduces to
asserting that d is the scale’s maximum. The definition for a non-minimal adjective
ADJ- is similar:
standard(d)(JADJ-K)(C) = min(scaleADJ−) < d (1.45)
Note that, coherently with the analysis, the standard for absolute adjectives does
not depend on the comparison population C.
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Kennedy and McNally (2005) show a remarkable connection between the struc-
ture of the adjective’s scale and the adjectives that are defined on that scale. Namely,
gradable adjectives associated with totally open scales have relative stan-
dards; gradable adjectives that use totally or partially closed scales have
absolute standards.
This means that if the ordered set underlying the adjective has an infimum or a
supremum (or both), then the adjective refers to an extreme category. Otherwise, it
does not.
There are various additional complications to this picture. First of all, there
seem to be exceptions to the generalization above. A classic example is “full”. Some
containers do not have to be completely filled to count as full, e.g. a glass full of wine
might not be completely full. Moreover, this introduces a dependence between the
standard of comparison and the comparison population, which were predicted to be
independent for absolute adjectives in the analysis above.
A second complication comes from the fact that absolute adjectives are in practice
used to refer to non-extreme points. For instance, a stick can be described as straight
despite not being completely straight. The fact that this is a pragmatic effect is
demonstrated by the incoherence of the following example:
(1.46) # The stick is straight, but it is very slightly bent.
There are two main approaches to describe the pragmatic effect whereby an abso-
lute adjective receives a non-absolute interpretation. First, the interest-dependent
granularity of the scale might be the reason that non-extreme points are treated as
extreme (Gaio, 2009). Second, there can be a pragmatic halo at the scale’s extremes.
I return to the latter approach in chapter 6.
In this section, I reviewed previous literature on the semantics of gradable adjec-
tives, including various accounts of bare forms, and previous analyses of monotonic-
ity. In particular, I concluded that the semantic analyses of gradable adjectives are
consistent with non-monotonic and non-extreme categories. In the next section, I re-
view the literature on quantificational semantics and the properties of monotonicity
and extremeness for quantifiers.
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1.2.2 Quantifiers
In the previous section, I discussed a formal analysis of gradable adjectives that
analyses bare uses as referring to monotonic and sometimes extreme categories on
scales. In this section, I move onto discussing another class of terms, namely quanti-
fiers. Quantifiers have received both set-theoretical analyses and analyses based on
degrees and scalar concepts. I briefly discuss both and show how they can formalize
monotonicity and extremeness. Both styles of analyses are ultimately compatible
with the proposed universals of scalarity.
Generalized quantifiers theory
A common analysis of the semantics of natural language determiners sees them as
expressing generalized quantifiers.13 Generalized quantifiers are semantic objects of
type 〈〈e, t〉 , 〈〈e, t〉 , t〉〉. Therefore, they can be thought of as functions that take a
set and return a function from a set to a truth value.14 Alternatively, they can be
understood more simply as properties of tuples of sets. I write QM(A,B) to indicate
the quantifier evaluated on the sets A as first argument and B as second argument, in
modelM. Attributing this semantic type to determiners in natural language allows
a simple compositional analysis of sentences such as “Some students sleep”, where









When the quantifier appears in predicative position, the situation is slightly more
complicated. However, the syntactic details are irrelevant for the present purposes.
It is worth noticing that the truth of a quantifier is evaluated in a universe of objects
M . Features of M , in addition to the quantifier’s arguments, can determine the
truth of a quantifier. I return to M in more details below.
13In the following, I will focus on D-quantifiers. What I say can mostly be easily extended to
A-quantifiers. See Lewis (1975) for the origins of the distinction.
14This is a specific type of generalized quantifiers. In the general definition, generalized quantifiers
can take as arguments any n-tuple of relations. Notation wise, 〈i1, . . . , in〉 indicates the type of a
generalized quantifier that takes an ij-ary relation in its jth argument.
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Any function from tuples of sets to truth values is a generalized quantifiers. This
includes very odd functions, for instance a function that is true iff either of the
sets contains a dodo, and false otherwise. Simple determiners in natural language
can only express a few of the possible generalized quantifiers. Some substantial
restrictions on the meaning of natural language determiners have been noticed, which
limit the possible generalized quantifiers that morphologically simple determiners can
express. These restrictions are called the universals of quantification. I consider a
few of them.
First, consider a property of some generalized quantifiers called conservativity.
For all universes M and all sets A,B ⊆M , a generalized quantifier Q is conservative
iff:
QM(A,B) ⇐⇒ QM(A,A ∩B) (1.48)
In intuitive terms, this means that the elements in B that do not also belong to A are
irrelevant to the truth of the quantifier. For instance, “all” expresses a conservative
quantifier:
(1.49) All bird fly ⇐⇒ All birds are flying birds.
A second proposed universal of quantification is extension. For any two universes
M,M ′ such that A,B ⊆M ⊆M ′:
QM(A,B) ⇐⇒ QM′(A,B) (1.50)
This intuitively means that changes in the universe that do not affect the quantifier’s
arguments do not affect the quantifier’s truth. In combination, conservativity and
extension mean that the truth of the quantifier can be established by simply looking
at what is inside A.
A third universal is isomorphism closure. To define isomorphism closure, the
concept of isomorphic models is needed. A model M is a tuple consisting of a
set of objects M and relations over M . Two models M = {M,R1, . . . , Rn} and
M′ = {M ′, R′1, . . . , R′n} are isomorphic iff15 there is a bijection f from M to M ′
such that for any element a of M and any i ≤ n,
Ri(a) ⇐⇒ R′i(f(a)) (1.51)
15I only define monotonicity for generalized quantifiers that relate two predicates, i.e. type 〈1, 1〉
quantifiers, for simplicity of exposition. For a more general definition, see Peters, Westerstahl, and
Westerst̊ahl (2006, p. 99).
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In intuitive terms, an isomorphism from a models to another is a mapping that
preserves the structure and has an inverse (it does not lose any structure). In the
case of quantifiers, the relevant bit of structure is the set to which each object belongs.
Therefore, two models are isomorphic if there is a mapping f from the objects in
one to the other model that preserves to which sets each object belongs. Based on
the concept of isomorphism, the universal of isomorphism closure can be defined. A
quantifier Q is isomorphically closed iff for any two isomorphic modelsM andM′,
QM(Ri, Rj) ⇐⇒ QM′(R′i, R′j) (1.52)
This says that the quantifier does not distinguish between isomorphic models. The
only information that is retained across all isomorphic models is the number of
elements in each set. Therefore, isomorphism closure says that all that matters
for the truth of a quantifier is the number of elements in the involved sets, i.e.
A,B,A ∩B,M − (A ∪B).
A quantifier Q that is conservative, extensive and closed under isomorphism
satisfies the following for every sets A,B ⊆M and A′, B′ ⊆M ′. If |A∩B| = |A′∩B′|
and |A−B| = |A′ −B′|, then:
QM(A)(B) ⇐⇒ QM′(A′)(B′) (1.53)
This means that the truth of the quantifier only depends on the size of two sets,
namely the intersection of restrictor and scope set and the restrictor minus the
scope set. This is proved in Keenan and Westerst̊ahl (2011, p. 875). It is generally
accepted that natural language quantifiers satisfy 1.48, 1.50, and 1.51. Therefore,
as an illustration, 1.53 implies that for any natural language quantifier Q, if Q cats
sleep and there are (1) as many non-sleeping cats as jumping horses, and (2) as many
sleeping cats as non-jumping horses, then Q horses don’t jump.
The monotonicity universal for generalized quantifiers
I move next onto monotonicity as a proposed universal of quantification. In the gen-
eralized quantification literature, a quantifier Q is monotonically increasing [decreas-
ing] in its right argument iff for all A ⊆ M and all B ⊆ B′ ⊆ M [all B′ ⊆ B ⊆ M ]:
QM(A,B) =⇒ QM(A,B′) (1.54)
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Similarly for its left argument. In words, a quantifier is monotonically increasing in
an argument if the quantification cannot be falsified by adding elements to the set
corresponding to the argument. As an example, consider “most”, which is monoton-
ically increasing in its left argument. Since the set of sleeping things is a (proper)
subset of the set of living things:
(1.55) Most cats sleep. =⇒ Most cats live.
While some quantifiers (the Aristotelian quantifiers “all”, “some”, “no”) are mono-
tonic in both arguments, monotonicity in natural language quantifiers is usually
found in the right argument. The intuitive reason for this becomes clear when
thought in the context of the universals described above. Giving the freedom to add
new elements or remove old elements from the left argument A, i.e. the restrictor
argument, means that elements can be removed or new elements added both from
A − B and from A ∩ B. One could thus change everything that is relevant to the
truth of the quantifier. Such a quantifier would then have to encode information
that is robust to removing or adding new elements to both of the sets relevant to its
truth. On the other hand, adding new elements or removing existing elements from
the right argument B, the scope set, can at most change the size of A ∩ B, but not
the size of A − B. It is easier for quantifiers to be robust to such changes to their
right arguments.
The properties expressed by equations 1.53 and 1.54 point to a way that quan-
tifiers are monotonic in the sense introduced above in this thesis. If a quantifier is
monotone increasing in its right argument and Q(A)(B), it means that while keeping
A the same, increasing the size of A ∩ B cannot falsify the quantifier. Therefore,
quantifiers that are saturated in their first argument (i.e. whose first argument has
already been given a value) are monotonic on the scale of numbers. Denote a quan-
tifier Q that is saturated by set A in its first argument QA. For all sets A ⊆M and
any quantifier Q that satisfies the universals of quantification presented above:
|B| ≤ |B′| ∧QAM(B) =⇒ QAM(B′) (1.56)
This clarifies the relation between the concept of monotonicity in generalized quan-
tifier theory and the concept of monotonicity I discussed above. For any value of
the restrictor set, quantifiers are monotonic in the sense defined above on the total
order imposed by cardinality (rather than e.g. the partial order of inclusion).
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The definition of monotonicity for quantifiers in equation 1.56 is however some-
what unsatisfying, because it only concerns the truth value of the scope set, once
the restrictor set is fixed. This is at odds with the fact that quantifiers have two
arguments, namely two sets 〈A,B〉. Since quantifiers take two arguments, a total
order on tuples of sets would be more natural for quantifiers to be monotonic on.
The classes of proportional and numerical quantifiers presented above help in this
respect. Recall that all the information that a quantifier can exploit after it has been
restricted to satisfy the universals discussed above is the sizes of A−B and A ∩B.
Proportional quantifiers exploit information from both sets, while numerical quanti-
fiers only make use of the latter. In each case, it is possible to define monotonicity
without the need to fix the restrictor set. I first define proportional and numerical
quantifiers in the framework of generalized quantification theory, and then I define
scales on which such quantifiers are monotonic.





where ◦ ∈ {<,>,≤,≥} and P ∈ [0, 1]. ◦ is not an argument of the quantifier, but
rather part of its lexical meaning. P can be lexically encoded, or context dependent.
This is the case for quantity words such as “few” and “many”, to which I return






Each numerical quantifier can be expressed as
λA.λB.|A ∩B| ◦H (1.58)
Where ◦ has the same meaning as in equation 1.57. The assumption that numerical
quantifiers only depend on |A ∩ B| implies that “all” is not a numerical quantifier,
while “none” might be considered one. A quantifier analysed in these terms is:
JFiveK = λA.λB.|A ∩B| ≥ 5 (1.59)
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This a common analysis of bare numerals as monotone increasing quantifiers, where
the exactness reading comes from a scalar implicature.16 The exactness implicature is
cancellable in appropriate contexts. For instance, if a tax reduction scheme requires
a family to have three children, families with four children will qualify too.
Monotonicity for numerical and proportional quantifiers can now be defined in a
way that involves both argument sets. As in the case of gradable adjectives, there
are two different ways of defining monotonicity. First, quantifiers can be seen as
monotonic categories on the totally ordered sets of proportions or integers. In this
definition, P in equation 1.57 and H in 1.58 are the transitions of the categories
expressed by the quantifiers. Quantificational monotonicity in this sense abstracts
from specific sets and deals directly with proportions or magnitudes. Second, quan-
tifiers can be seen as monotonic categories on the set of tuples of sets, ordered by
a total order. The total order is slightly different in the case of proportional and
numerical quantifiers. For any four sets A,B,C,D ⊆ M , the order for proportional
quantifiers is:





Proportional quantifiers can then be seen as monotonic categories on the set of tuples
of sets ordered by the relation in equation 1.60. On the other hand, the relevant order
for numerical quantifiers is:
〈A,B〉 ≤ 〈C,D〉 ⇐⇒ |A ∩B| ≤ |C ∩D| (1.61)
Numerical quantifiers can be seen as monotonic categories on the set of tuples of sets
ordered by the relation in equation 1.61.
The analysis of quantifiers above explains an asymmetry between “all” and
“none” when the restrictor set is empty:
(1.62) No blue cat sleeps.
(1.63) Every blue cat sleeps.
If there are no blue cats, there is a sense in which 1.62 is true. This is predicted by
the interpretation of “no” as a numerical quantifier. On the other hand, the truth
value of example 1.63 is unclear. In the contemporary analysis of quantification, it
16This analysis was introduced in Horn (1972), but see Barwise and Cooper (1981) for a classic
formal implementation.
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is conventionally taken to be vacuously true, while in medieval logic it was taken to
be false (Parsons, 2014, p. 10). This shows that the intuition on the truth value of
proportional quantification with an empty restrictor set are unclear. In my analysis,
the expression is semantically defective, since the denominator of the fraction is 0.
Like in the case of adjectives, it is easy to imagine a quantifier that is non-





6= 0 ∧ |A ∩B|
|A|
6= 1 (1.64)
This is true iff neither none nor all of the objects in A are also in B. The possibility
of non-monotonic quantifiers raises the question of why simple determiners in natural
language express monotone quantifiers. This question will be the topic of chapter 7
and, to some extent, of chapter 3.
One further advantage of a scalar analysis of quantification is that it can be
naturally extended to quantification over mass nouns. I only review the most basic
facts. A simple picture of quantifiers with mass nouns is that they bind a variable
ranging over portions of stuff. However, this cannot be the right analysis. von
Heusinger, Maienborn, and Portner (2011) illustrate this point with the following
type of example:
(1.65) All honey is either fluid or crystallized.
The example can be true despite the fact that some jars of honey contain both
fluid and crystallized honey. This means that there are some portions of honey of
which it is false that they are “either fluid or crystallized”, because they are both.
Therefore, 1.65 would be false in a stuff-variable analysis. An alternative analysis
sees quantifiers as including a mereological sum operator, which takes a predicate
and returns the sum of all the stuff that the predicate applies to. I write:
σx.P (x) (1.66)
to refer to such a sum for the predicate P . σx.water(x) would for instance be the
object consisting of all the water. The lexical entry for “all”, when its arguments
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Where µ is some measure function which plays the same role of mass as cardinality
for sets. Much more could be said about quantification with mass nouns, but it
would be beyond the scope of the present work.
Monotonicity in a degree analysis of quantification
I have discussed in the previous section the approach that sees natural language
determiners as expressing generalized quantifiers. I examined the difference between
monotonicity in generalized quantifier theory and monotonicity in the sense defined
in this thesis. A different approach to analysing the meaning of quantifiers starts
with the terms “many”, “much”, “few”, and “little”, called quantity words in Rett
(2018).
Rett (2018) provides the most up-to-date degree analysis of quantity words. In
particular, Rett aims at accounting for the previously unexplained fact that quantity
words can modify verb phrases, prepositional phrases, and comparatives, the so-
called non-singular uses:
(1.68) Mary can’t see much.
(1.69) The thesis isn’t much below expectations.
(1.70) John is much further away from Rome than us.
I sketch Rett (2008) and Rett (2018)’s implementation of the degree analysis of
quantity words. Rett (2018) assumes a null operator M-OP which takes a predicate
and relates it to a degree:
JM-OPK = λP.λd.λx.P (x) ∧ µ(x) = d (1.71)
while in Rett (2008) a similar null operator QUANTITY plays essentially the same
role:
JQUANTITYK = λP.λd.λQ.∃x[P (x) ∧Q(X) ∧ µ(x) = d] (1.72)
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Where µ is some measure function that is appropriate in the context. The differences
between the two accounts are irrelevant for the present purposes.17
Consider the sentence “Many cats sleep”. In a degree account, the M-OP mor-
pheme is introduced to connect the bare numeral to the rest. I report here the
analysis of Rett (2008, p. 42):
(1.73) 5
manyd









D is the characterizing function of a set of degrees. l is a function that returns the
measure of such a set.18 Note that “many” raises leaving a trace td. This ensures
that the many refers to the cats that sleep, rather than just to the cats. The meaning
of the whole sentence can be obtained compositionally:
1 = λd.λQ.∃x[cat(x) ∧Q(x) ∧ µ(x) = d]
2 = λx.sleep(x)
3 = ∃x[cat(x) ∧ sleep(x) ∧ µ(x) = d]
4 = λd.∃x[cat(x) ∧ sleep(x) ∧ µ(x) = d]
5 = λd′.l (λd.∃x[cat(x) ∧ sleep(x) ∧ µ(x) = d]) = d′ ∧ d′ > s
17While in M-OP the two predicated P and Q combine with predicate modification in the style of
Heim and Kratzer (1998), they are distinct arguments in QUANTITY. Moreover, even though both
M-OP and QUANTITY require existential closure over degrees at the sentential level, QUANTITY
also explicitly encodes existential quantification over objects.
18l is different from µ exactly in that the argument of the former is a set of degrees and the
argument of the latter is an individual. l returns the greatest among the degrees that verify its
argument.
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Finally, existentially close the remaining variables:
= ∃d′ [l (λd.∃x[cat(x) ∧ sleep(x) ∧ µ(x) = d]) = d′ ∧ d′ > s]
When its argument is a set, µ returns the cardinality of the set. Since any subset of
a set of sleeping cats is also a set of sleeping cats, node 4 is verified for any number
from 1 to the maximal number of sleeping cats. The function l will return that
maximum number. The respective account with M-OP is worked out in details in
Rett (2014).
Note that QUANTITY alone does not imply the monotonicity of the quantity
words. It is easy to imagine a lexical entry similar to that of “many” that does not
require the output of l to be greater than a contextually determined degree, but
rather e.g. between two degrees. One would then obtain a non-monotonic category
without changing QUANTITY. In Rett’s analysis, monotonicity follows from the
lexical entry of “many” in a way parallel to the adjectival case. The reason why
“many” implies monotonicity is that if the maximal degree d1 of a set of degrees D1
is greater than the standard s, then any d2 > d1 is also greater than s. The fact that
monotonicity is not implied by QUANTITY is important for the present purposes,
because if monotonicity followed from the way degrees themselves are encoded there
would be an explanation for monotonicity that only appeals to semantics. Such an
explanation would make the evolutionary approach less appealing.
The extremeness universal for generalized quantifiers
The totally ordered set of proportions has an infimum, 0, and a supremum, 1. Given
the generalization from the discussion on gradable adjectives, we should expect cat-
egories defined on that scale to have their transitions at the infimum and supremum.
However, many quantifiers do not. For instance, “most”, “many”, “few”, “several”,
“numerous” all have non-extreme transitions.
A possible reason why quantifiers express non-extreme categories is the need to
be accurate when communicating about quantities. There are only four extreme
monotonic categories on any given totally bounded scale, namely
1. A true transition from true to false at the infimum (corresponding to “none”).
2. A true transition from false to true at the supremum (corresponding to “all”).
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3. A false transition from false to true at the infimum (corresponding to “some”).
4. A false transition from true to false at the supremum (corresponding to the
morphologically non-simple “not all”).
Since there are more than four proportional quantifiers, at least some have to be
non-extreme. In the case of numerical quantifiers, only types 1 and 3 are possible
because the set of integers N does not have a supremum. Since there are more than
two numerical quantifiers, not all of them can express extreme categories.
It is worth noticing that the quantifiers that do express extreme categories,
namely the Aristotelian quantifiers “all”, “some”, and “no”, are remarkable in several
respects. Experimental evidence shows that participants verify Aristotelian quanti-
fiers faster than other quantifiers (Szymanik & Zajenkowski, 2009). Moreover, they
are used more often than other types of quantifiers (Szymanik & Thorne, 2017).
While many quantifiers express non-extreme categories, the ones that do seem to
play a special role.
1.2.3 Possible exceptions to monotonicity
In the previous sections, I presented standard formal analyses of gradable adjectives
and quantifiers. I have shown that all these analyses allowed the construction of
a natural order, and that they referred to monotonic categories on these orders.
Moreover, monotonicity is not implied by the semantics of these terms, but is rather
a semantic-external fact. At various points, we encountered and discussed various
exceptions to extremeness. I now discuss a few terms that are prima facie non-
monotonic. This will illuminate possible ways that monotonicity can fail, showing
that non-monotonic categories are possible and therefore that the commonness of
monotonic categories calls for an explanation.
The first apparent counterexample to monotonicity in the adjectival domain is
“chubby”. Prima facie, chubby means something like “above average weight, but
not fat”. The intuition is that chubby shares the same scale as “fat”, and refers
to a non-monotonic category on this scale. However, there are various indications
that “chubby” is not on the same scale as “thin” and “fat”. A first indication that
“chubby” is not on the same scale as “fat” comes from modification:
(1.74) Mary is slightly chubby.
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The modifier “slightly” indicates that “chubby” is a non-minimal adjective, and
therefore that the scale of chubbiness is half-open. Second, no amount of intensifica-
tion of “chubby” seem to force the conclusion that somebody is fat. I conclude that
the scale of chubbiness is not the same as the scale of fatness. Lastly, the fact that
“chubby” satisfies the following inference indicates that it is monotone:
(1.75) If Roberta is chubby, and Elizabeth is chubbier than Roberta, then
Elizabeth is chubby too.
“Lukewarm” is a particularly puzzling case. Clearly, “lukewarm” refers to an
interval on the scale of temperatures. However, it is not gradable:
(1.76) # The soup is slightly / very / completely / absolutely / somewhat
lukewarm.
There is an interpretation of “the soup is completely lukewarm” where every mere-
ological part of the soup is lukewarm, but this is not the intended temperature
interpretation. Moreover, “lukewarm” does not allow comparison:
(1.77) # The soup is more lukewarm than the curry.
Therefore, “lukewarm” does not seem to have a degree argument, despite its connec-
tion to the temperature scale. The fact that “lukewarm” is not gradable does not
imply that it should not be monotonic on the scale of temperature. I take gradability
to be a symptom of scalarity, but not a requirement. This is because the mechanisms
of gradation in natural language might require monotonicity, making my explana-
tion circular. I argue below for an account where monotonicity depends solely on
the structure of the conceptual domain. Therefore, the fact that “lukewarm” refers
to the scale of temperature should in itself suffice to make it monotonic.19 Whatever
the structure of “lukewarm”, the existence of non-monotonic scalar categories is com-
patible with the evolutionary model I develop in chapter 3. Indeed, I conclude that a
large enough pressure for communicative accuracy might cause non-monotonic terms
to evolve. Temperature is a good candidate for a common topic of communication
with high-stakes.20
19I return in the next section to the problem of differentiating between the semantic phenomenon
of scalarity and the grammatical phenomenon of gradability.
20See Koptjevskaja-Tamm (2015, p. 341) for a discussion of intermediate temperature adjectives
“tiepido” and “fresco” in Italian. Their behaviour is interestingly different from “lukewarm” in
that they can be graded.
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Categories on conceptual scalar domains are in some cases expressed by nouns.
For instance, consider nouns that refer to individual of different ages: “infant”,
“child”, “adolescent” (“teenager”), “adult”. These terms are all monotonic on the
scale of age except “adolescent”. Interestingly, “child” and “adult” are not etymolog-
ically related to gradable adjectives, showing that their monotonicity is not derived
from adjectival monotonicity. The same considerations apply to “adolescent” as for
intermediate gradable adjectives in the previous paragraph. While much more could
be said about the semantics of nouns in scalar conceptual domains as well as other
alleged instances of non-monotonicity, I leave a more detailed discussion to future
work for reason of space.
1.2.4 Conclusion: the role of formal semantics in the debate
In this section, I discussed the role that scales have to play in the semantics of two
word classes, as well as two universals of scalarity. It is commonly accepted that a
semantics of gradable adjectives requires the use of scales,21 and I showed that bare
uses of adjectives are monotonic on these scales in the sense defined above. The case
of quantifiers is slightly more complicated. I found that much discussed universals
of quantification imply that quantifiers refer to monotonic categories on the natural
(weak) total order imposed by cardinality, once a restrictor set is fixed. Going
beyond the universals of quantification to the more specific classes of proportional
and numerical quantifiers allowed me to define a sense in which quantifiers refer
to monotonic categories on scales that involve both arguments. The independently
motivated degree analysis of quantification confirmed this account.
Formal semantics has three roles to play in this work, which justified the extended
discussion in this section. First, some classes of words have been given an analysis
based on scales, pointing to the fact that the respective conceptual domains are
scalar. The relevance of this fact will become clear in the next chapter. Second, the
formal semantic accounts of gradable adjectives and quantifiers are based on a large
set of examples and linguistic data. Therefore, couching the proposed universals in
terms of independently motivated analyses in the semantics literature ensures that
the universals indeed apply when a large number of linguistic data is considered.
21See the discussion of Klein (1980) on page 40 for an attempt at developing a semantics of
gradable adjectives without scales, and how to make sense of the question about the evolution of
monotonicity within such a theory.
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The third role of formal semantics, which I briefly discussed above, is to show that
the explanation for the universals proposed are not internal to semantics. Suppose
that monotonicity and extremeness could be explained by some other, more general
semantic fact. Then, it might still be an empirical question why the more general
semantic fact holds, but there would be no need for an explanation of the universals
as such. In other words, formal semantics can show what the right explanandum is.
The semantic analysis was needed to show the naturalness of analysing the mean-
ings of the categories I discuss in scalar terms. However, the literature I discussed
in this section was not concerned with the causal mechanisms that lead to the con-
sidered universals. In the next section, I turn to the accounts of the evolution of
monotonicity and universals that have been proposed in the literature.
1.3 Previous work on the evolution of scalar uni-
versals
In the literature, there have been attempts to explain the linguistic patterns for
monotonicity and extremeness I pointed out above. In this chapter, I will review
and evaluate the most important of those. The aim for the literature presented in
this section is to find a mechanistic explanation of the two universals under discussion
across the different word classes I considered.
I start by considering previous work on the evolution of monotonic categories,
both in gradable adjectives and in quantifiers. Then, I move onto the evolution of
extremeness, which has been studied especially in the case of gradable adjectives.
I delineate some problems and gaps in the previous literature that motivate the
approach I take in the rest of the thesis.
1.3.1 The evolution of monotonicity
Gradable adjectives
Monotonicity in the sense I defined above is not discussed directly in the evolutionary
literature on gradable adjectives. However, discussions of similar phenomena suggest
some routes to explore. A first possible explanation of the evolution of monotonicity
is based on Kennedy (2007)’s Interpretive Economy principle:
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(1.78) (Interpretive Economy) Maximize the contribution of the conventional
meanings of the elements of a sentence to the computation of its truth
conditions.
This principle, to which I return again in the next section, is introduced to explain
data in a discussion related to the position of the comparison standard. Intuitively,
it says that the computation of truth conditions tends to stick to conventional as-
pects of the involved meanings, avoiding when possible non-conventional, context
sensitive factors. Since comparison standards can be context-sensitive, each addi-
tional transition increases the amount of sensitivity to the context. Therefore, the
principle predicts a tendency to minimize the number of transitions. Assuming that
one standard is the minimum possible number of standards, the principle predicts
monotonicity.
The main issue of this principle in an evolutionary context is mentioned in Potts
(2008): “It is an optimization principle left unsupported by a theory of optimization”.
In other words, Kennedy does not propose a mechanism through which context-
sensitivity would be avoided in language. Without such a mechanism, Interpretive
Economy is not an evolutionary explanation for monotonicity. A second, more sub-
stantial issue with explaining monotonicity using the Interpretive Economy principle
is the possibility of non-monotonic gradable adjectives that are not context-sensitive.
The Interpretive Economy principle cannot account for the absence of such adjec-
tives, since they do not introduce additional context sensitivity. I constructed an
adjective with this behaviour in section 1.2. It might be possible to refine the prin-
ciple and use it to explain monotonicity, but in chapter 3 I take a different more
promising direction, and argue that monotonicity is the result of optimization of
semantic structure to the requirements imposed by various pressure, but I will give
an explicit mechanism through which this optimization happens.
Quantifiers
A possible evolutionary account of quantificational monotonicity is based on the
idea that reasoning patterns are simpler with monotonic concepts. Therefore, mono-
tonic concepts would have been preferred in the evolution of conceptual structure.
Geurts and Van Der Slik (2005) argue that the psychological complexity of infer-
ences is lower with monotonic than non-monotonic quantifiers, which is particularly
important as the meaning of quantifiers are in general complex: “a system for pro-
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ducing monotonicity inferences can be very simple, because it requires only a shallow
understanding of the representations it operates on”. This direction of research is
promising, since it makes clear empirical predictions and delivers a clear picture
of the connection between semantics and cognition. However, it is unclear through
which mechanism the role that quantifiers have in the cognitive complexity of specific
inferences would influence the meaning of quantifiers at the language level. More-
over, the literature has mostly attempted to compare the complexity of upward and
downward monotonic quantifiers, rather than monotonic and non-monotonic quan-
tifiers. See Szymanik (2016, p. 38) for a review of processing-based explanations for
monotonicity in the semantics of quantifiers.
As I mentioned above, learning is an important pressure acting on language
evolution. Learnability-based explanations have been developed for quantificational
monotonicity. Steinert-Threlkeld and Szymanik (2020) and Steinert-Threlkeld and
Szymanik (2019) use neural networks as a model of learning, and show that learning
monotonic quantifiers is easier than learning non-monotone quantifiers. They infer
that ease of learning is a plausible explanation for why natural language quantifiers
are monotonic. One component missing from this explanation is the evolutionary
component, namely a story of how individual-level ease of learning explains the
development of monotonicity at the language level. I return to this approach again
below in chapter 7, which attempts to partially fill this gap in the literature.
The project of explaining universals of quantification in terms of learnability is
developed in a different direction in van de Pol, Steinert-Threlkeld, and Szymanik
(2019). The authors use the tool of (approximate) Kolmogorov complexity (Chater &
Vitányi, 2003) to compare monotonic and non-monotonic quantifiers. Often, a string
can be described in a way shorter than the string itself, by exploiting patterns in the
string. Kolmogorov complexity is a measure of the shortest description of a sequence
of symbols, which is uncomputable but can be approximated. van de Pol et al. found
that monotonic quantifiers are robustly less complex than non-monotone quantifiers.
This is a valuable result in the context of the present work, as it provides evidence
that the right explanation for the universal of monotonicity lies in the simplicity of
monotonic quantifiers. However, the relation with the conceptual spaces approach
that I will develop in the next chapter is, for the moment, unclear. In particular, the
result in van de Pol et al. (2019) cannot readily be applied to the monotonicity of
gradable adjectives. An extension of the work on Kolmogorov complexity to other
lexical classes constitutes a promising research avenue.
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Magri (2015) presents a similar attempt to derive monotonicity from learnability
in the PAC (Probably Approximately Correct) learnability framework. The result
is that while other universals of quantification help with learnability, monotonicity
does not. Note that PAC learnability is not concerned with the simplicity of a
representation, but rather with the possibility of constructing an accurate classifier
from observed data. Therefore, this result further supports the hypothesis that a
simplicity bias is needed to explain the evolution of monotonicity.
Another relevant attempt at modelling the acquisition of the meaning of quan-
tifiers is Piantadosi, Tenenbaum, and Goodman (2012) (expanded in Piantadosi,
Tenenbaum, and Goodman (2016)). The authors model a rational Bayesian learner,
who observes the cardinalities of the relevant sets along with quantifiers produced
by a noisy adult speaker. The set of possible meanings is defined in terms of a lan-
guage of thought (LOT), consisting of a probabilistic context-free grammar whose
words are sets along with logical and quantitative relations. The model encodes an
important bias for meanings that are encoded with shorter LOT expressions. The
modelled learners are capable of acquiring the correct meaning for many quantifiers
with just a few hundred to a few thousands observations. This is remarkable as it
is comparable to the amount of data based on which a child learns the meaning of
quantifiers. A further advantage of this model is that it deals with presuppositions,
which I have not explicitly discussed.
Piantadosi et al. (2012) does not explicitly discuss monotonicity or extremeness,
but its basic approach is very different from the approach taken in this thesis. The
difference in approach—language of thought (LOT) vs conceptual spaces theory—
would make a systematic comparison of the approaches difficult. Moreover, I will not
give an explicit model of learning until a later chapter. I limit the discussion of this
paper to a few considerations. First of all, the choice of basic rules for the language
of thought in which meanings are encoded is somewhat arbitrary, and allows the
encoding of meanings that are implausible to be considered by learners. Secondly,
in the account proposed in this thesis the meanings of “few” and “many” are de-
rived naturally as context-sensitive transitions on the scale of proportions, which are
independently needed for gradable adjectives but would not be straightforward to
implement in a LOT approach (see chapter 2). Thirdly, unless transitions are en-
coded in the LOT, the connection between monotonicity in quantifiers and gradable
adjectives becomes more mysterious than it is in my model. Lastly, in chapter 2
I present a picture of scalar meanings as transition-based categories on an ordered
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conceptual domain. This picture significantly restricts the set of possible quantifiers
compared to the quantifiers that can be encoded in a LOT approach, making the
learning task as easy as finding the appropriate scale and setting the right number
and position of transitions. Whether the picture for which I will argue below is too
restrictive in the set of possible quantifiers is an important question which however
needs to be investigated empirically.
Chemla, Buccola, and Dautriche (2019) presents a picture of the relation between
the property of connectedness (which they name connectedness) and monotonicity
that is connected in interesting ways to the analysis presented above. While in the
next chapter I will emphasize the differences between monotonicity and convexity,
Chemla et al. (2019) emphasize their similarities. More specifically, they notice the
following important relation between monotonicity and convexity:
Theorem 1. A quantifier is monotone iff it is connected and its negation is con-
nected.
An alternative explanation for monotonicity consists in introducing, beyond the usual
reasons for convexity, a pressure that pushes negated categories to also be convex.
In their words,
monotonicity is the minimal property that ensures both connectedness
and stability of connectedness under negation. [ . . . ] Therefore, if there
were pressures for meanings obtained compositionally (from conjunction
and negation) to be connected, then we might expect ‘primitive’ expres-
sions to generally be monotone.
The pressure for meanings obtained compositionally to be simple is an exciting di-
rection of research in evolutionary linguistics. However, Chemla et al. (2019) do not
propose an explicit, mechanistic model of how this pressure should act on language.
My picture differs from Chemla et al. (2019)’s in a few respects. First of all,
while Chemla et al. (2019) do not discuss an explicit theory of categorization, I
claim that monotonicity and convexity arise in response to two different categoriza-
tion strategies, namely prototype-based and transition-based strategies (see chapter
2). I argue below in section 2.1.4 that it is difficult for a unified categorization strat-
egy to account for both monotonicity and convexity. A second difference is that
while Chemla et al. (2019) focus on the distinction between content words and func-
tion words, I focus on the distinction between ordered and non-ordered conceptual
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domains. These two distinction are different, as ordered conceptual domains can be
found both among content words (gradable adjectives) and function words (quanti-
fiers). My distinction does a better job of carving out the places where monotonicity,
as opposed to merely convexity, appears. Until a more explicit evolutionary account
of the pressure acting on language to make negated meanings simple is proposed,
a direct comparison of the present theory with the one in Chemla et al. (2019) is
difficult.
In addition to the theoretical component presented above, Chemla et al. (2019)
offer experimental evidence that monotonic quantifiers are indeed more learnable. In
an experiment, they show participants a series of screens, each showing 5 coloured
circles, and they ask participants to judge whether the shown screen is consistent
with a rule. The task consists of a two-option forced choice with immediate feedback.
The rules are defined in terms of the number of red circles in the screen. Each rule
is true for some number of red circles and false for other numbers, and therefore
expresses a quantifier of the type “Q circles are red”. Participants are tested on
three types of quantifiers in three conditions respectively:
Condition Rules “Transitions”
Monotonic a. 0, 1, or 2 red circles 2-3
b. 3, 4, or 5 red circles 2-3
Merely connected c. 1, 2, or 3 red circles 0-1, 3-4
d. 2, 3, or 4 red circles 1-2, 3-4
Non-connected e. 0, 1, or 5 red circles 1-2, 4-5
f. 0, 4, or 5 red circles 0-1, 3-4
g. 1, 2, or 4 red circles 0-1, 2-3, 3-4
The results were only partially supportive of the hypothesis. Monotonic quanti-
fiers were on average learned the fastest, followed by connected, and finally by non-
connected quantifiers. However, only the difference between monotonic and non-
connected quantifiers was significant. Within the non-connected rules, (e) and (f)
were learned at a similar speed as the merely connected ones, while rule (g) took
longer. Chemla et al. (2019) interpret this result by analysing the connectedness of
the rule’s negation. However, these results are also predicted by the transition-based
picture, as shown in the table; the higher the number of transitions needed to encode
the meaning, the harder to learn the rule. Which of the two interpretations is closer
to the cognitive reality could be investigated in future empirical work.
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Brochhagen, Franke, and van Rooij (2018) develop a model of the evolution
of monotonicity based on a combination of Iterated Learning and a communicative
pressure with RSA agents. Given the similarities between this model and the models
I develop below, I delay discussion of this paper until after presenting the models in
chapter 3.
In this section, I have discussed previous literature on the evolution of mono-
tonicity. The literature on monotonicity for gradable adjectives is scarce, whereas
different proposals have been made for quantificational monotonicity. Most previ-
ous proposals to explain the evolution of monotonicity lack a mechanism to connect
the level of the individual agent and the level of linguistic structure. The model
presented in chapter 3 will address this issue.
1.3.2 The evolution of extremeness
In this section, I discuss previous literature on the evolution of extreme categories.
Nearly all the literature on the evolution of extremeness concerns gradable adjectives.
The first evolutionary account I consider we encountered already, namely Kennedy’s
Interpretive Economy principle (statement 1.78 above). The picture explains why
standard selected extreme degrees when bounds are available in terms of two mech-
anisms.22 First, standard selects a natural transition, i.e. a transition that stands
out. In the case of open domains, statistical properties of the comparison population
provide a transition that stands out. In the case of domains with some boundary,
the boundary also provides such a natural transition. According to Kennedy (2007),
this first part of the picture is insufficient to explain all the data, since in bounded
scales there are two natural transitions: the ones provided by statistical properties
of the comparison population, and the boundaries. Therefore, we should expect ad-
jectives on bounded scales to be absolute and relative with roughly equal frequency,
contrary to the observation that they are in fact mostly absolute. The second part
of the picture evokes the Interpretive Economy principle to fix this hiatus between
data and theory. Since the comparison population is context-dependent while the
domain’s boundary is not, the latter minimizes the contribution of the context to
the computation of the truth-conditions. This explains why gradable adjectives on
bounded domains tend to be absolute.
22For a review on the standard function and how it contributes compositionally to the meaning
of adjectives in their bare uses, see section 1.1.1.
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Kennedy’s picture explains the data relating to gradable adjectives extremely
well. It is capable of explaining why extremeness is a tendency rather than a strict
universal, as well as accounting for much of the behaviour of gradable adjectives
described in Kennedy (2007). However, as mentioned in the discussion of evolution of
monotonicity, it does not provide a mechanistic evolutionary account and is therefore
unsatisfactory in this context. Even though the correct evolutionary account of
extremeness might involve something like the Interpretive Economy principle, it will
do so in the context of a causal explanation. Moreover, Kennedy’s theory cannot
directly explain the tendency towards extremeness for categories whose transition’s
position is not context-dependent, such as quantifiers.
Potts (2008) is an attempt to couch the Interpretive Economy principle within
a theory of optimization. In Potts’ words, the aim is to “show that Interpretive
Economy follows from basic assumptions about cognitive prominence and evolution-
ary stability”. Potts notices that what Kennedy’s explanation lacks is an account of
why boundaries are cognitively salient and evolutionarily stable. Cognitive saliency
is analysed in terms of Schelling points, i.e. points in a state space that are salient in
the common ground: They are salient for me, I know that they are salient for you, I
know that you know that they are salient for me, etc. The boundaries of a scale are
Schelling points. Saliency alone is however not enough to explain the extremeness
of absolute adjectives, as other points on the scale can be more salient in specific
contexts. To explain the stability of boundary-transitions across many situations,
Potts argues that boundaries are fixed because they become a convention. The evo-
lution of the convention is shown by Potts within the framework of evolutionary
game theory. The crucial result is informally that a population of speakers that is
establishing a convention will eventually converge to boundary transitions—i.e. the
Schelling points. In sum, Potts’ picture identifies the root of extremeness in the ten-
dency for conventions to stabilize on points that are salient in the common ground,
given the fact that boundaries are particularly salient points.
Franke (2012a) and Franke (2012b) criticise Potts’ explanation on two grounds.
The first is that according to Franke an explanation of extremeness ought to account
not only for the boundary position of transitions on closed scales, but also for the
extremeness23 and sensitivity to context of transitions on open scales. For instance,
although the transition for “tall” is not on a boundary—since the scale of height
23In this paragraph, the word “extreme” is used in its everyday meaning rather than the technical
meaning introduced above.
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is unbounded—it is on a point that is extreme with respect to tallness compared
to e.g. average height. Potts’ explanation does not straightforwardly account for
the extremeness of open scales, since there are no stable Schelling points on open
scales. Moreover, without a Schelling point Potts’ account predicts that transitions
should be fixed to a context-independent value, contradicting the context-sensitivity
of relative adjectives.
The second of Franke’s criticisms to Potts’ picture is that it fails to confront a
prima facie problematic fact about extreme categories, namely their low utility for
communication. Under the simple picture of communication which I will discuss in
more detail in section 3.1, a communicative event is successful iff the state o observed
by the sender is identical to the state g guessed by the receiver. This simple picture
cannot be retained when dealing with continuous spaces. If the signal conveys a
single point, the sender will never have a chance to use it; on the other hand, if the
signal conveys a region of the space, the receiver will never guess exactly the right
observation. An alternative picture quantifies success as the similarity between o and
g. This way of measuring communicative success is more apt for continuous state
spaces, because it allows the receiver to be more or less successful even when not
guessing o exactly. This more realistic model of communication however introduces
a problem for Potts’ account. Namely, extreme meanings are guaranteed to perform
communicatively very poorly.
Franke argues that communication with gradable adjectives serves different pur-
poses, and that in important cases communicative success does not depend directly
on the similarity of o and g. More specifically, Franke draws a distinction between
referential and descriptive language use. To understand the distinction, consider
the following cases. You are describing your favourite toothbrush that is in your
bathroom, and you say it is “green”. Based on this, I can form an accurate picture
of the color of this toothbrush. This is a case of descriptive language use, as the
aim for the receiver is to construct a representation that matches reality as closely
as possible. In particular, notice that the success of this communicative interaction
does not depend on whether e.g. there are other toothbrushes in your bathroom that
resemble the one you described. On the other hand, consider a case where I am in
your bathroom and I have to pick one of the toothbrushes to use. Only one of them
is new, and you described it as being green. The aim is not to form an accurate rep-
resentation anymore—even though forming an accurate representation might help
in the task—but rather to pick a specific one of the toothbrushes. This is a case of
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referential language use, where the receiver tries to identify one object from a set of
possible objects based on information about the intended object’s properties coming
from the sender. In referential language use, the population of alternative picks for
the receiver matters for communicative success. Even if I pick a toothbrush that is
exactly the same color as the one you meant to describe, the communication would
be a failure if there are two green toothbrushes in your bathroom and I happen to
pick the used one.
Franke proposes that we should consider the evolution of extreme meanings in
gradable adjectives in the context of referential, rather than descriptive, language
use. A pressure on language to be communicatively accurate would then push for lan-
guages that allow its users to succeed in tasks like the new-toothbrush-identification
task described above. To model referential communication, Franke formalizes the
situation as follows. A referential game consists of a sender s, a receiver r, and a
context c = 〈o1, . . . , on〉 consisting of n objects. Sender s wants to have r pick a
specific object oi. Each object is associated with a vector of m features ∈ Rm. Each
feature is distributed in a way that encodes whether it corresponds to a property
that is open, bounded, or half-bounded:
Scale Distribution density
Open Normal (µ = 0, σ = 1/3)
Bounded Uniform (in [0, 1] interval)
Half-bounded Truncated Normal (µ = 0.1, σ = 1/3)
The whole information can be modelled as an n × m matrix, whose j, k element
represents the degree to which object oj has feature k. The game is structured as
follows. First, oi is selected. Then, s picks a signal that conveys information about
the features of oi and sends the signal to r. Finally, r picks an object from c based
on the information contained in the signal. If r picks oi, then the communication is
successful, otherwise it is not.
In the referential game described by Franke, there are 2m many signals, i.e. two
signals for each feature. Each signal conveys two distinct elements of information,
namely (1) which property s intends to single out, and (2) whether oi has the property
to a high or low degree. For instance, if one of the features is height, there would
be one signal that conveys that oi has a greater than average height, and a signal
conveying that oi has lower than average height.
Franke (2012a) proposes a specific strategy that senders and receivers might be
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implementing in communication. Namely, senders pick the signal associated with
the property that is most salient among the ones in the intended object. Receivers
choose the object that has the signalled property to the most salient degree. In
formal terms, sender and receiver behave as follows. First, s selects the most salient
property j∗ among the properties of oi. Franke proposes a way to measure the
saliency of an object with respect to a property based on the difference between the
object and all other objects in the context with respect to that property. Then, s
selects the signal conveying that oi has property j∗ to a high or low degree, depending
on the real value of oi with respect to j∗. After receiving the signal, r selects the
object that is most salient with respect to j∗ among the objects compatible with
the signal, i.e. the object that have a high or a low degree of the property. The
focus here is not on how language users arrive at this strategy, but rather on the
fact that it is a simple, plausible communicative strategy that leads to on average
very successful communication. I implemented the model based on the description
in Franke (2012a) and Franke (2012b). Results are shown in figures 1.3 and 1.4.24
The model presented by Franke has a number of advantages. However, there are
issues with it that lead me to ultimately reject it as an evolutionary explanation
of adjectival extremeness. First of all, the space of possible strategies that the
language users consider for referential communication is not defined. Rather, a
specific strategy is hand-coded. While the picked strategy is a plausible one, a
causal, mechanistic evolutionary model needs to simulate how the strategy is picked
and spreads. Rather than showing how the strategy evolved, Franke’s model shows
that a salience-based strategy is a good compromise between communicative success
and simplicity.
Second, there are reasons to think that the strategy described by Franke is not
the one underlying the meaning of gradable adjectives. Franke’s model makes the
wrong prediction for minimum-standard adjectives, which have a transition at the
scale’s infimum. Specifically, Franke’s model predicts a transition above the mean
of the property’s distribution (see bottom plot in figure 1.4). This contradicts the
fact that e.g. “wet” does not refer to a (soft) extreme with respect to wetness (i.e.
”very wet”), but rather the threshold is at an extreme of dryness. This indicates
that, consistently with Potts (2008), there is something special about boundaries
that is not explained in terms of communicative utility. I return to this point again
24Code for this and the following reimplementations is available at (Carcassi, 2020).
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Figure 1.3: Reimplementation of the results from Franke (2012a). The plot shows the
proportion of successful communications for various combinations of context size and
number of properties for each object. Communication is on average more successful
when there are fewer objects and more properties to choose from.
in chapter 6. Franke’s model shows a related problem in closed scales. Even if the
degree expressed by a signal on a closed scale can get very close to the extremes,
it will never refer to a truly extreme degree in the way I defined above. This is
because the signals are used for property degrees that are actually instantiated in
the context, rather than having a fixed meaning. Since extreme values are never
instantiated, they will never be used in Franke’s model.25 It is important to not
misunderstand the problem here. The problem is not that signals in the model are
never used for extreme values—since extreme values are arguably never observed in
the real world, the model should also not rely on observations of extreme values.
25Zhao and Cremers (n.d.) argue that in some contexts there might be non-zero probability mass
on a scale extreme. I return to this point below and argue against this solution.
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Figure 1.4: Reproduction of results from Franke (2012a). Degrees referred to by the
signals on open (top), closed (middle), and half-closed (bottom) scales. The green
lines show the distribution densities of the properties on the scale type.
Rather, the problem is that since extreme values are never observed in the world
but some signals with extreme meaning are used for non-extreme degrees, usage and
semantics have to be kept separate in an evolutionary model of extremeness.
A third problem with Franke’s model is the assumption that the greatest com-
municative pressure for the transition’s position comes from referential use. This
is a problem because it is difficult to estimate the proportion of referential and de-
scriptive communication in real language, and therefore difficult to evaluate this
assumption of the model. More in general, it is unclear what referential language
use for quantifiers would consist of, indicating that descriptive language use suffices
for the evolution of extremeness.
Lassiter and Goodman (2013) approach the problem of the origins of extremeness
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Figure 1.5: Reimplementation of results from Lassiter and Goodman (2013). The
plot shows the pragmatic receiver’s posterior density for (1) the threshold position
and (2) the degree observed by the sender, after receiving “tall” (right plot) and
“dangerous” (left plot). The model correctly predicts that “tall” conveys approxi-
mately “significantly above average height”.
from a different prospective.26 Rather than investigating the communicative success
of various threshold positions in a population, they assume that all that adjectives
encode lexically is polarity. The distribution of the property in the comparison
population determines whether the scale counts as open, closed, or half-closed. A
rational receiver, after receiving a signal such as “tall”, calculates a joint distribution
over (1) the degree observed by the sender and (2) the threshold’s position. The
distribution over thresholds and over degrees can then be obtained by marginalizing
the joint posterior. The model is implemented in the Rational Speech Act (RSA)
framework, which will be explained in more detail below. A reproduction of some of
the results from Lassiter and Goodman (2013) is shown in figure 1.5.
26While Lassiter and Goodman (2015) is closely related to Lassiter and Goodman (2013), it does
not focus on the distinction between absolute and relative adjectives, and therefore I do not discuss
it further.
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I do not discuss the model in detail in the interest of space. Qing and Franke
(2014a) discuss the advantages and flaws of Lassiter and Goodman (2013)’s model
in detail. I only remark briefly on features of the model that are relevant here.
Lassiter and Goodman (2013) assume that the threshold’s position is not encoded
in the lexical entry for the term, but rather its distribution is calculated, along
with the distribution over degrees, as part of pragmatic inference. The view that
threshold position is not encoded lexically, while debated in the literature on gradable
adjectives, is much less plausible in the context of explaining the extremeness of
quantifiers. I instead will assume that extremeness is lexically encoded, making a
unified explanation for the tendency towards extremeness easier.27
A second problem is that Lassiter and Goodman (2013)’s model is missing, like
Franke (2012a)’s model, a separation between semantics and usage. I argued above
that this difference is necessary to make sense of how extreme meanings can be
used for non-extreme observations. The conflation is not problematic for Lassiter
and Goodman (2013), because they reject the assumption that absolute gradable
adjectives express extreme categories. Rather, they work under the assumption that
absolute adjectives’ thresholds are vague, but tend to be close to the scale’s extrema.
As pictured in figure 1.5, Lassiter and Goodman (2013) predicts that the thresholds
for half-bounded scales are not extreme, although they tend towards extreme values
of the scale.
Qing and Franke (2014a) improves in various respects on Lassiter and Goodman
(2013)’s model. Qing and Franke (2014a) do not assume that the threshold’s po-
sition is determined by pragmatic inference. Rather, they rely on the evolutionary
perspective that language is optimized for communication. Therefore, they assume
that senders employ a threshold that tends to maximise long-term communicative
success. The model defines the probability density over position of the transition
that the sender will use. Like in the previous models, the language users’ behaviour
is influenced by the distribution of the property in the comparison population. The
case of properties with substantial probability mass around the extremes, which is
taken to correspond to bounded (or half-bounded) scales, is particularly interesting.
Here, Qing and Franke (2014a) predict that, given enough probability mass at the
border, the probability density function increases monotonically as it gets closer to
27I do not show that extremeness is encoded lexically, but rather assume it. The point here is that
an account of extremeness that does not assume it has to also provide a story for how extremeness
evolves in quantifiers.
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Figure 1.6: Reimplementation of results from Qing and Franke (2014). The left plot
shows the probability of the speaker using thresholds Θ for positive (Θ+) and negative
(Θ−) adjectives, for various production costs (c). The property is distributed as a
beta distribution with α = 3, β = 7. The right plot shows density of threshold
position for various distributions of the property. When the beta distribution has
more mass concentrated towards the lower extreme (α→ 0), the probability density
for the thresholds is also concentrated at the bottom.
the border (see right plot of figure 1.6).
Despite the improvement over previous models, Qing and Franke (2014a)’s model
is somewhat unsatisfactory if one assumes, as I do in this thesis, that absolute adjec-
tives express truly extreme categories. This point is argued in more detail in Zhao
(2019). As I mentioned above, the proposed picture is that senders sample a transi-
tion from the distribution in usage. However, since the density puts no probability
mass on the extrema of the scale, a truly extreme transition will never be used.
This makes sense in the picture of Qing and Franke (2014a), because an extreme
transition would lead to low expected communicative success; the resulting language
would be equivalent to a language without the adjective. This result is satisfactory
in two cases. First, if one works under the assumption that absolute adjectives do
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not express truly extreme categories in the sense defined above. Second, despite
assuming that absolute categories’ transitions are extreme, one might rather be in-
terested in the transition’s position insofar it explains usage. We have seen above
that since extreme values are never observed, some pragmatic adjustment have to
be made for extreme categories to be used. Leffel, Xiang, and Kennedy (2017) and
Aparicio, Xiang, and Kennedy (2016) elaborate on the difference between the se-
mantic view of gradable adjectives in Qing and Franke (2014a) and Lassiter and
Goodman (2013). A related indication of Qing and Franke (2014a)’s problem with
absolute adjectives comes from the experimental data in Qing and Franke (2014b).
Model fitting shows that the participants’ categorization behaviour when using ab-
solute adjectives is more extreme than predicted by the model. Qing and Franke
(2014a) note that the probability of the transition’s position is maximised at the
extremes of the scale for a wide variety of property’s distributions that put some
mass at the extreme. However, it is unclear how this feature of the model predicts
extreme, crisp transitions, rather than almost extreme, vague ones.
Zhao and Cremers (n.d.) propose a model that is designed to deal with extreme-
ness. This model makes three innovations compared to the models presented above.
First, the model is extended to account for complex expressions, i.e. adjectives mod-
ified by “very”. I will not discuss this innovation of the model as it is not relevant for
the present purposes. The second innovation of the paper is that the sender selects
a threshold optimally for any given distribution of the property in the comparison
population. However, the sender is uncertain about what this distribution is. This is
modelled through a hyperprior, i.e. a prior on the parameters of the property’s dis-
tribution. In sum, albeit the sender selects a threshold optimally, uncertainty about
the property’s distribution in the comparison population defines a distribution over
optimal thresholds.
The third innovation of Zhao and Cremers (n.d.) is to use a prior over the property
that is not absolutely continuous, but rather attributes non-zero probability mass to
the infimum of the scale. This is modelled as a rectified Gaussian distribution, which
concentrates the probability mass of negative degrees on 0. The intuition behind this
choice comes from the absolute adjective “late”. Intuitively, the adjective “late” is
defined on the [0,∞] portion of the time domain, where 0 corresponds to the present.
Since “late” is a minimum-standard adjective, any time that is non-minimal counts
as late. However, any arrival before the present is counted as belonging to time 0
for the purposes of “late”. The rectified Gaussian distribution models this situation
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well.
The strategy of using a mixture of a continuous distribution and a constant
in Zhao and Cremers (n.d.) assumes that the adjective’s scale is a subscale of a
larger scale, and that a portion of the latter is mapped onto a single point of the
former. While not many scales can be described in this way, the strategy works for
some adjectives. For instance, some processes that over time monotonically move an
object in a specific direction of a closed scale can ensure the existence of extrema;
since the processes that empty and dry objects can render objects completely empty
and dry, there is a non-zero probability of encountering true infima of the scales of
wetness and fullness. However, it is hard to see how this strategy can be applied
in general. The problem is apparent with scales such that the available processes
to change the degree do not easily lead to an extreme. For instance, the process of
filling a container will always leave some space, e.g. the space between the molecules
of the liquid, that prevents a container from ever being, in its most literal sense, full.
Beyond these three main innovations and a few technical details, Zhao and Cre-
mers (n.d.)’s model of communication is the same as Qing and Franke (2014a).
Overall, Zhao and Cremers (n.d.) improves over previous models in that it proposes
a picture of how a truly extreme categories can be communicatively advantageous.
However, the picture only applies to some adjectives. A full picture should be able
to explain how it is possible for extreme categories to evolve, even when the scale’s
extreme has zero probability mass.
1.4 Conclusions and general plan
In this chapter, I discussed the linguistic data relating to monotonicity and extreme-
ness. A discussion of recent formal accounts of the meaning of these terms showed
that categories that fail to be monotonic and extreme are possible, ruling out a purely
semantic explanation of the universals. I also considered previous work on the evo-
lution of these two universals, and indicated various respects in which the previous
literature only gives a partial explanation of the data. In the case of monotonicity,
previous work did not develop an explicit evolutionary mechanism through which
monotonicity might have evolved. In the case of extremeness, previous work has
treated true extremeness unsatisfactorily, focusing rather on closeness to the border,
and moreover focused solely on linguistic adaptation for communication. In this the-
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sis, I analyse monotonicity and extremeness, and by taking their scalar properties
seriously I give a more complete account for both phenomena in an evolutionary
context. I test my ideas using computational modelling as well as experiments.
In chapter 2, I turn to conceptual spaces theory as a cognitive theory of the
meaning of scalar terms. I present various problems with the standard account of
categorization in conceptual spaces theory, and propose an alternative account of
categorization that solves them. My proposal includes an account of how scalar
meanings are encoded. While categories on highly-dimensional domains, expressed
by nouns, are encoded in terms of prototypes, a prototype-based analysis is im-
plausible for categories on one-dimensional domains, such as the ones expressed by
gradable adjectives and quantifiers. Instead, one-dimensional categories are encoded
in terms of transitions. The reason why this conclusion about encoding will be cru-
cial is that it will influence the measure of complexity for scalar categories, which as
discussed above is fundamental in modelling the evolution of language.
In chapter 3, I develop a model of the evolution of monotonicity for scalar cate-
gories. This model shows that neither a pressure for learnability nor a pressure for
simplicity alone can explain the evolution of monotonicity. Rather, a combination of
the two pressures is needed, in addition to the assumption that agents are pragmatic,
rather than literal, language users. Moreover, I model without additional assump-
tions the evolution of other features that characterize systems of scalar categories in
natural language, as presented in chapter 1.
In chapters 4 and 5, I turn to the account of learning of scalar categories that I
developed in chapter 2 and that was assumed for the models in chapter 3. Specifi-
cally, I attempt to test the prediction that monotonic categories have an advantage
in learning over non-monotonic categories for scalar conceptual domains, but not for
non-scalar domains. I test this hypothesis in a series of six experiments. I anal-
ysed some of the data with a hierarchical Bayesian model and a cognitive Bayesian
model. Much of the chapter focuses on the formulation of the learning model and
its implementation as a statistical model. The data did not support the hypothesis.
In chapter 6, the focus shifts to the universal of extremeness. I present a computa-
tional model showing that learning alone can contribute to the observed preference
for extreme categories. This model contributes to the literature in two respects.
First, I consider the contribution that learning might make to the evolution of ex-
tremeness. Second, I distinguish clearly between the semantic and pragmatic factors
at play in the use of scalar categories, which I argue was a problem in previous
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computational models of scalar extremeness.
Finally, in chapter 7, written in collaboration with Shane Steinert-Threlkeld and
Jakub Szymanik, I return to monotonicity in the specific case of quantifiers. I
show how monotonicity can emerge in a population of feedforward neural networks,




Scalar meaning in conceptual
spaces
In the first chapter, I focused on the universals of scalarity and monotonicity from the
point of view of formal semantics. Morphologically simple terms are monotonic and
when possible often extreme on the scales that are naturally associated with them.
However, a purely formal, truth-conditional treatment of scalarity is not sufficient
for the purposes of this thesis. The aim is to give a mechanistic account of the
evolution of scalar categories, which depends on how scalar categories are acquired
and encoded by the human cognitive system. Therefore, in this chapter I develop a
cognitively grounded theory of scalar meanings within the framework of conceptual
spaces.
This chapter is structured as follows. I start by introducing the framework of
conceptual spaces in section 2.1, and an account of how categorization happens in
conceptual spaces based on prototype theory. Then, Gärdenfors (2017)’s analysis of
gradable adjectives and quantifiers is presented. I argue that the prototype picture
does not work for scalar categories. Finally, in section 2.2 I propose a new account
of scalarity in the conceptual space framework, which solves the problems of the
prototype account and supports an appealing picture of categorization in scalar
conceptual spaces. I conclude that the proposed extension to conceptual spaces
theory is not sufficient on its own to explain the evolution of the two universals I
discussed in the previous section, namely monotonicity and extremeness. However,
the extension proposed in this chapter provides an important basis for the cognitive




Conceptual spaces theory is a theory of cognition with important applications to
semantics. The theory is cognitive because it concerns the way that humans encode
various features of the world, as well as providing a model of the concepts used to
talk about these features. The simplest features of the world that are encoded, i.e.
the fundamental dimensions with respect to which two objects can be different, are
called quality dimensions. Quality dimensions constitute one of the fundamental
building blocks of conceptual spaces theory. Examples of quality dimensions are
pitch, width, length, brightness, temperature, sweetness. Quality dimensions are
the fundamental features of the world that cognition keeps track of (Gärdenfors,
2011). Some quality dimensions are concrete, such as length, but others, such as
boringness, are abstract. A definitive list of quality dimensions in humans cannot
be given, because while many quality dimensions are plausibly innately determined
others are acquired culturally (Gärdenfors, 2011).
Quality dimensions are endowed with geometric structure. To see what this
means, consider as an example the domain of time (Gärdenfors, 2017, p. 22). It
is the underlying structure of the time domain that allow us to make comparisons
between time points. Time is isomorphic to R, the set of real numbers: the present
is the zero point, future is R+, the past is R−. Moreover, a time point can be twice
as far in the future as another time point, and similarly for the past. Crucially,
while these might not be features of physical time, they are an essential part of how
humans think about time. The idea of conceptual spaces theory is that geometrical
structure is not an exclusive feature of the temporal conceptual domain, but rather
is pervasive in human thinking.
Quality dimensions can stand in different relationships to each other. A group of
quality dimensions is integral iff whenever an object is given a value on one of them,
it must be given a value on all of them. For instance, brightness and saturation
are different quality dimensions, because their values are independent of each other
and they each have their own geometric structure. However, they are integral, be-
cause whenever the brightness of a surface is imagined, so is its saturation. Quality
dimensions that can be specified independently and are therefore not integral are
called separable. A domain is a set of integral dimensions that are separable from all
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other dimensions. As Gärdenfors (2017) notes, many domains, such as temperature,
consist of a single quality dimension. The temperature of an object can be imagined
independently of any other of its features.
I take quality dimensions as given, whether by fundamental feature of human
cognitive making or by acculturation. Once quality dimensions are given, a funda-
mental way that humans make use of them is in categorization. Gärdenfors (2017)
distinguishes between two types of categories, properties and concepts. A property
is a convex region of a single domain. An extension is convex iff for any two points
p1 and p2 that fall in the extension, if a point p3 is between p1 and p2 then p3 also
falls in the extension (See figure 2.2). An example of a property is blue, which is a
convex category in the domain of color. Blue is a convex property because any color
shade between two shades that belong to the “blue” category is itself blue. I return
to the problem of defining betweenness below, and rely on intuition for the moment.
While properties are restricted to individual domains, concepts are convex regions
on one or more domains. An example is the concept of banana, which includes infor-
mation across many domains such as color, size, and taste. Note that the definition
of concept assumes convexity, and therefore assumes that a relation of betweenness
is defined for all involved domains. To get an intuition for what convexity means
in the case of multidimensional concepts, consider the concept of chair. That the
concept of chair is convex means that all the objects that interpolate between two
chairs are also chairs. Technically, the conceptual space is the set of all domains.
However, I will talk about conceptual spaces laxly as any set of quality dimensions
and domains.
2.1.2 Convexity, prototypes, & Voronoi tessellations
Gärdenfors (2017) points out a relation between conceptual spaces and prototype
theory, originated from the work on categories by Eleanor Rosch and collaborators
(E. H. Rosch, 1973; E. Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976; E. Rosch
& Lloyd, 1978). Prototype theory starts with the observation that the classical theory
of concepts, which defines them in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, gets a
crucial feature of human way of thinking about concepts wrong. Namely, the classical
theory predicts that all objects that satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions
should count as equally valid instances of the concept. However, humans have a
strong intuition that some individuals are better examples of a category than others.
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Figure 2.1: Non-convexity is illustrated by the red line: although both extremes
belong to the category, some of the points in between fall outside it. For the convex
category on the right hand side, it is not possible to construct such a line. Instead,
all lines behave like the green line: if the endpoints are within the category, all points
will be too.
For instance, robins are better examples of the category of bird than penguins. In
some intuitively geometrical sense, robins can be thought of as occupying a more
central position in the category of birds than penguins. The most typical instance
of a category, which occupies the most central position in the category, is called
the category’s prototype. In prototype theory, as objects get more distant from the
prototype, they become worse examples of the category. Eventually, they stop being
part of the category and fall in another category.
Gärdenfors (2017) argues that there is a natural way how convexity, a fundamen-
tal property of categories in geometrical spaces theory which I introduced above,
might emerge from encoding categories in terms of prototypes. Suppose that we
start with a set of points P = {p1, . . . , pn} on the conceptual space. Then, we asso-
ciate every point pi in P with the set of points in the conceptual space that is closer
to pi than any of the other points in P . In this way, we define a set of categories, one
for each point in P .1 More specifically, this algorithm induces a Voronoi tessellation
on the conceptual space (Gärdenfors, 2004, chap. 3). Figure 2.2 shows an example
of a Voronoi tessellation with six prototypes. The points in P are the most central
points for their respective categories, and are therefore the categories’ prototypes.
An important feature of Voronoi tessellations is that, except for a set of points
of measure zero at the borders between categories, they contain no gaps, i.e. points
1There is a set of measure zero of points equidistant from two prototypes, under the assumption
that the conceptual space is dense. This complication will not be problematic for reasons related
to vagueness, which I discuss below.
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Figure 2.2: The left plot displays a Voronoi tessellation with six prototypes (points
p0−6). The lines indicate the borders between categories. Lines that continue in-
definitely are dashed. Voronoi tessellations produce convex categories. The green
line shows convexity—points between points that belong to a category also belong
to the category. In order for the line to contain points that belong to two different
categories, the line’s extremes have to belong to different categories (red line). The
right plot is a visualization of the precisification approach to account for vagueness
in Voronoi tessellations. The external prototypes (three blue dots) are fixed, while
different possible values of the central prototypes, and the relative tessellations, are
shown. The color of the precisified central prototypes (on a red color palette) shows
the closeness to the mean prototype. The green points indicate different levels of
vagueness. While point 1 belongs to different categories in different precisifications
and its category membership is vague, point 2 belongs to the same category in all
precisifications and therefore it is clear to which category it belongs.
of the space that do not belong to any category, and no gluts, i.e. points of the space
that belong to more than one category.2 There are no gaps because each point is
closest to at least one category, and there are no gluts because each point is closest
to at most one category. This characteristic of prototype-based categorization will
be crucial in showing that the classes of categories discussed in this thesis cannot be
based on prototypes.
2I borrow the terms gap and glut from many-valued logic, where they are used in a different
sense.
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While convexity only requires that betweenness is defined on the space, the con-
struction of Voronoi tessellations from prototypes requires a notion of distance.
Therefore, something more can be said about the geometrical structure of those
conceptual spaces where categories are defined in terms of prototypes. Distance
is formalized in terms of a metric function. Given a set X, a metric function
d : X × X → [0,∞) on X is a function that satisfies the following axioms for
all x, y, z ∈ X:
d(x, y) ≥ 0 Non-negativity (2.1)
d(x, y) = 0 ⇐⇒ x = y Identity of indiscernibles (2.2)
d(x, y) = d(y, x) Symmetry (2.3)
d(x, y) ≤ d(x, z) + d(z, y) Triangle inequality (2.4)
Since the metric function is meant to model the intuitive notion of distance, it is
worth checking that the axioms correspond to intuitive features of distances. Non-
negativity says that the distance between two points cannot be negative. The identity
of indiscernibles says that points at distance 0 are identical. Symmetry says that
distance between two points in one direction is the same as in the other direction.
Finally, the triangle inequality says that the distance between two points is smaller
than or equal to the sum of the distances of the two points to a third point. While a
weaker notion of distance than a metric might suffice for the present aims, Gärdenfors
(2017) assumes that the conceptual spaces underlying nouns have a metric structure.
Connecting conceptual spaces theory and prototype theory introduces some fur-
ther complications. An important distinction, introduced in Kamp (1995) and elabo-
rated e.g. in Hampton (2007) and Douven (2016), is that between degree of member-
ship M and typicality T . M measures how much an individual belongs to a category,
under the assumption argued for by prototype theory that category membership is
graded. Individuals that are closer to the prototypes belong more to the prototype’s
category than ones near the border to other categories. On the other hand, T mea-
sures how typical an individual is for a category. While it might be appealing to
identify them, M and T can come apart in important cases. For instance, consider
the concept of penguins. Penguins are atypical instances of the category of birds, and
therefore have a low value for T . However, they clearly belong to the category and
therefore have a high value for M . Conceptual spaces theory can account for cases
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where T and M come apart as follows. The further a point is from the prototype of
a category, the less typical a member of that category it is. For instance, penguins
are very far from the prototype of birds. On the other hand, as shown above the
membership in a category is also a function of the surrounding categories and the
resulting Voronoi tessellation. Therefore, an object can be a very untypical member
of the category, while still belonging to the category, as long as there are no other
categories close enough to “claim” the object.
The gradedness of M is needed to account for the fact that categories are vague.
The simple picture of Voronoi tessellations presented above cannot explain vagueness.
An account of vagueness in conceptual spaces is developed in Decock and Douven
(2014), which take the supervaluation approach already mentioned in the discussion
of scalar categories above. The rough idea is that each category is not associated
with a single prototype, but rather with multiple (and possibly infinitely many)
prototypes. The Voronoi tessellation obtained by choosing one of the prototypes of
each category is called a precisification. The complex tessellation that comprehends
all the possible precisification is called the collated Voronoi tessellation. The degree of
membership in a category is a function of the proportion of precisifications in which
the point falls in the category. If the point is close to the prototypes associated
with the category, it will have a high degree of membership to the category. This
is displayed in figure 2.2. This description does not answer the question of how the
set of prototypes for each category is determined. A promising option, explored
in Verheyen and Égré (2018), is that each category is associated with a probability
density that describes the distribution of its prototype. While I do not discuss further
how to account for vagueness in a picture of categorization based on prototypes, I
will return to the idea of precisification below when discussing the vagueness of scalar
categories.
Conceptual spaces theory as presented above is not without critics in the litera-
ture. Hernández-Conde (2017) argues that concepts expressed in natural language
are in fact not convex (but see Gärdenfors (2019) for a response). Gauker (2007)
develops a more general criticisms against similarity-based theories of concepts. I do
not discuss these criticisms any further, but rather refer to the literature.
It is important to note that prototype-based categorization trades off the high
simplicity of coding categories through prototypes and the requirement it puts on the
structure of the involved conceptual domains, i.e. metric structure. For comparison,
consider the alternative strategy of simply storing the individual points that belong
85
to each category. This simple listing strategy does not put any requirement on
the structure of the domain. However, it has disadvantages. Learning could not
generalize beyond the observed instances of the category, and it would put absurd
requirements on memory. On the other hand, prototype-based categorization, while
constrained to spaces with a metric structure, only requires learners to identify and
encode as many points as the number of categories. The fact that categorization
exploits the available structure to gain in efficiency is a point to which I return again
below, where I argue that conceptual spaces with a different structure afford other
categorization strategies.
2.1.3 Scalar language in conceptual spaces
According to Gärdenfors (2017), conceptual spaces theory can provide a cognitive
basis for distinguishing between classes of words. I sketch next the conceptual spaces
account of gradable adjectives and quantifiers presented in Gärdenfors (2017). Then,
I discuss a previous attempt to apply conceptual spaces to scalar language.
Gärdenfors (2017)’s account of adjectives, previously introduced in Gärdenfors
(2014), is based on the notion of property introduced above. Gärdenfors proposes
the single-domain thesis for adjectives, which says that adjectives express proper-
ties, i.e. convex regions on single domains, which themselves consist of one or more
integral quality dimensions. Gärdenfors expands his theory of adjectives in various
directions. Of particular interest for the present work is Gärdenfors’s conclusion that
the geometric and topological structure of the domain underlying an adjective has
grammatical consequences. This conclusion parallels Kennedy and McNally (2005)’s
conclusion about the effect of boundedness on extremeness presented in the previous
section. Gärdenfors’s own account is missing an account of how adjectives in general
are encoded, although the default seems to be prototype theory. I return to this
point in the next section and sketch a way to expand Gärdenfors’s account.
Gärdenfors (2017)’s analysis of quantification is based on the one in Langacker
(2003). Both authors distinguish between two types of quantifiers: proportional
quantifiers, which I have discussed above, and representative instance quantifiers.
According to Langacker, proportional quantifiers make reference to a maximal ex-
tension E of elements of the same type, i.e. the extension that includes all individuals
of that type. For instance, the maximal extension for the type of cats would consist
of all cats. E corresponds to the restrictor set. Langacker and Gärdenfors (2017)
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analyse proportional quantifiers as referring to a proportion of E. Up to this point,
Langacker’s analysis of quantifiers strongly resembles the scalar analysis proposed
above. Langacker however goes further by giving an cognitive embodied analysis of
how the comparison between the sets happens. The proposal is that proportional
quantifiers are based on the following everyday, bodily process:
• Looking for objects of a particular kind (the elements of the restrictor set, e.g.
cats).
• Putting the objects together (defining the restrictor set E, e.g. the set of cats).
• Perceiving an object as having a bounded spatial extension.
• Laying one object on top of another for purposes of comparison or measurement
(e.g. comparing the set of cats and the set of sleeping things).
Langacker claims that this forms the basis for the mental process involved in repre-
senting proportional quantification. However, Langacker does not explicitly acknowl-
edge the important fact that the overlap of the two sets has to consists of the very
same objects. For instance, to verify “Every cat smokes” it is not enough that the
set of cats is smaller than the set of smokers, so that an overlap is possible. Rather,
the very same objects that are cats have to also smoke.
Gärdenfors (2017) does not explicitly endorse the embodied aspect of Langacker’s
analysis of proportional quantifiers. However, he analyses proportional quantifiers
with the related concept of multiplex-mass interchange. The concept is illustrated
with the following example:
(2.5) There were soldiers posted all over the hill.
Soldiers are treated here not as a set of individual elements, but rather as a mass, in
analogy with e.g. “There was wine all over the tablecloth”. Gärdenfors (2017, p. 13)
describes the internal process of considering a set of elements as a mass as “squinting
with your inner eye”. The restrictor and scope sets are compared as two masses.
In sum, quantifiers in Gärdenfors (2017) are analysed, similarly to Langacker, as
expressing a proportion between two masses. Neither Langacker nor Gärdenfors
(2017) discuss numerical quantifiers explicitly, but it is reasonable to assume that
they would be analysed in a similar way as expressing the extent of the overlap
between two masses.
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The representative instance quantifiers are “every”, “each”, and “any”. Gärdenfors
(2017, p. 238) analyses their meaning as encoding verification strategies:
• Any: verify by constructing a generic individual in the restrictor set and see
that it belongs to the scope set.
• Each: verify by surveying the individuals in the restrictor set sequentially and
show for each of them that they belong to the scope set.
• Every: verify by considering the individuals in the restrictor set all at once and
see that they all belong to the scope set.
While these quantifiers do encode meanings that are monotonic on the scale of mag-
nitude, is it not clear what the conceptual domain underlying them is, and whether
it is scalar. As the topic is quite complex but not directly relevant to the present
aims, I do not discuss representative instance quantifiers further.
I have briefly reviewed what Gärdenfors (2017) says about quantificational and
adjectival semantics. Crucially, an account of categorization in scalar language is
missing. While such an account is developed for nouns, Gärdenfors does not discuss
how categories are established for gradable adjectives and quantifiers. Decock, Dietz,
and Douven (2013) partially fill this gap by developing a conceptual spaces account of
comparative expressions such as “taller than” that goes beyond Gärdenfors (2017).
The main idea in the paper is to analyse comparative concepts in terms of the
independently defined membership function MC for any category C:
(2.6) CC: For all individuals i and i′ and all comparative concepts “C-er than” and
corresponding categorical concepts C, i is C-er than i′ iff MC(i) > MC(i
′).
Decock et al. (2013) do not give an independent analysis of the root of the compara-
tive, but rather assume the definition of M based on the Voronoi tessellation picture.
This picture is unsatisfying for various reasons. First of all, as the authors them-
selves point out, the account is “limited to comparative concepts whose associated
categorical concept has one or more prototypes”. Secondly, they notice that “we
are unable to think of any concept lacking a prototype that is not representable in
a one-dimensional space”. As I will discuss in more detail below, multidimensional
adjectives provide examples of such concepts. Lastly, the authors propose, without
developing the view further, to analyse scalar concepts in terms of the structure of
the underlying domain: “age, height, price, all being measured on an interval scale,
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the semantics of older than, taller than, and cheaper than can simply be stated in
terms of the < relation.” However, once such an analysis is developed, as will be
done below, the need for an analysis of comparative constructions in terms of proto-
types disappears. Crucially, such 1-dimensional conceptual domains constitute the
most frequent and important cases of comparison.
In the following, I first argue that the picture of prototypes and the resulting
Voronoi tessellations that works for nouns will not work for scalar language. Then, I
sketch an extension of conceptual spaces theory that can account for categorization
in scalar domains.
2.1.4 The prototype picture won’t do for scalar terms
We saw in the previous section that Gärdenfors sees gradable adjectives as extensions
on single domains, and proportional quantifiers as extensions on the proportion scale.
In this section, I argue that the prototype picture of categorization is inconsistent
with categories on scalar spaces by presenting a list of problems. I start with the
following problem:
Problem 1. In a Voronoi tessellation, every point belongs to at least one category.
However, systems of gradable adjectives do not cover the whole semantic domain.
In a system of gradable adjectives, the zone between antonyms that belongs to neither
antonym is called the zone of indifference after Sapir (1944). For instance, average
height is not covered by either of the two antonyms “tall” and “short”, nor by any
of the other height adjectives such as “towering”. A circumlocution such as “of
average height” can refer to the zone of indifference, but is not lexically simple. The
expression “average” alone, with enough help from contextual cues, can also be used
to refer to the zone of indifference. However, the reference to a specific conceptual
domain is again not lexically encoded.
A first possible counterargument to problem 1 is that systems of nouns also fail to
cover some parts of the conceptual space, and in this respect cannot be modelled by
Voronoi tessellations. For instance, consider the systems of nouns used to describe
animals. There is no name for an animal that looks like a dog but with a giraffe-like
neck. According to this counterargument, 1 does not show that the mechanism of
nominal categorization is different from the one for scalar categorization, because it
applies to both nouns and adjectives. The success of this counterargument depends
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on how it modifies the Voronoi tessellation approach above to account for why some
parts of the conceptual space are not covered. There is a fundamental reason to
be sceptical that such a modification would succeed. Namely, systems of gradable
adjectives neglect to cover the conceptual space in a much more radical way than
nouns. While the dog-giraffe chimera described above is never observed, persons
of average height—and in general the individuals in the zone of indifference—are
the most commonly observed. The zone of indifference does not cover marginal or
unusual parts of the conceptual space, but rather the most common. A defence of the
uniformity of scalar and nominal language with respect to categorization strategy
would have to account for this remarkable difference in how 1 affects adjectival and
nominal conceptual domains.
A second counterargument to problem 1 is that the zone of vagueness should
be interpreted as a vague threshold, where elements do not belong clearly to either
category, rather than a part of the domain that is not covered by any adjective.
This counterargument is contradicted by two observations. First, metalinguistic
intuition tells us that objects in the zone of indifference clearly do not belong to
either category, rather than unclearly belonging to one of them. This explains how
“The average person is tall” and “The average person is short” can be both false.
Second, variations in the comparison population are hard to explain in a prototype
analysis. Consider two comparison populations with different height variances. The
standard for “short” and the one for “tall” will get further apart from each other
as the variance increases. In a prototype analysis, this has to be understood as an
increase in the size of the zone between categories affected by vagueness. It is unclear
how the population variance should affect the amount of vagueness in the category.
Problem 1 does not apply to quantifiers, where the whole scale is covered. A
second problem however applies to both gradable adjectives and quantifiers:
Problem 2. In a Voronoi tessellation, no non-zero-measure region of the domain
belongs to more than one category. However, there are non-zero-measure overlaps
between categories in systems of gradable adjectives and quantifiers.
No region belongs to more than one category because there is no region of non-zero
measure whose points can all be closest to two prototypes. An obvious objection to
problem 2 is that there are overlaps between nouns, e.g. the extension of “cat” over-
laps with the extension of “animal”. Therefore, according to the objection nouns
might very well be categorized with the same strategy as adjectives—and neither
90
would be a Voronoi tessellation. Problem 2 has to be made more precise to counter
the objection. The more precise claim is that no overlap should exist between cat-
egories at the same level of abstraction (E. Rosch et al., 1976). For instance, the
extension of nouns referring to specific animal species or geometric shapes tend to
not overlap. The tendency to assume in learning that different nouns refer to dif-
ferent objection is known in psychology under different names: synonymy avoidance
(Carstairs-McCarthy, 2010), principle of contrast (Clark, 1993), and mutual exclu-
sivity principle (Markman, 1989).
As opposed to nouns, systems of adjectives show a systematic tendency to over-
lap. It is useful to distinguish two types of overlap in system of adjectives. The
first type is an overlap between a relative and an extreme adjective. Extreme ad-
jectives (not to be confused with adjectives expressing extreme categories as defines
above) are adjectives like “gigantic”, “fantastic”, “gorgeous”, which accept modi-
fiers such as “flat-out”, “downright”, and “positively” (Morzycki, 2009). This type
of overlap exists for instance between “big” (relative adjective) and “huge” (extreme
adjective). It could be argued that extreme adjectives do not occur often enough
to influence the extension of the main couple of antonyms. This criticism is con-
tradicted by the high frequency of extreme adjectives in certain adjectival systems
(“freezing”/“cold”/“cool” and “warm”/“hot”/“boiling”)3 and by the fact that in
noun systems the extension of frequent nouns can be restricted by rare nouns (e.g.
“walk”, “trot”, “canter” and “gallop”, the natural gaits of horses, have widely dif-
ferent frequencies).
The second type of adjective concerns two relative adjectives, e.g. “warm” and
“hot”. The second type of overlap provides more convincing evidence that adjectives
have a systematic tendency to overlap, since extreme adjectives are arguably more
specialized words than relative adjectives. Quantifiers also show systematic overlap,
e.g. the extension of “all” is contained within the extension of “some”.
The third problem I consider has to do with the categories that can be encoded
with Voronoi tessellations:
Problem 3. Extreme categories cannot be defined in a Voronoi tessellation.
In order to define an extreme category, the border between two categories has to fall
at the infimum or the supremum of the scale, and moreover the extreme category
3Kranich (2016) found that a surprising proportion (close to a third) of all the instances of
positive evaluative adjectives in an English corpus of letters to shareholders were extreme adjectives.
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has to be defined as including the border. Consider the case where the border is at
the supremum. For the border to fall at the supremum of the scale, both prototypes
have to be at the supremum of the scale. However, if the two prototypes coincide,
prototype theory would predict that they are in fact the same category. Since couples
of adjectives such as “dry” and “wet” refer to different categories, they cannot be
encoded in terms of Voronoi tessellations. The same argument applies to “some”
and “none” in the semantic domain of quantifiers.
Finally, I discuss a fourth problem with modelling scalar categories in terms of
prototypes:
Problem 4. While prototypes are usually statistically frequent, in order to get the
observed adjectival categories prototypes would have to be at points that are rarely
observed.
Prototypes tend to be located in the most frequently observed part of the conceptual
space (Ibbotson & Tomasello, 2009). Contrary to this observation, the location of
the prototypes that are required to define a category like “tall”, i.e. a fairly extreme
position on the height scale, are rarely observed.
There are further problems with applying the prototype pictures on scalar cate-
gorization. While points further away from the prototypes in nominal categories are
judged as being less typical examples of the category, more extreme points in scalar
domains are not. For example, increasingly tall persons do not become less typical
instances of the “tall” category. Another problem is the metalinguistic intuition that
many scalar categories do not have typical instances. For instance, there is no typical
instance of “tasty”. I do not discuss these further problems in the interest of space.
As we have seen in this section, categorization based on prototypes and resulting
Voronoi tessellations will not work for scalar language. Whether a pictures based on
prototypes is the correct one for nouns or not, I argued in this section that prototypes
offer a better model of nominal categorization than they do for scalar categorization.
In the following section, I propose an alternative account of scalar categorization
that improves on the picture based on prototypes.
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2.2 An expansion of the conceptual spaces account
2.2.1 Coding of scalar categories
I start with the observation that some conceptual domains are structured by orders.
This amounts to saying that the relation between points in some conceptual domain
is encoded by a relation that satisfies the order axioms as defined above. Often, a
single domain is ordered both by a metric and by an order structure. As an example,
consider the conceptual domain of size. In order to fully encode what is expressed
by specifying a size, the difference in size between any two objects, expressed by a
metric, is not enough. This is because a metric is symmetric, i.e. it does not keep
track of the direction of comparison. Crucially, when two objects differ in size, one
has a smaller size than the other.
Various clarifications are in order. First of all, orders and metrics are compatible.
Some conceptual domains are encoded with just a metric (e.g. colors), some with just
an order (arguably, tastiness), and some with both an order and a metric (height).4
To determine the amount of structure that is encoded in a domain, one can check
which relations can be asserted to hold between points of the domain. If the domain
encodes a metric, it is possible to assert that one point a in the domain is further
away from a point b than from a point c. For instance, blue is further away from
brown than green is from brown. If the domain encodes an order, it is possible to
assert that one point in the domain is greater than another point. For instance, it
can be asserted that the temperature of a cup of tea is greater than the temperature
of a glass of water. As another example, “height” refers to a certain property, which
is not directly tied to either of the adjectives constructed on the height scale, “short”
and “tall”. Importantly, heights themselves can be compared in terms of an order,
e.g. in the expression “greater height”. This shows that the domain of heights, rather
than some additional structure implied by the adjectives, is thought of as ordered.
In fact, the situation for ordered conceptual domains is subtler than the picture
presented in the last paragraph. Some conceptual domains have a natural direction
of increase. For instance, height increases in the direction of tallness, temperature
increases in the direction of hotness, and luminosity increases in the direction of
brightness. This is manifested in the grammar through the distinction between pos-
4Other still, such as nationality, arguably lack both an order and a metric structure. A classic
classification of possible structures is Stevens (1946).
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itive and negative adjectives. “Tall”, “warm”, and “bright” are positive adjectives,
while “short”, “cold”, and “dark” are negative adjectives. Polarity in adjectives
manifests itself e.g. in the bias of questions:
(2.7) How tall is Sam? (no implicature that Sam is tall)
(2.8) How short is Sam? (implicature that Sam is short)
The fact that a domain has a natural direction of increase is sufficient for scalarity, as
the notion of increase is only well-defined if there is an order with respect to which
the increase happens. However, a natural direction of increase is not a necessary
condition for a conceptual domain to count as ordered, which is the feature that is
relevant for the present purposes. Given an order ≤, is it always possible to define
a dual order ≤OP such that x ≤ y ⇐⇒ y ≤OP x. For instance, “shorter” defines
the dual order of “taller” because “A is shorter than B” ⇐⇒ “B is taller than
A”. It is in principle possible that neither of the dual orders defined on an ordered
conceptual domain is more natural than the other. What makes the domain ordered
is then the fact of encoding the information that determines the two orders. In sum,
the claim that a conceptual space is ordered is different from the claim that there is
an intrinsic or natural direction of increase.
It is possible in many cases to construct an ordering ≤c from a metric d and a
point c, where a ≤c b ⇐⇒ d(c, a) ≤ d(c, b). The most familiar case is when c is a
prototype. For instance, consider the sentence “This cat is doggier than this one”.
The adjective “doggy” requires the construction of an order induced by the distance
to the prototypical dog. The fact that the individual dimensions of comparison
remain available is shown by expression such as “This cat is doggier than this one
with respect to its personality”.
In sum, I propose that some conceptual domains are structured by orders rather
than metrics—i.e. they are scalar—and that they should be a sui generis type of
conceptual domain from the point of view of conceptual spaces theory. In the rest
of the section, I show how the picture of categorization based on Voronoi tessella-
tions presented above can be modified to make sense of how categorization happens
on scalar domains. Moreover, I discuss how the new picture can account for data
gathered in previous attempts to explain scalar categories with prototype theory.
Finally, I discuss multidimensional scalar domains and the role of monotonicity and
extremeness in the picture.
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2.2.2 Categorization in scalar domains
Much like nouns exploit the given metric structure to enable complex categories to be
encoded with just a handful of points, I propose that categorization in scalar domains
exploits the available order structure. The picture is as follows. Each category in an
ordered domain is associated with points that play the role of transitions from the
category applying to not applying or vice versa, in the sense defined above in section
1.1. Additionally, the type of the first transition is encoded, in the sense of “type”
defined on page 21. As shown in lemma 4 on page 22, the type of the first transition
is enough to determine the type of all other transitions. The transition coding for
categories exploits the order structure because category membership for any point
is fully determined by the transition immediately below it. In sum, encoding one
category requires one to encode one point for each transition, plus specifying the
type of the first transition, as was shown in lemma 4.
It worth remarking on three features of transition-based categorization. First,
category membership is independent of the distance of the transition from the point,
which implies that while the conceptual domain might have a metric structure, the
metric is not exploited when defining categories in terms of transitions. Second,
the convexity generalization that Gärdenfors (2017) formulates is satisfied by scalar
monotonic categories, given a natural extension of the notion of betweenness to
orders. Specifically, given an order point b is between a and c iff a ≤ b ≤ c or
c ≤ b ≤ a. Third, each category defined in terms of transitions varies independently
of the other categories defined on the same space. This is different from prototype-
based categorization, where the extension of a category depends on the location of
the surround prototypes.
The transition-based categorization strategy for scalar terms proposed in this sec-
tion avoids the problems with prototype categorization of adjectives and quantifiers
presented in the previous section on page 89. I consider the problems in turn. Prob-
lem 1 is easily avoided by the fact that the transition for the negative antonym lies
below the transition for the positive antonym on the scale. Problem 2 is explained by
the fact that any two monotonic categories of the same type overlap, as shown above
in lemma 5. Problem 3 is avoided by the possibility of extreme categories in the
sense of definition 8. Finally, 4 is a more interesting problem to which I return again
below when discussing how the position of adjectival transitions are determined.
Since the problems of the last section are avoided, I propose that the word classes
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I discussed above, namely gradable adjectives and quantifiers, express categories on
conceptual domains structured by an order, and moreover these categories are en-
coded in terms of transitions. Analysing these classes of words in terms of transitions
has advantages beyond avoiding the problems above. First of all, it tracks the met-
alinguistic intuition that a natural analysis of the meaning of gradable adjectives is
in terms of comparison with a threshold. Second, once a prototype-based picture is
rejected, a transition analysis gives a unified cognitive account of multiple classes of
words. Within the quantificational domain, the transition account illuminates the
connection between quantifiers and quantity words such as “many” and “few”, as
illustrated by the previously developed semantic theories presented in the previous
chapter. Lastly, as I argue below, the encoding in terms of transitions plays a cru-
cial role in explaining the evolutionary origins of the universals of monotonicity and
extremeness.
It is worth mentioning a prima facie plausible hypothesis that ties the conceptual
domain and the type of categories built on it:
(2.9) Hypothesis: Every category on a one-dimensional conceptual domain that is
structured by (at least) an order is encoded in terms of transitions.
This in effect amounts to saying that there is a preference for exploiting orders
over other structure in one-dimensional domains. If this hypothesis turns out to be
correct, it raises the empirical question of why there is a preference for exploiting
orders in one-dimensional domains. Note that this hypothesis leaves open the way
that categories are encoded for multidimensional domains. I do not argue for this
hypothesis in the present work, but leave it as a plausible generalization that can
explored further in future work.
It is worth at this point to consider how a transition-based theory of categoriza-
tion can account for context sensitivity. The relevant phenomenon, already discussed
above in the context of formal semantics, is that the same gradable adjective can con-
vey different information depending on the comparison class. For instance, “Jenny
is tall” conveys different information about Jenny’s height if the topic of discussion
is basketball players or 18th century Sicilians. If Jenny was 170 centimetres, the
sentence would be true in the latter but not in the former case. This dependency on
the context implies that associating a stable transition with each gradable adjective
is a partial characterization of adjectival meaning. The challenge therefore is to give
a geometrical account of how the meaning is influenced by context.
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Gärdenfors (2017, chap. 13) presents a simple geometric picture of context sen-
sitivity based on the concept of radial projection. In geometric terms, consider two
convex regions A and B that share at least one point. A radial projection is a
function from points of A to points of B. Pick (1) a specific shared point o, called
the origo, (2) a half-line starting from o and intersecting A’s boundary at zA and
B’s boundary at zB, and (3) any point x such that
d(o,x)
d(x,zA)
= p. Then, the radial
projection maps x to the point y ∈ B on the half-line such that d(o,y)
d(y,zB)
= p (where
d is the metric function for the domain). Radial projection is pictured in figure 2.3.
Gärdenfors (2017) proposes that radial projections account for the sensitivity of the
adjective to the modified noun:
If the region of space representing the head contains a point shared with
the space representing the modifier, this point can be taken as the origo
of a transformation of the modifier space.
To see how this works, consider the expression “white wine” as an example. First
of all, note that white wine is not white, indicating that “white” is sensitive to the
meaning of “wine”. To compose the two meanings, create a radial projection of the
space of colors onto the space of wines. The portion of the projected color space that
usually corresponds to “white” is then what is expressed by “white wine”.
The approach of Gärdenfors (2017) has various problems. First, radial projections
require the region associated with the modifier to be compact :
(2.10) (Heine-Borel theorem) For any subset A of Euclidean space Rn, A is
compact iff it is closed and bounded.
However, as it should be clear by now, categories expressed by gradable adjectives
are not compact when they lie on open domains. For instance, the range of heights
covered by “tall” has to upper bound, and is therefore not compact. Despite the
systematic lack of compactness, the domain of gradable adjectives can be applied
to nouns in a context-sensitive way. More intuitively, it is not clear how one would
map the domain of size onto the domain of dogs, since the former does not have
an upper or lower bound. A second problem is that the combination between noun
and modifier often does not fully specify the comparison population, showing that
context sensitivity goes deeper than Gärdenfors (2017)’s account can reach. As an
example, consider the phrase “An expensive mistake”. If the topic is shopping, an
expensive mistake might be a few hundred pounds. On the other hand, if the topic
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Figure 2.3: The figure shows how a radial projection maps a point x in a set A to a
point y in a set B, when o is the origo and the line intercepts the border of A at zA
and the border of B at zB.
is war an expensive mistake might cost the life of thousands of people. In sum,
the head noun is often insufficient to determine the comparison population; the full
context is needed. A third problem is that Gärdenfors (2017) does not explain how
the origo is picked among the points shared by the modifier space and the noun
space. The position of the origo can make big differences in the way the modifier’s
space is mapped onto the head space.
I do not make a claim about a general mechanism for context sensitivity or
semantic composition. Rather, I assume that the process of fixing the position of
transitions depends on mechanisms of cultural evolution, to which I return below.
Still, I do assume that the transitions’ positions can depend on various properties
of a contextually given comparison population. For instance, it can depend on the
topological structure of the domain, as seen above in the contrast between absolute
and relative gradable adjective, or it can depend on the distribution of the property
in the comparison population, as seen in the case of relative adjectives. The picture
will ultimately have to be more complex than the one presented in Gärdenfors (2017).
I have discussed how the context sensitivity of gradable adjectives can be ac-
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counted for. Next, I briefly discuss the work of Ashby and colleagues, who developed
an account of categorization based not on prototypes, but rather on the decision
boundaries that separate categories (Ashby & Gott, 1988; Ashby & Maddox, 1990,
1993; Maddox & Ashby, 1993). I do not review the empirical evidence in favour of
this approach, because its relation to the theory presented in this chapter is gen-
erally unclear and a discussion of their relations would be beyond of the scope of
the present work. In Ashby’s account, the boundaries are not encoded in terms of
an underlying order, but rather various possible boundary construction algorithms
are considered. The crucial difference between my and Ashby’s account is that my
account is not meant as a general substitute for the prototype based picture of cate-
gorization, but rather as a proposal for domains structured by an order, which are in
general one-dimensional (I discuss below the multidimensional case). An advantage
of my approach is that it unifies cases where a transition can better account for
the data and cases where prototypes do under the single theoretical framework of
conceptual spaces.
Kalish and Kruschke (1997) apply the work of Ashby on decision boundaries
to single-dimensional conceptual domains. This is particularly relevant because,
as I discussed above, there is a special connection between orderedness and one-
dimensionality. Kalish and Kruschke (1997) compare exemplar theory and decision
boundary theory with respect to how well they can explain data from a series of
categorization experiments. Participants were trained on segments of various lenghts,
categorized in two overlapping categories. The hypothesis is that if participants are
encoding the categories by encoding a decision boundary, the slope of the category
membership function should be very steep where the categories change. The main
relevant result was that the data is incompatible with a deterministic response model,
where participants always respond with the category that is most probable given
the training data. Rather, responses in the zone of overlap between categories are
probabilistic. The main question this raises is how to make sense of the probabilistic
behaviour of participants when the thresholds of two categories are such that the
categories overlap. Although I will return to this challenge at various points below,
I do not discuss the point extensively and leave it to future work.
In sum, I propose the following picture. Depending on the way a conceptual
domain is structured, different way of creating categories are available. Conceptual
domains can be structured at least by orders and metrics (or both). Whenever a
metric is defined, a prototype-based strategy is available. If an order is defined,
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a transition-based categorization strategy can be used. Is is possible that other
categorization strategies are available, depending on other conceptual structures.
Moreover, I hypothesised a connection between the preferred categorization strategy
and dimensionality: for one-dimensional spaces, transition-based categorization is
used. This simple picture can be applied to the semantics of gradable adjectives and
quantifiers, and it avoids the problem of a prototype analysis presented in the pre-
vious section. While the picture of transition-based categorization presented above
is motivated both by avoiding problems of the alternative picture and by indepen-
dent advantages, it leaves much open about categorization in ordered conceptual
domains. For instance, it does by itself not explain how the number of transitions,
as well as their positions, is decided based on the data observed by the language
learner. Therefore, it leaves open what lies behind monotonicity and extremeness.
However, the picture provides a crucial component of such an explanation, on which
I build in the chapters that follow.
2.2.3 Verheyen & Égré (2018)
Verheyen and Égré (2018) attempt to account for the categories expressed by grad-
able adjectives in a conceptual spaces framework. The authors ask participants to
produce various judgments on the typicality and category membership of degrees
in different gradable adjectives. Then, the authors compare different possible ways
of weighting the prototypes for a single category in the collated Voronoi tessellation
approach which I discussed above. The main aim of the paper is to explain how grad-
able adjectives can be interpreted in terms of prototype-based categorization. After
introducing an extension of conceptual spaces theory meant for scalar categories, an
alternative account of the data in Verheyen and Égré (2018) can be developed. I
first present the study and then sketch an alternative, scalar account of the data.
The compared couples of adjectives are: (1) short/tall, (2) light/heavy, (3)
young/old, (4) low/high, (5) cold/warm, (6) slow/fast, (7) cheap/expensive, (8)
thin/thick. For each of these adjectives, participants were asked to generate typical
instances (typicality generation task), select typical instances from a list of degrees
(typicality selection task), categorize a list of degrees into belonging to one of the
antonyms or an intermediate category (trichotomous categorization task), produce
degrees of membership in the categories (continuous categorization task), categorize
degrees into exactly one of the antonyms (dichotomous categorization task), and pro-
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Figure 2.4: The responses for the first forty (out of 80) participants for the section
of the experiment concerned with height adjectives. The left plot shows the gener-
ated typical instances (gen) as well as the selected (sel) degrees in the trichotomous
categorization task. The x-axis does not show the absolute heights, but is instead
centered around each participant’s judgment of what the average height is. The right
plot shows the continuous categorization data for the same participants.
duce average and ideal examples for each category. Some of the data for one of the
antonym couple is displayed in figure 2.4, which I generated with the data found in
osf.io/djkdg.
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In the data analysis presented in the paper, the instances produced by partici-
pants in the typicality generation task play the role of prototypes. A membership
function was obtained by calculating the proportion of precisifications (i.e. propor-
tion of samples from the generated typical instance) where each degree falls in each
antonym, after aggregating all data across participants for each antonym couple.
Comparison between the membership function thus obtained and the continuous
categorization task shows a close fit. The prototype picture can therefore account
well for the aggregated data.
A direct comparison to the transition-based account with aggregated data is
difficult. Some design choices were influenced by assumption on the author’s part
that the extension of the two antonyms are interdependent. For instance, in the
continuous categorization task participants are asked “How inclined are you to call
a male adult of 176 cm SHORT or TALL?”, which collapses the vague threshold
functions for the two antonyms into a single function. Moreover, throughout the
paper membership degree for the negative adjective is calculated as 1 minus the
membership degree for the positive adjective. However, I now show how my picture
can also account for the data.
Two aspects of the data should be accounted for. First, where do degrees of
typicality come from. Second, why do they relate as they do to the position of
the transitions. I explain both in a transition picture of scalar terms. I claim that
“typicality” in the case of properties referred to by gradable adjectives is a statistical
property. Namely, it refers to the most frequently observed degrees in the category.
Two factors then are at play. First, since relative adjectives do not cover the most
probable degree—e.g. “tall” does not cover average height—the typical individual will
be at the threshold. As an example, the typical “tall person” will be the shortest,
and therefore most likely to be observed, among the tall persons. The second factor
is that since the position of the transition is vague, there is no clearly most typical
individual in the category. For example, there is no clearly shortest person among
the tall persons. While in the picture of Verheyen and Égré (2018) the transition is
determined based on the maximally typical individual, in my picture the maximally
typical individual is found based on the transition.
I argued that defining the most typical individual requires balancing the confi-
dence that the individual does in fact fall in the category with the frequency of the
individual. How are these two opposing requirements met? The picture of vague
transitions discussed in section 1.1.1 can be of help here. The idea was to asso-
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ciate each transition not with a single point, but rather with a probability density
on the scale expressing the probability that the “true” transition happens at each
point. The cumulative density function then expresses the probability that each
point belongs to the category.
When asked to generate typical instances for a positive [negative] adjective, par-
ticipants will produce the lowest [highest] values that still have a high probability
of belonging to the category. On the other hand, in the trichotomous categorization
task participants will judge a point as belonging to the positive part of the scale iff
the probability of the transition being below it is greater than the probability of it
being above it.5 Therefore, it is to be expected that generated typical members of
the positive [negative] category are above [below] the ones categorized as belonging
to the category. This intuitive explanation is displayed in figure 2.5.
I do not attempt a systematic comparison between the two accounts in terms of
how well they fit the data. However, the fact that a transition-based account can
in principle explain the data, as I have shown, in combination with the arguments
against a prototype-based account presented above leaves us with more support for
a transition-based picture of categorization for gradable adjectives.
2.2.4 Gradable adjectives on multidimensional domains
While the examples of scalar conceptual domains discussed above mostly consist of
single quality dimensions, orders are also possible for (d > 1)-dimensional domains.
Examples, which I mentioned above, include multidimensional adjectives such as
“healthy” and “intelligent”.6 Gärdenfors (2017) proposes a picture where the quality
dimensions of multidimensional adjectives—e.g. temperature, frequency of coughing,
tiredness—are merged together to create a single dimension. The single dimensions
still remain available, as demonstrated by expressions such as “healthy, except for a
slight fever”. What defined order-based category coding is the fact of exploiting only
the order information to define a category. I sketch two ways that this approach can
be extended to multidimensional domains.
5The assumption here is that while the extensions for the positive and negative adjectives are
each defined with a vague threshold, the zone of indifference is defined negatively as the zone that
falls under neither antonym. Therefore, considering only the positive adjective, if a degree has a
probability p of being above the transition, it has a probability 1− p of being below it.
6For more on multidimensional adjectives, see Sassoon (2013), which argues that not all multi-
dimensional adjectives behave identically in how the constituting dimensions are connected.
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Figure 2.5: The figure shows the behaviour in the trichotomous categorization task
as well as in the typical instances generation task for two vague thresholds. The
confidence that a degree belongs to T 1 increases rapidly, while for T 2 it is slower.
Point a is the point of equiprobability for both thresholds: points above it are more
likely to belong to the category than not. Point b is the lowest point with a high
probability of belong to category of T 1. Point c is the same for T 2.
The first approach is to build the category as a function of the orders of the
individual dimensions of the domain. The order for an individual dimension encodes
whether a point is greater or lower than another point in the domain. An order-
based category in a multidimensional domain consists then of a set of transitions
in each of the dimensions of the domain, plus a way that the dimensions interact.
For each individual domain, the transitions play the same role as they did before,
specifying whether a point in the domain belongs to the category with respect to that
dimension. The relation between the dimensions is then encoded as a function of the
Boolean information coming from the individual dimensions. For instance, a point
in a domain might belong to the category iff it belongs to it with respect to each
dimension, or with respect to at least one dimension. The fact that no order is defined
on the domain as a whole prevents a natural definition of monotonicity. However,
convexity can be still defined.7 This first type of definition can only define categories
7All that is needed to define convexity is the notion of betweeness. If a metric d is defined on
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whose decision boundaries are orthogonal or parallel to the axes. Moreover, it can
encode non-convex categories, even when the categories are convex in the individual
dimensions, e.g. when the Boolean function connecting the categories is XOR.
The second approach to constructing order-based categorization in multidimen-
sional domains is to first define an order on the whole domain as a function of the
single dimensions, and then define a category based on the domain-level order. De-
pending on the information that is exploited about the individual dimensions to con-
struct the domain-level order, this strategy can construct a great variety of decision
boundaries. In this approach, monotonicity can be defined in the usual way with the
order that is defined on the whole domain. I present one possible way of constructing
an order. Assume we have two points a = [ a1 . . . an ] and b = [ b1 . . . bn ] in
an n-dimensional domain D, and that each dimension i is structured (at least) by an
order ≤i. Then, we can let a ≤D b ⇐⇒ a1 ≤1 b1 ∧ . . . ∧ an ≤n bn. This is a partial
order called the product order. The strategies in this and the present paragraph
are not mutually exclusive. For instance, product order and some strategy from the
previous paragraph are interdefinable.
While I do not discuss this in details, product orders on the dimensions of a
conceptual domain might account for how multidimensional adjectives can exist on
multiple dimensions but retain an intuitive notion of monotonicity. Consider the
domain of health as an example. If Marianne is as healthy as Lucy in all respects
except coughing more than Lucy, then Marianne is sicker than Lucy. However, if
Marianne is sicker than Lucy in some respects and Lucy is sicker than Marianne in
others, it is neither true that Marianne is sicker than Lucy nor that Lucy is sicker
than Marianne. The bare use of “healthy” can then be analysed as a monotonic
extension on the partially (product) ordered domain of health.
2.2.5 Monotonicity & extremeness in categories encoded with
transitions
I have argued that the prototype picture of categorization does not work for classes
of words expressing categories defined on scalar domains. Then, I presented an
alternative picture of how categorization might happen on those conceptual domains.
Next, I make a claim about the relation between scalarity and categorization:
the domain, a point b is between points a and c iff d(a, b) + d(b, c) = d(a, c).
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(2.11) Categories encoded in terms of transitions are monotonic.
This generalization connects the discussion of the universals of scalarity and the
discussion of categorization, in a way that parallels Gärdenfors’s claim that nouns
express convex categories. As shown by lemma 3, 2.11 is equivalent to the claim
that when categories are encoded with transitions, they are encoded with a single
transition. A tempting idea is that monotonicity follows from transition-based cate-
gorization plus a bias from simplicity, which tends to reduce the number of encoded
prototypes. However, the picture is more complicated. As we will see in chapter 3, a
picture of categorization alone is not enough to explain the evolution of monotonicity,
and other ideas from the theory of language evolution are needed.
Claim 2.11 does not make reference to any specific grammatical category. There-
fore, if 2.11 is true, we should not expect a priori an alignment between grammatical
categories and monotonicity. This contradicts the generalizations from the section
on formal semantics, where I claimed monotonicity for whole grammatical classes
of words. There are two reasons why such an alignment between monotonicity
and grammatical class might come about. First, language seems to keep track of
the structure of conceptual spaces, so that differences in type of conceptual spaces
are reflected in the grammar, as previously argued in e.g. Culbertson, Kirby, and
Schouwstra (2016). For instance, the grammatical class of gradable adjectives re-
quires its members to express categories on scalar domains. Second, whole classes of
words share few scales. For instance, quantifiers appear to only require the scale of
proportion and the scale of integers. The effect of scalarity would then apply to all
words on those scales.
For what concerns extremeness, as I have shown above, transition-based encod-
ing makes extreme categories possible in contrast to categories defined in terms of
prototypes. As shown in the discussion of the linguistic data, there is a tendency for
categories to transition at the domain’s boundaries if the boundaries exist. I return
to the effects of transition-based encoding of scalar categories in chapter 6.
As discussed above, an important distinction can be drawn between absolute
and relative gradable adjectives with respect to their context-sensitivity. I have
briefly discussed how vagueness could be dealt with in a conceptual spaces account of
transition-based categories, by using the supervaluation approach. We encountered
a similar approach when discussing vagueness in prototype-based theories of cate-
gorization, in the concept of collated Voronoi tessellation. These scattered remarks
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cannot explain the extremely complex data on gradable adjectives. Specifically, I
do not attempt to explain the sometimes vague behaviour of absolute adjectives
(Burnett, 2014). For reasons of space, I also do not discuss the relations between
distributions of a property, scale structure, and vagueness in a conceptual spaces
framework.
2.3 Conclusions
I started this chapter by describing Gärdenfors (2017)’s version of the theory of
conceptual spaces, and its associated theory of categorization based on prototypes
and Voronoi tessellations. Then, I presented some problems with applying this theory
of categorization to scalar language. I developed an alternative theory based on
orders and transitions, which solves the problems of the prototype account. Finally, I
discussed various complications with the transition account and how to make sense of
experimental data and discussions from the previous literature. Much more could be
said about the details of a transition-based picture of scalar semantics in a conceptual
spaces framework, but for reasons of space I leave further details to future work.
In sum, this chapter discussed the cognitive foundations of scalar language in a
conceptual spaces framework. The cognitive account left two important features of
the semantics of scalar terms undetermined, namely the number of transitions and
their location. The two universals of scalar language I discussed in the previous sec-
tion, namely monotonicity and extremeness, correspond to these two undetermined
features respectively: monotonicity fixes the number of transitions per lexical entry
to one, and extremeness consists in a relation between domain structure and transi-
tion’s location. Since neither monotonicity nor extremeness have a semantic-internal
explanation, as I argued in 1.2, nor a cognitive-internal explanation, as I will argue
in the next chapter, the rest of the thesis will bring in other factors to explain their
origin and evolution. In the next chapter, I show that the picture of learning of scalar
categories developed in this section is not sufficient to account for the evolution of
monotonicity, and propose a more complex evolutionary picture based on previous




Modelling the evolution of
adjectival monotonicity
In chapter 1, I presented two universals of scalar categories, namely monotonicity and
extremeness. In chapter 2, I proposed an extension of the theory of conceptual spaces
to account for linguistic data concerning categories on scalar conceptual domains.
This extension consists of a proposal for how scalar categories are encoded, namely
in terms of transitions rather than prototypes. While this extension of conceptual
spaces theory provides an explicit cognitive framework for scalar categorization, I
have argued that it is by itself insufficient to explain the universals of monotonicity
and extremeness that I discussed in chapter 1. This is because some transition-
encoded categories are non-monotonic, and some are non-extreme. In the current
chapter, I will zoom in on the monotonicity of gradable adjectives, and present an
account of the evolutionary mechanisms that favour languages with monotonic scalar
categories, building on the account of scalar categorization developed in chapter 2. I
will support this account with computational models of the evolution of monotonicity.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. I first discuss the Iterated Learning
(IL) model of language evolution, a theoretical and modelling framework that will
form the basis for my account of the evolution of monotonicity (3.1). Then, I develop
three agent-based simulations, each building on top of the previous one. In the first
model (sec. 3.2.1), I implement a learning bias for simplicity acting on language
structure through an IL model. Under the simplicity pressure alone, the signals end
up expressing degenerate meanings, covering either all or none of the scale’s degrees.
In the second model (sec 3.2.2), I add a pressure for communicative accuracy on the
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agents. In the second model, the agents communicate literally, i.e. they produce and
interpret signals assuming that their communicative partner is truthful, but not nec-
essarily cooperative. The signals do not evolve to express degenerate meanings, but
in order to maximize communicative accuracy they express non-monotonic meanings.
Lastly, in the third model (sec 3.2.3) I implement more sophisticated agents, capable
of doing pragmatic inferences. In combination with the other two pressures, from
learning and communication, this causes monotonic meanings to emerge. On the
basis of the third model, I conclude that monotonicity emerges as the best trade-off
between learnability and communicative accuracy given human pragmatic reasoning.
3.1 The Iterated Learning model of language evo-
lution
In chapter 1, I discussed previously proposed evolutionary explanations for mono-
tonicity and extremeness. Some of these focus on cognitive biases for monotonic
or extreme categories, and some focus on the advantage of such categories in com-
munication. This section discusses the theoretical, experimental, and computational
framework of IL (Kirby, Griffiths, & Smith, 2014) as a way of unifying and modelling
the effects of communicative and cognitive pressures on language. I discuss the two
pressures in turn, starting with the pressure from learning in section 3.1.1 and then
moving onto the pressure for communicative accuracy in section 3.1.2. The rest of
this chapter will argue that a full picture of the evolution of monotonicity needs to
consider both of these pressures.
3.1.1 The pressure from learnability
One fundamental feature of language is that it is a cultural object, whose existence
is dependent on the cognitive systems that learn it and use it. Since language has
to be learned anew by each generation, and learning is a noisy process, we should
expect languages to change over time. Crucially, the language learned by new users
are not unbiased1. While the biases in the learned language might be small, and
1Here, we use unbiased in the following technical sense. Consider the teacher’s language Lt and
the acquired language La, which are both random variables. La is an estimator of Lt because
the former is an estimate of the latter based on the data observed by the learner. La is a biased
estimator of Lt iff the expected value of La is different from Lt.
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therefore the changes they induce might be imperceptible for a single transmission,
over many generations they can have a large impact on language. IL is therefore a
causal mechanism that connects individual learners’ biases—which affect the changes
they introduce in the process of language learning—and the structure of language
as a whole. The linguistic universals caused by the process of IL depend on specific
individual biases. Very general biases, which are shared by all humans, will have
repercussions on the structure of all languages through IL.
Computational and experimental methods have been developed to model and
study the way that cultural transmission affects language (Kirby et al., 2014). A
standard IL model consists of a number of generations h0, h1, . . . , hn. In turn, each
generation i ≤ n consists of a number of agents ai,1, ai,2, . . . , ai,m. The life of agents in
each generation h0<i<n has two stages. In the first stage, agents in hi−1 are selected
to be cultural parents of the agents in hi, and proceed to teach the language to
their cultural children. In the second stage, the agents in hi become the cultural
parents of agents in hi+1. In the case of h0, the languages of the agents are picked
at random from the set of all possible languages. The data to be analysed is the
set of languages learned by all agents in generations after a burn-in period. Given
this general structure, the essential missing ingredients are a language model and a
learning model. Language model and learning models depend on the specific aspect
of real language that one is focusing on.
Iterated Learning with Bayesian agents
The learning models that I develop in the following assume Bayesian learners. In
general terms, a Bayesian agent that learns a language calculates a distribution
p encoding the probability of a language l being the one that produced a set of
observed linguistic data D. Moreover, p(l | D) is calculated by using the Bayes
theorem, which expresses the relation between the probability of a language given
the observed data, the probability of the data given the linguistic data, and the
probability of each language prior to observing the data:




li∈L p(D | l)p(li)dli
(3.1)
where L is set of all possible languages.
Bayesian learners are a natural model of learning in IL models, because they
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factorize the posterior (up to normalization) into two components: the likelihood,
expressing the information coming from the linguistic data from the previous gen-
erations, and the prior, expressing the cognitive biases of the agents thought of as
expectations about what the true language is. Calculation of the likelihood requires
a picture of how the language produces the data.
Since agents in IL models have to pick a language to produce data to train
the generation after them, there has to be a decision procedure to pick a language
based on the posterior distribution. In the following, I will consider two decision
procedures. First, Maximum a Posteriori (MAP) agents always pick the language
that has the greatest posterior probability. Second, sample agents sample a language
with a probability proportional to its posterior probability. While the MAP decision
rule is deterministic given a dataset, the sample decision rule is stochastic. However,
note that the language ultimately picked by a learner is always a random variable,
whose distribution depends on (1) the true language spoken by the cultural parent,
(2) the likelihood function, (3) the prior distribution, (4) the decision procedure
(MAP or sample).
Markov Chains
In the previous section, I introduced Bayesian learning as a convenient formalism for
modelling agents in IL models. In this section, I introduce one further modelling tool,
which I apply to IL in the next section. Markov chains are mathematical objects
that can be used to gain insights into IL models with Bayesian agents. A Markov
chain is a time-discrete stochastic process, i.e. a set of random variables {Xi | i ∈ I}
indexed by a totally ordered countable set I. In the following, I will always be some
set of integers {0, . . . , n}. Markov chains have the Markov property, i.e. for every
i ∈ I:
P (Xi+1 | X0, . . . , Xi) = P (Xi+1 | Xi) (3.2)
In words, equation 3.2 says that the distribution of the random variable at any index
only depends on the immediately preceding variable. This is sometimes expressed as
“the future is independent from the past, conditional on the present”. The Markov
property allows us to think of Markov chains as a series of transitions from a state
to another, each happening according to some probability distribution that only
depends on the immediately previous state.
If the transition probabilities remain the same over time and the random variables
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have discrete support, the transition behaviour of the variables can be encoded in
a transition matrix P , where Pi,j is the probability of transitioning from state si
to state sj. For instance, imagine that the support of the random variables is the
set {s1, s2}, and that the Markov chain has probability 0.8 of going from s1 to s2,














Pi,j = 1 (3.4)
The advantage of expressing the transition behaviour of a Markov chain with a
transition matrix is that it helps formulating interesting generalizations about the
behaviour of the chain. Note that P allows us to easily calculate the probability
of moving from each state to any other state by using matrix multiplication. First,
we encode the current state si as a one-hot vector ~v
2 that is 1 at index i and 0
everywhere else. The probability of going from si to any other state is then encoded












Moreover, imagine we start with a distribution over states encoded by a vector ~g,
where the ith component of ~g is the probability of starting in state si. Then, ~g
TP
gives the probability distribution over states after one step. Imagine we start with


















Combining equations 3.5 and 3.6, we can calculate the distribution after any number
of steps n starting with any distribution ~v. All we need to do is multiply ~v by P n












. . . P
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n
= ~vTPPP . . . P = ~vTP n (3.7)
The stationary distribution of a Markov chain with transition matrix P is a vector
π such that:
πTP = πT (3.8)
According to equation 3.8, the stationary distribution is (up to normalization) the
left eigenvector of P that has eigenvalue 1. Therefore, the stationary distribution
can be found in any of the usual ways to calculate eigenvectors.
The most important result we will need below connects the long-term behaviour
of a Markov chain with its stationary distribution. If P is the transition matrix of an




P l = πT (3.9)
Equation 3.9 tells us that for the specified Markov chains, the long-term distribution
over states is independent of the starting vector, and moreover it is identical to the
stationary distribution. In practice, this allows us to calculate the distribution over
states given the transition matrix in the long term.
3A Markov chain is called ergodic iff it is both aperiodic and irreducible. The period of a state si
for a Markov chain is the greatest common divisor of the set J of numbers such that the probability
of starting at si and returning to it after j ∈ J transitions is non-zero. A Markov chain is aperiodic
iff the period of every state is 1. A Markov chain is called irreducible iff every state communicates
with every other state. Two states of a Markov chain sj and sk communicate with each other iff
there exists some n,m such that the probability of going from sj to sk in n steps is non-zero and
the probability of going from sk to sj in m steps is non-zero.
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Markov chains and Iterated Learning
To see the connection between Markov chains and IL, consider the simple case of an
IL chain with generations comprising a single agent, and assume that there is a finite
set of possible languages. The language learned by the agent in generation hi only
depends on the language of its cultural parent in generation hi−1. In other words,
it is conditionally independent of the languages spoken by the agents in generations
before hi−1. Therefore, the languages spoken by the agents in all generations are
random variables that form a Markov chain indexed by the generation index. Call
pi,j the probability that the cultural child of an agent speaking language li ends
up using language lj. Then, the transition probabilities between languages can be
encoded by a transition matrix P such that Pi,j = pi,j.
Recall from equation 3.6 that if the distribution of the language spoken in the
first generation is expressed by vector ~f , the probability of the agent in the second
generation speaking each language is ~fTP . Moreover, recall from equation 3.7 that
the distribution over languages in generation n is given by ~fTP n. Finally, equation
3.9 tells us how to find the stationary distribution over languages from the transition
matrix, assuming ergodicity. The stationary distribution in an IL model describes
the probability that an agent will use a language, after so many generations that the
distribution over languages is mostly independent of the initial distribution.
Griffiths and Kalish (2007) show a remarkable fact about stationary distributions
of IL with Bayesian learners. Namely, they find that the stationary distribution for
a chain of Bayesian sampling agents is simply the agents’ prior distribution over lan-
guages. This phenomenon is called the convergence to the prior. Moreover, conver-
gence to the prior also holds of an infinitely large population of agents in continuous
time. Kirby, Dowman, and Griffiths (2007) shows that, given additional assump-
tions, the stationary distribution for MAP agents is a more peaked version of the
prior. These results show that, under certain conditions, the long term behaviour of
an IL model can be predicted without running it.
The bias for simplicity
In the discussion of IL up to this point, I have discussed learners’ biases in general,
abstracting from biases specific to the human cognitive system. However, IL by itself
can only explain observed linguistic universals in conjunction with facts specific to
the human cognitive system. In the rest of the thesis, I will work with a specific
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bias, namely a bias for simplicity. The fundamental idea of a bias for simplicity is
that humans attribute a greater prior probability to simple hypotheses over complex
hypotheses, an idea is supported by previous work (Chater & Vitányi, 2003; Feldman,
2016; Culbertson & Kirby, 2016). The bias for simplicity has an important role to
play in IL models. Since the stationary distribution fundamentally depends on the
prior of the Bayesian agents, and the simplicity bias is encoded in the prior, the
stationary distribution will depend on the simplicity bias.
The assumption of a bias for simplicity has to be implemented with assumptions
about how complexity is measured by the cognitive system. Prima facie, many mea-
sures of complexity seem to be equally valid alternatives. A common way to measure
the complexity of an object is as the length of the shortest description of the object.
This captures the intuition that the string “000111” has a lower complexity (“Three
0s and three 1s”) than the string “100101” (No obvious way to compress it). Such a
measure seems to be sensitive to the language in which the description is given. How-
ever, the concept of complexity has been studied from a mathematical point of view,
and a measure of complexity that is independent of the description language, called
Kolmogorov complexity, has been shown to exist. However, Kolmogorov complexity
is uncomputable (Li & Vitányi, 2008), and therefore approximations have to be used
that are sensitive to the language in which hypotheses are described. In particular,
the coding language for hypothesis will depend on details of human cognition.
The relevance of the discussion of categorization strategies from chapter 2 should
be clear at this point. As argued above, scalar categories are coded with transitions.
Therefore, categories that can be expressed with fewer transitions will be simpler to
encode. Cognitive biases for easily coded categories are reflected at the language level
through IL. In conclusion, scalar categories encoded with fewer transitions should
be more common in language. However, as I will argue below this cannot be the full
story. To understand why, a second pressure on language evolution, coming from
communication, should be considered.
3.1.2 Pressure for communicatively accurate languages
When an IL model is used to study the effects of cognitive biases on language struc-
ture, the cultural parents are sampled uniformly from the population. However, in
reality not all languages are equally likely to survive the test of usage. A second
pressure on the evolution of language, the pressure for communicative accuracy, in-
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fluences which languages are more likely to survive and be transmitted to successive
generations. The pressure for communicative accuracy follows from the fact that
language is used for conveying information. Language is used with many different
goals, not all of which are prima facie reducible to the goal of conveying information.
However, the transmission of information is arguably one of the fundamental goals
of linguistic communication, and therefore we can expect it to put a pressure on
language to better adapt to it. In order to implement selection by communicative
accuracy in an IL model, a model of communication is required. In this section, I
discuss two approaches to modelling communication and communicative accuracy,
namely literal communication and pragmatic communication.
Literal communication
In the following, I only consider a simple model of communication that can nonethe-
less track differential accuracy of different languages in communication. Specifically,
communication in the model will be between two agents, a sender S0 and a receiver
L0.
4 A single communicative event unfolds as follows. First, the sender makes an
observation o. Second, the sender selects a signal s and sends s to the receiver. In
the simplest model, s is selected with uniform probability among the signals com-
patible with the observation. Third, the receiver receives signal s and tries to infer
the content of the speaker’s observation, o, finally making a guess g. In the simplest
model, g is selected uniformly from the states compatible with s. In a model of literal
communication, the receiver’s guess of the sender’s observation does not depend on
the receiver’s beliefs about the sender’s mental state. However, g might depend on
the sender’s prior beliefs about the state of the world as well as the sender’s knowl-
edge of the meaning of s. The communication’s degree of success is calculated by
comparing o and g in terms of a chosen utility function. For instance, if the set of ob-
servations is categorical, the utility function might just track whether the receiver’s
guess of the world state is identical to the observation made by the sender. If the
set of observations has a metric structure, success might be the distance between
4The index 0 indicates that we are dealing here with literal agents. This notation will be
convenient when dealing with non-literal agents below. I use the letter L for consistency with the
previous literature. L was chosen to refer to receivers as an abbreviation of “listener”. However,
using the term “listener” as an umbrella term for receivers reinforces a view where the prototypical
production in a communication event is verbal. Therefore, I will try to use the term “receiver”
instead. While “observation” is often used to talk about the visual modality, it does not necessarily
refer to sight, and I will use it throughout the thesis.
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the receiver’s guess and the sender’s observation. I return below to the question of
how to calculate the utility of a language for communication, which is a function of
communicative success.
In practice, in the models below observations do not have internal structure.5
Each signal is associated with a set of observations that models its meaning. The
set of meanings is the powerset P(O) of subsets of O. For instance, if the set O
of possible observations is {o1, o2, o3}, possible meanings include {o1}, {o2, o3}, and
{}. How does a set of observations model the meaning of a signal? Each signal
conveys to the receiver that the sender’s observation is one of the observations in
the set associated with the signal. In the simplest model of literal communication,
after receiving a signal the receiver first renormalizes its prior over the world states
compatible with the received signal, and then picks the world state with the greatest
probability.
The task described above captures the fundamental principle of communicative
use of language, namely conveying information about the state of the world. How-
ever, the model is of course a simplification of how information is transmitted in real
interactions. First of all, the described communicative event is not interactive and
lacks the possibility for feedback. Secondly, not all transmission of information has
a clear loss function associated with it. For instance, it might not make a difference
if information conveyed during small talk is true or false. Thirdly, the conveyed
information in real interactions does not have to be even in principle available to the
receiver. For instance, it might be impossible to determine the truth of anecdotes
about something that happened a long time ago. Many other aspects of real infor-
mation transmission are left unmodelled. Whether the simplifications made by the
model of communication above are reasonable depends on whether they affect the
way that the pressure for accuracy shapes language. For reasons of space, I do not
discuss further the effects of these ulterior factors on the phenomena studied below.
I presented a simple model of communication for literal agents, how its utility for
communication can be modelled, and some respects in which it fails to model real
linguistic interactions. While some simplifications can be put aside for the models
developed below, a more complex model will be required for the phenomena studied
below. Specifically, a model of pragmatic communication will be needed.
5Note however that while observations themselves are unstructured, in the models below the set
of observations is structured.
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Pragmatic communication: the Rational Speech Act model
In interpreting and producing signals, literal language users do not exploit the knowl-
edge that they are communicating with cooperative agents, i.e. agents that share their
goals in communication. To see an instance in which communication with a coop-
erative vs an uncooperative agent makes a difference, consider the following case.
Sandro and Roberta went to Edinburgh for Christmas, and they are planning to
visit the Christmas market. Sandro asks Roberta, who was outside, what the tem-
perature outside is. One way of characterizing Roberta’s thought process before she
answers Sandro’s question (albeit possibly not a cognitively realistic account) is that
Roberta considers various possible answers. Some of these answers are true, and
some are false. However, even among the true questions, some are more useful to
Sandro and some are less useful. If Roberta is cooperative, i.e. she wants to answer
Sandro’s question in the way that helps him the most, she will tend to pick not
simply a true, but also a useful answer. For instance, imagine it is in fact freezing
outside, and possible answers are “It is cold” and “It is freezing”. While “It is cold”
is true, it is less helpful than “it is freezing” for Sandro. Therefore, Roberta will
tend to say that it is freezing. From Sandro’s point of view, the assumption that
Roberta is cooperative can therefore be used to extract more information from the
answer than would be possible given the answer’s literal meaning alone. Since if it
was freezing Roberta would answer “It is freezing” and not “It is cold”, if Roberta
does in fact answer “It is cold”, Sandro can infer that it is not freezing.
The surplus of information that can be extracted from a sentence through the
cooperative assumption is called an implicature (Grice, 1989). Implicatures can be
grouped according to the contexts in which they arise. If there is a set of contextually
relevant assertions which only differ in terms of how many world states they are
compatible with—their strength—then the choice of one of them by a cooperative
sender implicates the falsity of all of the stronger ones. This type of implicature
is called a scalar implicature. In the following, pragmatics will mostly enter my
models in the form of scalar implicatures. The Rational Speech Act (RSA) modelling
framework offers a convenient way to simulate scalar implicatures in computational
models.
In the type of RSA model I consider, there are three agents, a literal receiver L0,
a pragmatic sender S1 and a pragmatic receiver L1. L0 is used by S1 as part of the
calculation of the probabilities of producing each signal. S1 produces signals, but
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also appears in L1’s calculation of the probability of each state given the received
signal. When a literal receiver L0 receives a signal with a meaning m, they attribute
to each state d a probability equal to 0 if the meaning is not compatible with d and a
probability proportional to the prior probability of d if m is compatible with d. This
corresponds to the simplest situation where L0 has a uniform prior distribution over
world states. I assume here that the world is in each state with uniform probability.
Pragmatic speaker S1 observes a world state d and calculates the utility that each
signal s has for L0:
US1(s; d) = − (− log(pL0(d | s))) (3.10)
were PL0(d | s) is the probability that the literal receiver attributes to d after having
received signal s, and − log(pL0(d | s)) is the surprisal for that probability.6 This
equation identifies the utility of a signal with the negative surprisal for the literal
agent of the world state observed by the speaker after the literal agent has received
the speaker’s signal. Signals that maximize the listener’s posterior for the world
state observed by the speaker have higher utility. Pragmatic speakers then choose
the signal to utter with a probability proportional the utility:
pS1(s | d) ∝ exp(αUS1(s; d)) (3.11)
α determines the strength of the increase in the probability of picking an utterance
given an increase in utility. When α = 0, the left-hand side of 3.11 becomes 1 for
the true signals and all true signals are therefore uttered with equal probability. As
α → ∞, the signal(s) with the highest utility gets a greater and greater advantage
over the other signals.
Finally, L1 performs Bayesian inference on the basis of the behaviour of S1. After
receiving a signal s with meaning m from a speaker, L1 calculates the probability of
each world state:
pL1(d | s) ∝ pS1(s | d)pL1(d) (3.12)
where pL1(d) is the prior probability that the listener attributes to the world state
being observed.
To see how L1 is capable of calculating implicatures, consider the following simple
case. Imagine there are two states, d1, d2, and two signals, s1 and s2. Signal s1 has
6I simplify the standard RSA model by assuming that the utterance cost is the same for all
adjectives.
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meaning {d1, d2}, while signal s2 has meaning {d2}. Assume also that L0 has a
uniform prior over the world states, i.e. each state takes probability 0.5. L0 can




In this setup, if d2 is observed S1 would tend to pick signal s2, even though from
a semantic point of view s1 is equally acceptable as s1, because s2 increases the
probability that L0 will guess the right world state. Therefore, we get the following




Therefore, if the speaker sends s1, the observed signal was probably not s2, but




The three agents are plotted in figure 3.1.
Measuring communicative accuracy
To implement selection dependent on communicative accuracy in an IL model, a way
to quantify communicative accuracy is required. An intuitive measure of commu-
nicative accuracy for a combination of sender language SL and receiver language LL
is the expected utility of that combination of languages. This is the expected value of
the utility function for the two agents communicating. Consider the simplest case of













Figure 3.1: The figure displays L0, S1, and L1 for a simple RSA model. The dots
show whether a signal is compatible with a state (green) or not (red), and the color
shows probability (lighter being more probable). While the probabilities of the two
world states given signal s1 are uniform for the literal receiver (left), the probability
of state d2 given signal s1 is much greater than that of d1 for the pragmatic sender.
This shows that the pragmatic receiver calculated a scalar implicature.
This is the expected value across all observations of the probability that the sender
sends a signal for that observation and that the receiver guesses the right observation
given the sent signal.
The expected utility for a combination of languages can be calculated in a more
efficient way than as a sum, namely with multiplication between matrices. Define
two matrices S and L, the first representing the sender and the second the listener.
For both matrices, each row represents a signal and each column an observation.
Moreover:
Si,j = pSL(si | oj)
Li,j = pLL(oj | si)
The value
∑
s pSL(s | ok)pLL(ol | s), i.e. the probability that a sender makes observa-
tion ok and that the receiver guesses observation ol, is the k, l index of the matrix:
STL (3.14)
The only important cases for communicative accuracy are the cases where the lis-
tener guesses the right observation, i.e. the elements of the diagonal of matrix 3.14.
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Therefore, define the vector ~a as the main diagonal of matrix 3.14. The ith element
of ~a is the probability that the receiver will guess observation i, given that the sender
makes observation i. Finally, the success probability for each observation have to be
weighted by the probability of the observation. Call ~p the vector whose ith element
is the probability of the sender making observation i. The expected communicative
success is the dot product of ~a and ~p:
CS(SL, LL) = ~a · ~p (3.15)
This way of calculating expected utility makes for a much more efficient implemen-
tation.
Below, I will consider other ways of calculating the expected utility of a combi-
nation of speaker’s language and receiver’s language. The main difference will be in
the measure of success for a single communicative event. In particular, success might
not be categorical—either a communication is successful or it is unsuccessful—but
rather graded, and based on the similarity between the observed and guessed world
states. How good a language is for communication will still be calculated as the
expected success interaction-wise.
3.1.3 Combining the pressures in an IL model
The pressures for simplicity and communicative accuracy always act together to
shape language structure. However, they often pull in opposite directions. Simple
languages, which can be learned easily, are often incapable of conveying much infor-
mation. On the other hand, languages that draw many distinctions about the world
and are therefore capable of conveying world states to a high degree of precision are
generally cognitively complex.
The joint effect of the pressures for simplicity and communicative accuracy can
be studied by modifying the IL model presented above in section 3.1.1. In an IL
model plus communication, the selection of agents to become cultural parents is not
random, but rather happens with a probability proportional to the agents’ expected
communicative success with other agents. Two choices are necessary to define selec-
tion based on communicative success. First, which agents is each prospect parent
communicating with? In the models below (chapter 3), I assume that they are com-
municating with their cultural parents, but other choices are in principle possible.
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For instance, they can be modelled as communicating with the other agents in their
generation. This latter choice is more computationally expensive and more difficult
to interpret. Secondly, is communicative accuracy taken with the prospect parent as
a speaker, as a hearer, or both? In the models in chapter 3, I take the prospect par-
ents as speakers, but the other options are also valid possibilities. The expectation is
taken over many events of communication, and the measure of communicative suc-
cess depends on the specific model. A pressure for communicative accuracy added to
an IL model in the way described in this section causes the emergence of languages
that find the best compromise between simplicity and expressiveness.
Pragmatic skills play a special role in the interaction between language simplic-
ity and communicative accuracy. Communicative accuracy partially depends on the
amount of information that is conveyable by a language. A pragmatic agent is capa-
ble of extracting more information from a language than a literal agent. Therefore,
pragmatic agents will have greater communicative success with simpler languages.
Populations of pragmatic agents can evolve language that better adapt to their sim-
plicity bias, without losing in terms of communicative accuracy. This phenomenon
will appear again in the models developed in this chapter.
In this section, I presented the framework of IL as a way to study the evolution
of language in response to the pressures coming from individual cognition and com-
munication. I focused on the modelling aspect of IL. In the next section, I apply the
techniques presented in this section to the problem of the evolution of monotonicity.
3.2 A model for the evolution of monotonicity
3.2.1 Model 1: Pressure from learning
Language model
The first model only includes the pressure acting on scalar categories from cognition.
The model consists of:
1. An ordered set O = {D,≥D} modelling a scale, where D = {d1, . . . , dn} is a
set of n degrees ordered consistently with their indices.
2. A uniform probability distribution PD over D modelling the probability of
specific degrees being observed.
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3. A set M of meanings, which is the set of sets of degrees, i.e. the powerset P(D).
4. A set of signals S = {s1, . . . , so} that is identical for all languages.
5. A set of languages. Each language l : S 7→ M is a (total) function from each
signal to a corresponding meaning.
This way of defining the languages implies that there is no homonymy. However,
l might map two signals onto the same meaning, which means that synonymy is
possible. I added the further restriction that in every language there is at least one
meaning to refer to each degree. The languages are holistic in the sense of Kirby,
Tamariz, Cornish, and Smith (2015) because signals have no internal structure.
Each language l can be represented as a Boolean matrix L. Each row of L, Li,•,
corresponds to signal i and each column L•,j to state j. Li,j has value 1 iff dj ∈ l(si),
and 0 otherwise. For instance, the following language with 4 signals and 4 meanings:
d1 d2 d3 d4
s1 1 1 1 0
s2 0 1 1 0
s3 0 1 0 1
s4 1 0 1 0
is represented by the corresponding matrix L:
1 1 1 0
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
 (3.16)
Each language models a system of scalar categories. In the following, I consider
first languages with three signals and three degrees. Since a meaning is a set of
degrees, a scale with three degrees implies that there are 23 = 8 meanings. Each
way of attributing any three of the possible meanings to the three signals defines a
language, with the restriction that for each language each degree is contained in at
least one meaning. With three degrees and three signals, there are therefore a total
of 343 languages. I also discuss below the case where there are four signals and four
degrees, and therefore a total of 24 = 16 possible meanings and 50625 languages.
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Relation to adjectival meaning
The models in this section implement a model of the semantics of gradable adjectives
I presented in section 1.2. The meanings in M model standard functions by modelling
the set of degrees that verify λd.standard(d)(G)(C) given a fixed G and C, for a
simple scale consisting of only few degrees. The degrees covered by standard is
sufficient to model the effects of a bare assertion of a gradable adjective for what
concerns the degree argument. It will become clear below that the argument that
the models illustrate do not in principle depend on the number of scale degrees.
Much like for real scales, a transition in real adjectival meaning corresponds in
the model to a transition from m applying to not applying or viceversa when going
through the degrees in D in order. A meaning m ∈M models a monotonic standard
function iff m has zero or one transitions. A further distinction is useful to connect
the model to real world adjectives. Meanings with zero changes are either compatible
with all or with none of the degrees. I call meanings with zero changes degenerate
meanings. Degenerate meanings can be interpreted in two ways. First, they can be
understood as standard functions that are true for all degrees or false for all degrees.
Alternatively, a signal compatible with all states can be understood as silence, i.e. a
signal that does not exclude any possibility.7
Meanings with one transition are still monotonic while being compatible with a
proper subset of the set of degrees. Finally, meanings with two (or more) transitions
are non-monotonic. I will call degenerate those languages with only degenerate mean-
ings, monotonic non-degenerate those language that only have monotonic meanings
but no degenerate meanings, and non-monotonic those languages with at least one
non-monotonic meaning.
Particular care is needed in interpreting how model meanings represent real lan-
guage antonyms. As I discussed in 2, antonyms can be modelled as using two different
scales with the same degrees but opposite ordering relations, or the same scale with
transitions of different types (false-to-true for positive antonyms and true-to-false
for negative antonyms). In the model, both monotone increasing and monotone
7One must be careful with the latter interpretation, because differently from other signals, silence
as a signal that conveys no information is recognizable as such previous to learning. It is prima facie
appealing to interpret a model signal that is everywhere true as conveying that an individual has
the property to some degree, and a signal that is everywhere false as conveying that the individual
does not have the property to any degree. However, this interpretation is meaningless in the model
presented in this chapter, because by constructions senders directly observe a degree, rather than
an individual.
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decreasing terms can exist on the same scale. Nothing substantial hangs on this
interpretation. The choice of how to analyse the relation between antonyms is im-
portant in a related debate regarding the naturalness of increasing monotonicity as
opposed to decreasing monotonicity. If antonyms exist on two different scales in
a sense more substantial than I have discussed here, POS is technically not only
monotonic, but always increasing monotonic.
Likelihood and simplicity based prior
Agents are Bayesian learners of the type described in section 3.1.1. To define their
learning behaviour, a prior and a likelihood function have to be specified. The prior
is calculated as an inverse function of the language’s complexity, consistent with
previous work showing that learners prefer simpler languages (see 3.1.1 above for a
discussion of the relevant work). More specifically, the prior for each language is
calculated as follows. First, the description length of the language’s meanings, i.e.
the number of bits needed to encode the meaning of each signal, is calculated. The
description length of a language l, L(l), is the sum of the description lengths of the
meanings expressed by the language’s signals. Description length is my measure of
complexity. Finally, the prior for each language l is defined as:
p(l) ∝ 2−γL(l) (3.17)
Where γ is a value modelling the strength of the bias for simpler languages. Note
that languages with longer descriptions have lower prior probability. I use equation
3.17 for the prior in the agents’ Bayesian updating.
Equation 3.17 leaves open how to compress each meaning, which is needed to
calculate L. I argued in chapter 2 that scalar categories are encoded by specifying
the positions of all transitions from the meaning applying to not applying or from
not applying to applying. One extra bit must be added to specify whether the
first step is from applying to not applying or viceversa, since a list of the changes’
position leaves it unspecified and is therefore compatible with both a meaning and
its negation. For a discrete scale with n degrees, transition-based encoding allows
to compress any meaning in 1 + c log(n− 1) bits, where c is the number of changes
and n − 1 is the maximum possible number of transitions. The more degrees there
are, the more convenient it becomes to exploit the ordering on degrees rather than
simply encoding the single degrees that fall in the category. Notice that if a meaning
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Figure 3.2: The x-axis shows the underlying scale, e.g. the scale of height degrees for
“tall”. It is a fully bounded scale, consisting of degrees d1, d2, and d3. A meaning is
represented as a line extending over the degrees that belong to the meaning—e.g. the
degrees of height for which someone counts as “tall”. The complexity of a meaning is
estimated as the size of a lossless encoding of the meaning. If meanings were coded
by simply memorizing the degrees that belong to them, the description length of each
meaning would depend only on the number of degrees covered. Transitions-based
coding specifies the position of each change and whether the first change is from
belonging to not belonging to the meaning or viceversa. A natural result of coding
meanings based on transitions is that monotonic meanings have shorter descriptions
than non-monotonic ones.
has zero changes, it can be compressed in terms of transitions in one bit, which says
whether the meaning contains all the degrees or is empty.8 This compression method
is displayed in figure 3.2.
The consequence of compressing meanings by encoding their transitions is that
the meanings modelling monotonic standard functions are attributed a higher prior
probability than meanings modelling non-monotonic standard functions. This follows
from two facts. First, an increase in the number of changes always results in a
lower prior probability, and therefore degenerate monotonic meanings have the lowest
prior probability, followed by non-degenerate monotonic meaning. Second, as was
shown above, meanings with zero or one changes correspond to monotonic standard
functions.
8Technically, once a degree has been specified it can be excluded from the set of degrees that still
need to be specified. Therefore, at every new degree the number of degrees to pick from decreases
by one. Given a set of n degrees to choose from, the description length of a meaning covering k
degrees is 1 +
∑n
i=n−k log(i − 1), which is smaller than 1 + k log(n − 1) for n > 2. However, the
informational gain resulting from being able to exclude a value becomes smaller as the number of
degrees to pick from increases. I assume that for normal gradable adjectives the number of degrees
is big enough and the realistic number of degrees to specify small enough that this complication
makes no practical difference.
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The description length of a language in the model—and therefore its prior proba-
bility according to equation 3.17—depends on the description length of its meanings
but not in the way they are attributed to the signals. For languages with three
degrees, there are exactly three complexity levels for the meanings, corresponding
to zero, one or two changes. If the language moreover has three signals, there are
then at most 10 different distinct levels that the prior probability of a language can
take, i.e. the number of combinations with replacement of three complexity levels
for three available signals. In fact, there are fewer than 10 different monotonicity
levels. All that matters for the total description length of a language is the total
number of changes in the three meanings in the language, regardless of how they are
distributed across signals. For instance, language0 1 00 1 1
1 1 1

which contained three total transitions has the same coding complexity as0 1 11 0 0
1 0 0

Overall, there are exactly 7 different possible values for the prior probability of a
language, one for every way of summing a combination of 0, 1 and 2 changes. This
is shown in figure 3.3.
The way the prior above was defined influences how agents learn languages.
Specifically, the greater the total number of changes in the language, the longer
it takes agents to correctly guess the language, since the prior for the language is
smaller. Figure 3.4 shows this phenomenon for languages with four degrees and four
signals, for two levels of bias for monotonicity.
Once the prior is fixed, the other component needed for Bayesian updating is the
likelihood p(s | d, l), which is the probability of signal s being sent by a speaker of
language l after observing d. Calculating the likelihood therefore requires a model
of production, describing how agents pick a signal given a degree. There are two
relevant cases to model. If the observed degree is not in the meaning expressed by
the signal s in language l, the likelihood of the signal having been produced is 0. If
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Total # changes # changes by meaning Colour legend:
0 [0, 0, 0] degenerate mon
1 [0, 0, 1] non-deg mon
2 [0, 0, 2] , [0, 1, 1] non-mon
3 [0, 1, 2] , [1, 1, 1]
4 [0, 2, 2], [1, 1, 2]
5 [1, 2, 2]
6 [2, 2, 2]
Figure 3.3: The ten types of language by prior probability and monotonicity level.
Since the prior depends only on the total number of changes in the meanings of the
language, each language has one of seven different possible prior probabilities, one for
each row. Languages are subdivided in ten types in the second column by the number
of changes in each meaning. [a, b, c] names the type of language with a meaning with
a changes, a meaning with b changes and a meaning with c changes. A language
is degenerate mononotonic if each of its meanings has 0 changes, non-degenerate
monotonic if it contains at least one meaning with 1 change and no meaning with 2
changes, and non-monotonic if it contains at least one meaning with 2 changes.
one or more available meanings are compatible with the observed degree, the agents
need to choose which one to use for communication. For the simple agents in this
model, the only semantic criterion for choosing between meanings is compatibility,
so all compatible signals are semantically equally apt. Moreover, the agents are
literal, which means that they do not have pragmatic criteria to prefer one of two
meanings that are semantically equally compatible with a given degree. Lacking a
reason to prefer a compatible meaning over any other compatible meaning, agents
pick with uniform probability among the compatible meanings. This behaviour can
be modelled as:
p(s | d, l) =

0, if d /∈ l(s)
1
|{h | h ∈ Bl ∧ d ∈ h}|
if d ∈ l(s)
(3.18)
The production model in equation 3.18 has some desirable consequences. If a
language only has one signal to refer to the observed degree, then the production
probability is 1. A language that could not have produced a combination of signal
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Figure 3.4: The plot shows the difference between the teacher’s language and the
language with the highest posterior probability for the learner, for a variety of lan-
guages, number of observations, and two levels of simplicity bias (γ = 3 in equation
3.17). The languages of the agents in the plot have four degrees and four signals.
Each line corresponds to an averaged sample of 1000 languages with a given total
number of transitions. When agents do not have a bias for more compressible lan-
guages (left plot), the total number of transitions does not influence the number of
observations needed to acquire the language. On the other hand, when agents have
a bias for simplicity (right plot), languages with more changes are attributed smaller
priors and therefore agents need more observations to acquire them correctly.
and degree is judged impossible. Moreover, if two languages are equally probable
but one only has the received signal to refer to the observed degree while the other
has multiple signals, the former language is considered more probable.
The probability of each language is evaluated by the learner on a sequence of
tuples 〈degree, signal〉. Given equation 3.18, the probability of a sequence G =
〈〈s1, d1〉 , ..., 〈sn, dn〉〉 being produced by a speaker of language l is:





p(si | di, l) (3.19)
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Figure 3.5: Plot a: proportion of types across all languages. Plot b: prior probability
that the language will be of each type. Plot c: Frequency of monotonicity types in
model 1 over 50 runs of the simulation for each number of observations by learner.
Right plot: languages in same data by total number of transitions. The main con-
clusion of the first model is that learning alone induced the evolution of languages
proportionally to their representation in the agents’ prior. Therefore, a prior that
favours simple languages will induce an over-representation of degenerate languages.
Results
A pure IL condition was ran 50 times for 3000 generations with a population of 10
sample agents, for different numbers of observations by learners. Figure 3.5 shows
the frequency of the languages spoken for the different combinations of parame-
ters across all runs of the simulation, after excluding the first 1000 generations as
a burn-in. In a simple IL condition, agents across all generations mostly learn de-
generate languages for small numbers of observations. When learners make a lot
of observations before sampling a language, however, the number of non-degenerate
languages increases. This is a consequence of the fact that languages are preserved
very accurately across generations (see figure 3.4), and therefore the learner’s biases
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only influence the distribution of languages spoken in the population over very many
generations. Eventually, as discussed in 3.1.1, the distribution over languages will
converge to the prior distribution. However, if the languages are learned accurately,
it might take such as large number of generations before convergence to the prior
that it is infeasible to run the simulation. The convergence problem displayed in
figure 3.5 should make us suspicious of results that seem to depend on the number
of observations. However, all the results discussed below are stable even for high
number of observations.
This result is consistent with the larger framework of IL that was introduced
in 3.1.1. IL alone creates a pressure for languages to get increasingly simple, i.e.
conform to the prior expectations of the agents, since every new generation has a
tendency to learn languages that are simpler than the one spoken by the previous
generation.
However, this first model makes the wrong prediction with respect to the distri-
bution of language types. Degenerate languages, while monotonic, are not what we
observe in real world adjectival systems. Real world adjectives have non-degenerate
meanings and they allow speakers to convey information about amounts of properties
beyond whether an object has or not any degree of the property. The crucial advan-
tage of real-world non-degenerate adjectives over the predicted degenerate meanings
in model 1 lies intuitively in the fact that non-degenerate adjectives can be used
to convey information about the world, while degenerate meanings do not convey
any information. This gives a reason for thinking that a pressure for communicative
accuracy, as discussed above in section 3.1.1, might be involved in the evolution of
monotonicity. The second model, presented in the next section, makes this intuition
formal.
The conclusion of model 1 is that the pressure for simplicity coming from iterated
learning is not enough to account for the evolution of non-degenerate monotonicity
in adjectival meaning. Model 2 is a natural extension of model 1 with the addition
of a pressure for communicative accuracy.
3.2.2 Model 2: Communicative pressure on literal agents
Model 1 analysed the consequences that learnability has on the semantic structure
of gradable adjectives. The picture that emerged from model 1 is that pressures
from learnability drive gradable adjectives to be monotonic, but also to become
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degenerate and non-expressive. This is at odds with the observation that real world
adjectives tend to strike a balance between learnability and expressivity. Model 2
adds a pressure on languages to perform well for communication by selecting the
agents that communicate accurately to be cultural parents.
In model 2 a stage is added to the life of agents between the learning stage
and the teaching stage. In this middle stage the agents communicate with each
other as described on page 118. The pressure for language to be communicatively
accurate is implemented by selecting each agent a (with replacement) to be a cultural
parent for the following generation with a probability proportional to the expected
communicative success of a with its parent p:
p(a is selected) ∝ eεCS(a,b) (3.20)
where ε > 0 determines the strength of the selection. In the models below, ε is set
to 4, which allows for the emergence of different patterns with different values of
the other parameters. The intuition behind equation 3.20 is that an agent which is
communicatively successful with the other agents in its population is selected more
often to be a cultural parent. The consequence of this way of calculating fitness is
that languages that often provoke a failure in communication are taught less often
to the following generation.
Results
Model 2 was ran 50 times for 3000 generations with a population of 10 sample agents,
for different numbers of observations by learners. Figure 3.6 shows the frequency of
each language type being acquired by each generation after their learning phase,
again with a burn-in period of 1000 generations.
When pressure for languages to be communicatively accurate is implemented,
the number of monotonic languages decreases. This means that the communicative
pressure introduced in model 2 acts against the spreading of monotonic meanings.
The reason for this is that monotonic languages perform communicatively worse
than non-monotonic languages, and therefore the agents with the former languages
get fewer opportunities to be cultural parents to the following generation. The
communicatively poor performance of fully monotonic languages is a consequence of
two facts. First, while how much overlap the meanings have depends on where the
changes lie for each meaning, a language with three or more monotonic meanings
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Figure 3.6: Left plot: Frequency of monotonicity types in model 2 over 50 runs of
the simulation for each number of observations by learner. Right plot: languages in
same data by total number of transitions. The main conclusion of the second model
is that a pressure for communicative accuracy leads to non-monotonic languages
evolving.
necessarily has intersecting meanings (as long as no meaning is empty), as shown in
lemma 5. Second, a language with intersecting meanings is always suboptimal for
communication.
That a language l has intersecting meanings means that there exist two meanings
mi,mj in the range of l such that mi ∩mj 6= ∅. To see why a language with inter-
secting meanings cannot be optimal, notice that a consequence of the interpretation
behaviour described above is that for any two meanings m1 and m2, if |m1| > |m2|
and the speaker and the hearer use the same language, then a communicative event
in which m2 is used has a higher chance of being successful than a communicative
event in which m1 is used, just in virtue of m1 covering more degrees than m2. If
two languages l1, l2 are identical except for one signal which means m1 in l1 and m2
in l2, l2 has higher communicative accuracy when speaking with itself than the l1
when speaking with itself. Moreover, every language with two intersecting mean-
135
ings mi,mj (and possibly other non-intersecting meanings) can be transformed into
a language with no intersecting meanings by substituting mi with a new meaning
mk = m1 − (mi ∩ mj). Notice that |mi| > |mk|, and that the two languages are
identical modulo using mi or mk. A language with intersecting meanings can always
be transformed into a communicatively more accurate language, and is therefore
suboptimal. This has an effect on the model if the agents get enough data for their
languages to be similar to their parents’ languages, therefore approximating the ac-
curacy of the language speaking with itself.
The fact that any system of three monotonic meanings is communicatively sub-
optimal given the assumptions of model 2 also shows that the evolutionary pressures
behind monotonicity can be studied independently of where the threshold of applica-
bility of adjectives in their bare use falls. Wherever the threshold is, three monotonic
adjectives will be communicatively suboptimal and the model will give similar result.
In model 1, degenerate monotonic meanings prevail in virtue of their simplicity.
In model 2, non-monotonic languages prevail in virtue of their greater accuracy.
However, both models fail as an evolutionary account of adjectival monotonicity.
The communicative suboptimality of completely monotonic languages is tied with
the way that literal agents produce and understand signals. Since humans are not
literal agents, I give up the simplistic agents in model 2 and in model 3 study the
effects of implementing a more realistic model of communication that takes into
account human pragmatic skills.
3.2.3 Model 3: Communicative pressure on pragmatic agents
The agents in models 1 and 2 are literal in the sense that they base their linguistic
behaviour purely on the semantics of their language, without exploiting the addi-
tional information that comes from interacting with cooperative rather than merely
truthful agents. As speakers, literal agents pick with uniform probability among the
meanings compatible with the observed degree, without considering the hearer’s rea-
soning process. As hearers, literal agents guess with uniform probability among the
degrees compatible with the meaning of the received signal. In model 3, I implement
RSA agents as discussed in section 3.1.2. In this model, agents cooperate with each
other and take into account their being cooperative when determining their linguistic
behaviour.
The result of implementing recursive mindreading is that the agents in the model
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Figure 3.7: Left plot: Frequency of monotonicity types in model 3 over 50 runs of
the simulation for each number of observations by learner. Right plot: languages
in same data by total number of transitions. The conclusion from the third model
is that once pragmatically skilful agents are introduced, monotonicity evolves often
as a compromise between the pressure from the simplicity prior and communicative
accuracy.
become capable of calculating the model’s equivalent of real world implicatures. The
listener can in general assume that the speaker has chosen the signal that maximizes
the probability of communicative success among the ones compatible with the ob-
served degree. Since the signal that maximises the chances of the listener guessing
the correct degree is the one that covers the fewest degrees, after hearing a signal s
the listener will not guess any degrees d compatible with s but also compatible with




Model 2 was run 50 times for 3000 generations with a population of 10 sample agents,
for different numbers of observations by learners. The frequency of each language
type being acquired by each generation after their learning phase was calculated,
with a burn-in period of 1000 generations (figure 3.7). Most of the spoken languages
are non-degenerate and monotonic.
Model 3 makes the correct prediction, namely that systems of adjectives evolve
to be non-degenerate and monotonic. Implementing pragmatic skills, which gives
artificial agents the ability to calculate scalar implicatures, allows agents to accom-
modate the prior to a greater extend than in model 2 without losing in terms of
communicative accuracy. Monotonic, non-degenerate languages are the best trade-
off between communicative and learnability pressure only if agents are pragmatically
skilful.
3.3 Previous model of the evolution of monotonic-
ity: Brochhagen et al (2018)
The models above provided an evolutionary account for the monotonicity property
of scalar adjectives: monotone adjectival meanings constitute the best solution for
learnability and communicative accuracy, under the assumption that language users
are capable of pragmatic reasoning. Brochhagen, Franke, and van Rooij (2016) de-
velop an account that is similar to mine but differs in some crucial respects. The
meanings are less structured than in the models above. The structure of each mean-
ing is a function of its relation to an upper bound; each meaning can cover what is
below the upper bound, what is above, both, or neither, and is therefore encoded
with two bits. This modelling choice has two consequences. The first is that there
are no degenerate meanings in the sense used above. A meaning that is true for
both states in Brochhagen et al. (2016) is not degenerate, but rather simply one that
lacks an upper bound, e.g. the meaning of English “some”. In the models above,
I concluded that a simplicity pressure alone was insufficient because it resulted in
degeneracy. On the other hand, Brochhagen et al. (2016) exclude a pressure for
simplicity alone because it results in all the signals getting the same meaning, i.e.
the monotonic meaning. The two models offer therefore different arguments for the
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insufficiency of a simplicity pressure alone: avoidance of degeneracy in my model
and of synonymy in Brochhagen et al. (2016).
Additionally, since Brochhagen et al. (2016) focus on a very general sense of
scalarity, there is no obvious way to add structure to the model in a way that
encompasses all the relevant semantic structures. As a consequence, the higher com-
plexity of non-monotonic meanings and the size of this difference are stipulated in
the model. While this is an explicit modelling choice to avoid introducing assump-
tions, it makes it harder to extend the measure of complexity beyond two signals.
Since the model in Brochhagen et al. (2016) only has two states, there is not much
need for an explicit functional form for complexity. One can simply specify how
much more complex the non-monotonic meaning is than the monotonic one, and a
great variety of complexity measures could fit the two picked complexity values for
some parameters specification. On the other hand, calculating the complexity level
of three or more meanings requires a decision about their relative complexity, ideally
as a function of the differences in their semantic structure. Using scales to model the
meaning structure of scalar adjectives allowed us to model the relations between the
different meaning structures and their complexity. In sum, having a simple seman-
tic model makes the model in (Brochhagen et al., 2016) suitable to discuss different
cases of scalarity, but working with only two states and two signals implies that their
model cannot detect differences between degeneracy and monotonicity. Conflating
degeneracy and monotonicity is problematic, given that experimental work shows
that under a pressure for learning only, people prefer degenerate systems (Kirby et
al., 2015).
In a related and more recent paper, Brochhagen et al. (2018) narrow their focus to
quantifiers, and provide an explicit measure of complexity based on the set-theoretic
analysis of generalized quantification. In this paper, the semantic model has more
complexity, and includes three states, i.e. a representation of meaning that is more
similar to the one in the model presented in this chapter. However, other differ-
ences from the model above are introduced. Crucially, in Brochhagen et al. (2018)
degenerate meanings are excluded from the set of possible meanings. The spread of
degenerate languages was my reason for introducing a pressure for communicative
accuracy. Since there is no degeneracy in Brochhagen et al. (2018), this argument is
not available. Brochhagen et al. (2018) however have a different reason for introduc-
ing a communicative pressure in their model, namely to explain how the population
converges to a single language.
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A second difference between my and Brochhagen et al. (2018)’s paper is how
communicative fitness is calculated. In Brochhagen et al. (2018) what matters is
how well agents can speak with the other agents in the same population. Letting
agents interact within their generation is useful when studying convergence to a single
language. On the other hand, I calculate communicative accuracy between cultural
parent and offspring, implementing communication in a more restricted manner (and
allowing for more variability in the population). Calculating expected communicative
accuracy of an agent with their cultural parent only is also computationally more
efficient than calculating expected communicative accuracy of an agent with respect
to all the other agents in their generation. Spike, Stadler, Kirby, and Smith (2017)
compare various implementations of communication pressure in a computational
model, and their results suggest that the direction of communication (horizontal
vs. vertical) does not make a huge difference for obtaining a conventional signaling
system. Overall, the two models may produce very similar results. However, how
and whether the differences work out in the case of scalar meanings is still an open
question.
3.4 Discussion
Above, I considered three combinations of the following parameters:
1. Whether agents have or not a bias for simple languages.
2. Whether there is or not a selection for communicatively successful languages.
3. Whether agents are literal or pragmatic.
It is worth considering the other combinations of parameters to determine what the
contribution of each is. The results for other combinations of parameters across
different number of observations for learners is shown in figure 3.8.
When literal agents are not biased for simple languages (plot a, b, c, d in fig-
ure 3.8), direct selection of communicatively successful languages determines a high
proportion of non-monotonic languages, which, as argued above, can convey more
information about the parent’s observations.
The most interesting results occur when the model has pragmatic agents with
a preference for monotonicity, but no selection for communicatively successful lan-
guages (plot e in figure 3.8). In this case, monotonicity evolves very often, to levels
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Figure 3.8: Proportion of languages spoken for other combinations of parameters.
Agents can have or lack a bias for simple languages, they can be literal or pragmatic,
and there can be or not be a selection for communicatively successful languages.
comparable with the third model above. This results is coherent with the results in
Kirby et al. (2015), where a pressure for communicatively accurate languages was
implemented by having pragmatic agents rather than direct selection of languages.
Care is needed when interpreting this result. Without direct selection, the cru-
cial effect of pragmatic agents is not to increase the proportion of communicatively
successful (i.e. non-monotonic) languages irrespective of bias, but rather to avoid
degenerate languages when there is a bias. Indeed, with no bias and no selection,
pragmatic agents (plot d in figure 3.8) do not develop more non-monotonic languages
than literal agents (plot b). Looking at the proportion of individual languages de-
veloped by pragmatic agents with and without direct selection for communicatively
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successful languages shows that indeed almost degenerate languages often evolve in
the latter, but not in the former (figure 3.9).
Figure 3.9: Most frequently unique spoken languages in the IL models. Languages
are unique if they are not reducible to each other by shuffling the meanings across
signals (i.e. shuffling the rows of the matrix representing the language) and reversing
the order of the degrees. Each language is displayed as a 3 by 3 matrix as explained
above in 3.16. Yellow corresponds to 1 and black to 0. I selected for each condition
the 10 most frequently spoken languages (approximately 90% of the total for each
condition). The central column shows the selected languages, while the lateral plots
show the proportion of each of the languages in the condition with (right) or without
(left) direct selection by communicative accuracy (both conditions have pragmatic
agents and 40 observation by learners). While both conditions lead to a great major-
ity of monotonic languages (Lang 0, 5, 7, 14 are non-monotonic, but relatively rare),
the monotonic languages that evolve are different in the two conditions: languages
with two degenerate meanings—i.e. languages 0, 1, 3, 4, 13—often evolve in the
condition with pragmatic agents but without direct selection for communicatively
successful languages (right plot), but are rare when selection is added (right plot).
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Why do pragmatic agents prevent degenerate languages from evolving? The
reason is that it is easier to distinguish between degenerate and non-degenerate
languages for pragmatic agents than it is for literal agents. In other words, non-
degenerate languages will be mistaken more often for degenerate languages by literal
than by pragmatic agents, as can be seen in figure 3.10. However, the difference in
distinguishability does not depend on how communicatively successful the languages
is.
Figure 3.10: The plot shows the transition percentages between degenerate (‘d’),
monotonic (‘m’), and non-monotonic (‘n’) languages. Top row: with few observa-
tions, both pragmatic and literal agents with a bias only learn degenerate languages.
Central row: with more observations, literal agents mistake non-monotonic and
monotonic for degenerate languages more often than literal agents. However, prag-
matic agents mistake non-monotonic for monotonic more than literal agents. Bottom
row: With even more observations, literal agents become capable of recognizing each
language with high accuracy, but pragmatic agents still mistake non-monotonic for
monotonic languages.
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Figure 3.11: Results for the main three conditions with larger languages with 4
signals and 4 degrees. The results presented in the previous section for smaller
languages are reproduced for the larger languages. IL with literal agents and bias
alone leads to a majority of degenerate languages (left plot). Adding direct selection
for communicative accuracy leads non-monotonic languages to emerge often (cen-
tral plot). Adding pragmatic skills to selection based on communicative accuracy,
however, leads to a large majority of monotonic languages (right plot).
Finally, the reason why non-monotonic languages do not evolve with pragmatic
agents is that data produced by non-monotonic languages looks similar to data pro-
duced by monotonic languages, and therefore the likelihood function will be almost
uniform (figure 3.10). The prior will then play a large role in determining the poste-
rior. In sum, adding pragmatic skills makes the difference between agents speaking
degenerate and non-degenerate languages greater, and the difference between agents
speaking monotonic and non-monotonic languages smaller.
Until now, I have discussed the case of a language with three signals and three
degrees. However, it is worth considering the languages that evolve in the three
parameters regimes above when the scale contains more degrees and more signals
are available. I ran the models with languages consisting of four signals, and with
four degrees. Each combination of parameters was ran 50 times for 3000 generations.
Figure 3.11 shows that the main results presented above are reproduced for the larger
languages.
Larger languages are particularly interesting because they show how strategies to
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keep meanings monotonic while preserving communicative accuracy combine. With
this in mind, it is useful to observe which languages specifically evolve commonly
in the IL condition with pragmatic agents and direct selection for communicative
accuracy. In particular, two patterns emerge that I discussed in section 2.1.4. First,
two non-overlapping signals of opposite polarity develop on top of a degenerate signal
covering the whole space, in such a way that some degrees can only be expressed by
the degenerate signal. This is an example of such a language:
1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0

Language 6 in figure 3.12 is an example of such a language. Pragmatic agents will
infer from the use of the degenerate signal that none of the other signals were avail-
able. If the degenerate signal is interpreted as silence, insofar as it is compatible with
all possible world states, the central space that is left uncovered by all other signals
can be interpreted as the zone of indifference discussed in 2.1.4. This corresponds to
the intuition that a specific signal is not needed for the zone of indifference: when
the sender is silent about a certain feature in a descriptive task, the receiver can
imagine a degree that is not covered by all other non-silence signal.
The second patterns that emerges is two of the signals partially overlapping with
each other, e.g. the second and third signals in the following language:
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0

Language 15 in figure 3.12 is an example of this pattern. This type of language gen-
erates, as mentioned above, scalar implicatures for pragmatic users. For instance,
when the second signal is used, a pragmatic receiver can infer that the sender prob-
ably observed the third degree. If the sender had observed degrees one or two,
they would have send the third or fourth signal. This pattern corresponds to the
existence, in systems of gradable adjectives, of multiple signals with the same polar-
ity, such as “warm”, “hot”, and “boiling”. Both patterns can be recognized in the
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Figure 3.12: Most frequently unique spoken languages in the IL model, with larger
languages. For a fuller explanation of the plot, see figure 3.9.
model as strategies to reach high communicative accuracy while retaining monotonic
meanings, when language users are pragmatic.
While the models above deliver a picture of how monotonic but not degenerate
signals might have evolved, various criticisms could be raised. A first problem is
whether the set of possible meanings could be simplified. If the degenerate meanings
are excluded from the set of possible meanings, the monotonic languages have the
highest prior. Therefore, a model with IL alone naturally converges to monotonic
languages. A critic could argue that the possibility of degenerate languages should
be given up, remove them from the hypothesis space in the model and think of
monotonicity as a direct consequence of simplicity. This move would simplify the
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model without loss in explanatory power. However, this move is difficult to justify
for at least two reasons. First, degenerate languages are clearly options in the space
of adjectival meanings. While degenerate meanings do not give information about
the degree to which an object has a property, they do give 1 bit of information saying
whether an object has the property to any degree or not. Second, non expressive
languages similar to what I defined as degenerate emerge in pure IL experimental
conditions. This shows that degenerate meanings applying to all or to none of the
objects are not only theoretically possible, but can also emerge in linguistic systems
created by human agents when there is no pressure to make the meanings useful in
communication. (Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008).
A second objection that could be raised against the model concerns the selection
of linguistic forms according to communicative accuracy. Often, it does not make
a practical difference to communicate whether the degree to which an object has
a property falls within the extension of the positive or the extreme adjective for
that scale. Indeed, often scalar implicatures are not calculated for scalar adjectives
(Doran, Baker, McNabb, Larson, & Ward, 2009), and there is substantial variation
even among gradable adjectives with respect to the frequency of calculation of scalar
implicatures (Van Tiel, Van Miltenburg, Zevakhina, & Geurts, 2016). A critic might
remark that the mechanism presented in the present chapter, where scalar impli-
catures allow monotonicity without a loss in communicative accuracy, is therefore
in general not acting to shape the semantics of gradable adjectives. Therefore, the
communicative pressure in model 2 would be strong enough to prevent degenerate
meanings, but not strong enough to overcome the preference for monotonic exten-
sions. This argument could be further developed in a computational model, but I
leave this to future work.
In this chapter, I developed an evolutionary account of monotonicity, and argued
that the mechanism underlying the spreading of monotonicity rests on a combination
three facts. Namely, monotonic meanings are simpler than non-monotonic meanings,
language is shaped by both IL and a pressure for accurate communication, and
human beings are capable of pragmatic reasoning.
The account of the evolution of monotonicity presented in this chapter makes
some assumptions about cognition and communication. These assumptions make
specific empirical predictions that can be operationalized, providing support for the
models above. A crucial assumption of the models presented in this chapter, which
was first introduced and argued for in chapter 2, is that scalar categories are coded
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in terms of transitions rather than prototypes, and that therefore the structure of
the conceptual domain determines which categories are simpler to code. In the next




Testing a bias for monotonicity
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I discussed a model of the evolution of monotonicity in
adjectival semantics. The model made a crucial cognitive assumption, namely that
single bounded scalar categories are easier to learn than (n ≥ 2)-bounded categories
in scalar conceptual domains. This assumption was based on a picture of categoriza-
tion in scalar conceptual domains presented in chapter 2. In this chapter, I present
experimental work that attempts to test this account of categorization, and more
specifically the hypothesis that the bias for monotonicity is be stronger in scalar do-
mains than domains structured by metric relations. The general strategy I adopt for
testing the hypothesis is as follows. First, participants are familiarized with a group
of stimuli in two conditions. In one condition, the stimuli are framed as forming a
scale. In the other condition, the focus is on the relations of similarity holding be-
tween the stimuli. Then, participants are told that one or more of the stimuli belong
to an alien category. Finally, participants are asked to guess which other stimuli
belong to the category. The structure of the category inferred by the participants
can be used to make inferences about their learning biases.
The experiments in this chapter ultimately do not find support for the hypothesis.
The lack of a significant result is compatible with the hypothesis being true, because
the hypothesized differences in behaviour are difficult to measure. Therefore, in the
next chapter I develop a more complex statistical and cognitive model and run more
experiments to study the hypotheses of interest.
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4.2 Experiment 1: Selection of individual stimuli
4.2.1 Materials and Methods
Participants
28 participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) crowdsourcing
platform1, a website where users (called Workers) can perform tasks (called HITs)
in exchange for monetary compensation. Participant location was restricted to the
United States. One participant was excluded because they said in the feedback that
they could not use the interface properly, and one was excluded because they did
not complete the experiment. All participants received 0.75 USD for participation
in the experiment.
Materials
The experiment was coded in JavaScript and PHP and hosted in a server owned by
the University of Edinburgh. Stimuli consisted of 36 images described as alien plants
in the narrative frame presented to the participants. In order to keep the conditions
as similar as possible and to avoid introducing confounds, the same stimuli are used
for both conditions. The stimuli then have to satisfy the following conditions. First,
the stimuli have to approximate a continuous change, since the inferred conceptual
domain, whether a scale or a metric space, should be continuous. Second, the change
cannot be more natural in one direction than the other, to avoid the participants
from thinking about the stimuli as a scale when they are supposed to think in terms
of similarity. Third, in this experiment the change is not one-dimensional. Instead,
various features of the stimuli change, such as color and shape. Stimuli were drawn
in the Scalable Vector Graphics (vga) format with the Inkscape software.2 They are
shown in figure 4.1.
Procedure
The experiment consists of two conditions, a property condition and a similarity
condition. The experiment is visualized with a flowchart in figure D.1 of appendix




Figure 4.1: Stimuli for the first experiment, arranged in four rows for ease of vi-
sualization. The stimuli consist of 36 images of alien plants. The stimuli change
continuously and neither direction of change is more natural than the other.
to the property condition. Each condition has two phases, a familiarization and a
testing phase, plus a familiarization form at the beginning and a feedback form at
the end. The narrative frame and training were different in the two conditions, but
the testing phase was the same in each condition.
The familiarization phase in the property condition starts with a screen giving
the narrative frame of the experiment:
You just landed on an alien world. You are going to see a series of plants
from that world. These plants take different shapes depending on the
concentration in the environment of blagardium, an alien chemical. Try
to learn how different amounts of radiation impact the shape that the
plants took. You will be shown pairs of plants and asked which one
develops with the highest amount of blagardium.
The second screen of the familiarization phase asks participants to familiarize them-
selves with the stimuli, which are displayed on the screen. Since the stimuli are
designed to lack an intrinsic direction of increase, their order is flipped randomly
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across participants. An arrow below the stimuli indicates the direction of blagardium
increase. The arrow always points to the right.
The 3rd to 18th screen (a total of 15 screens) of the property condition train the
participants to think about the stimuli in a way appropriate to the condition. Each
screen shows two stimuli, and the participant is instructed to click on the plant with
the highest amount of blagardium. The whole set of stimuli with bottom arrow is
visible throughout at the bottom of the screen. The two stimuli are picked with
uniform probability and without repetitions. Participants got feedback for every
trial, and incorrect trials were repeated until correct
The similarity condition is mostly identical to the property condition. The fa-
miliarization phase in the similarity condition is:
You just landed on an alien world. You are going to see a series of plants
from that world. These plants can take different shapes. Try to learn
what shapes the plants can take and how similar different shapes are.
You will be shown two pairs of plants. You will be asked which of the
two pairs has the most similar plants.
In the second screen, the only difference is the absence of an arrow below the stimuli.
The 3rd to 18th screen in the similarity condition train the participants to think
about the stimuli as being structured by an order. The arrow below the stimuli
at the bottom of the screen is missing. Instead of two stimuli, participants are
presented with two pairs of stimuli, and they are instructed to select the pair with
the most similar plants. To avoid the two pairs having equally similar stimuli, one
pair is picked so that the two stimuli are at a distance of between 0 and 2 (included)
stimuli, and the other pair at a distance of 6 or more stimuli.
The testing phase is identical in the two conditions and consists of three screens.
In the first screen, the participant receives the following instruction:
The aliens speak an alien language, and they have words to talk about
the plants you observed earlier. Now you are going to observe plants that
the aliens call ‘meeb’. You will be asked to select the plants that you
think the aliens use the word ‘meeb’ for.
In the second screen, one of the stimuli is selected as belonging to the “meeb”
category. The pre-categorized stimulus is chosen randomly from the stimuli that are
more than 10 stimuli away from the border. The participant is asked to select the
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other plants that they think also belong to the alien category. Selection happens
by clicking and dragging over the plants. The plants selected by the participant are
surrounded by a black box.
4.2.2 Results and discussion
For each participant, the plants selected as belonging to the ‘meeb’ category in the
testing phase were recorded. Participants behaved in substantially the same way
in the two conditions (see fig 4.2). In each condition, two participants picked the
monotonic category and all other participants the non-monotonic category. There-
fore, the H0 cannot be rejected based on the data from experiment 1. However,
there are reasons to be sceptical of the data from experiment 1. A number of partic-
ipants only selected one stimulus, that was moreover different from the one shown
as categorized (fig 4.2). Since this choice is inconsistent with the given instructions,
these participants either used the interface incorrectly or they did not understand
the instructions. Third, monotonic categories are the largest categories, which makes
them extreme in a certain respect. Participant might have a resistance to picking
monotonic categories in virtue of their extremeness. While the preference for mono-
tonicity might still cause a difference in the behaviour across the two conditions,
the difference would not show up simply a difference in the number of monotonic
categories picked in the two conditions. A second reason to look at the results of
experiment 1 with scepticism is the fact that ‘meeb’ looks more like a noun than an
adjective. As discussed in chapter 2, the grammatical class might affect participants’
expectations about the structure of the category. In the new design, I try to move
away from expectations participants might have on the basis of the form of the word.
Experiment 2 is designed to solve these problems through a more intuitive interface.
4.3 Experiment 2: Choice among scalar categories
Experiment 1 tested the participants’ bias for monotonicity by having them select the
stimuli that they thought belong to an alien category. In experiment 2, participants
do not select the plants directly. Instead, they are give a forced choice task, choosing
between a monotone and a non-monotone category.
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Figure 4.2: The plot shows participants’ responses for experiment 1. For each partic-
ipant, the figure shows the stimulus that was presented as belonging to the category
(Selected) in translucent blue (transparency α = 0.5), as well as the stimuli selected
by the participants (Responses) in green. The order of the stimuli was randomly
flipped across participants, but the stimuli are brought back to the same order in
the plot.
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4.3.1 Materials and Methods
Participants
82 participants (41 per condition) were recruited via AMT. The same restrictions,
payments and AMT description apply as with experiment 1.
Materials
The stimuli are identical to the stimuli in experiment 1 (See fig 4.1).
Procedure
The training phase in the similarity condition is identical to experiment 1, except for
small changes in the instruction which can be seen in figure D.2. The testing phase
is quite different from experiment 1. The novel alien term ‘meeb’ becomes ‘ ’.
The reason for using a word written in unknown characters is that it would not afford
a reading of the word as a noun or an adjective.
In the second screen of the testing phase, participants are presented with one
stimulus that they are told belongs to the category, as well as two possible categories,
and are asked to identify one of the categories as the alien category by clicking on
the corresponding row of stimuli. The categories are picked randomly (see algorithm
2 in the appendix for more details).
4.3.2 Results
In the similarity condition, more participants picked monotonic categories than non-
monotonic categories. Moreover, more participants picked the monotone category
in the property than in the similarity condition. Fig 4.3 shows the pre-categorized
stimuli seen by each participant and the category they picked, and fig 4.4 summarizes
the data.
The data was analysed with a simple logistic model, regressing the participant’s
pick of monotonic category (a boolean variable) on the condition (a categorical vari-
able with two levels, property and similarity). The monotonic variable is boolean,
and the condition variable has values similarity (the intercept) and property. 25 par-
ticipants out of 41 picked the monotone category in the similarity condition, while
this rose to 27 out of 41 in the property condition. The regression shows that this
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Figure 4.3: The plot shows participants’ responses for experiment 2. For each partic-
ipant, the figure shows the stimulus that was presented as belonging to the category
(Selected) in translucent blue (transparency α = 0.5), as well as the stimuli selected
by the participants (Responses) in green. The order of the stimuli was randomly
flipped across participants, but the stimuli are brought back to the same order in
the plot. The monotonic categories are the ones that go up to the maximum (e.g.
second row in plot of similarity condition) or the minimum (e.g. last row in plot of
property condition) of the scale.
156
increase in number of participants choosing the monotonic category in the property
condition is not significantly different from no increase (See 4.1). More specifically,
the probability of the observed or a more extreme increase, under the assumption
that there is no difference between the two conditions (p-value), is ≈ 0.647. The
estimated log-odds of picking the monotonic category in the similarity condition is
0.4463, and therefore the estimated probability is exp(0.4463)
1+exp(0.4463)
≈ 0.61, which is the
proportion of participants that picked the monotone category in the similarity con-
dition. The estimated increase in log-odds when going to the property condition
is 0.21, and therefore the total predicted probability of picking the monotone cate-
gory in the property condition is exp(0.4463+0.21)
1+exp(0.4463+0.21)
≈ 0.658, which is the proportion of
participants that picked the monotone category in the property condition.
Table 4.1: Regression for experiment 2. SEs are shown in brackets below the es-










Akaike Inf. Crit. 111.490
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
4.3.3 Discussion
No clear pattern emerged in the way that participants pick monotonic categories. A
post-hoc analysis shows that, surprisingly, the distance of the categorized stimulus
from the center seems to have little effect on the participants’ choice (right plot in
fig 4.4). The model
monotonic ∼ cond i t i on + d i s t anc e . from . cent e r
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Figure 4.4: Summary plots for experiment 2. The left plot shows the number of
participants that picked monotonic and non-monotonic by condition. The right plot
shows the same information broken down by position of the pre-categorized stimulus.
The closeness of the pre-categorized stimulus to the border does not have a large
impact on the guessed category.
shows that the distance from center was not a significant predictor of the choice of
category. This means that participants were not more likely to pick the monotone
category if the observed stimulus was close to the extremes of the scale.
Participants did not behave significantly differently in the two conditions. One
possible reason for this is that a conceptual space with a scalar structure does not in
fact induce a preference for monotonic categories. Another possible reason for why
conditions were not significantly different is that the experiment failed at producing
different mental encoding of the stimuli set. While there is substantial change of the
stimuli across the scale, arguably no plant stands out as a potential prototype. Since
the hypothesis was that the preference for convex category comes from thinking in
terms of prototypes, in experiment 3 we increase the affordance for thinking in terms
of prototypes by changing the set of stimuli.
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Figure 4.5: Stimuli for experiment 3, arranged in four rows for ease of visualization.
The stimuli consist of 36 images of alien plants. Like in the first experiment, the
stimuli change continuously but no direction of chance is more natural than the
other. The stimuli have some perfect shapes (central column).
4.4 Experiment 3: Affordance for prototypical in-
terpretation
The stimuli set used in experiments 1 and 2 did not afford a prototype based in-
terpretation. Therefore, in experiment 3 we introduce a new set of stimuli (fig 4.5).
The new stimuli are simple geometrical shapes morphing into each other in a series.
The crucial difference with respect to the stimuli in fig 4.1 is that geometric shapes
afford a prototype structure. In particular, the stimuli for experiment 3 include a
circle, a square, a triangle, and an isotoxal square star.
4.4.1 Materials and Methods
Participants
40 participants were run for each condition. The same restrictions and MT descrip-
tion apply as in experiment 2.
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Procedure
While the design is mostly identical to experiment 2, there are a few differences. The
alien word is substituted by . This is because the geometric shapes
in afford analogies with the geometric shapes in the new stimuli set. For
the same reason, in the testing phase the expression “red rectangle” becomes “red
frame”. Lastly, the way categories are picked is different (see algorithm 3 for details).
4.4.2 Results
Fig 4.6 shows for each participant which stimulus they saw as pre-categorized and
which of the possible categories they picked. Fig 4.7 shows the data in a more syn-
thetic form. First of all, more participants picked the non-monotonic categories.
This indicates that the change in stimuli produced, to some extent, the intended
effect. We ran a simple logistic model, regressing the participant’s choice of mono-
tonic or non-monotonic category on the condition. Results are shown in table 4.2.
The model confirms the pattern with a significant negative intercept (p = 0.001)3
in table 4.2. Secondly, the difference between the two conditions increased, from
0.21 in experiment 2 to 0.726 in experiment 3.4 Despite the increased difference,
the property condition is not significantly different from the similarity condition in
experiment 3 (p = 0.146).
Like in experiment 2, a model including a random intercept by the distance of the
categorized stimulus from the center is singular, indicating that the distance from
the center does not explain the data better than noise.
4.4.3 Discussion
Participants in experiment 2 did not behave significantly differently in the two con-
ditions. However, changing the stimuli had an effect in the intended direction. This
is a first indication that participants are sensitive to the affordances of different types
of stimuli, and that the design of the experiment might be incapable of detecting
the relevant difference in participant behaviour between the conditions. More specif-
ically, a worry about the first three experiments is that they can only detect a large,
3I report p-values only up to three decimal points because the amount of data makes more
precise estimations meaningless.
4Note that the magnitude of this difference is hard to interpret directly because it is in the logit
space.
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Akaike Inf. Crit. 99.578
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
qualitative difference in the behaviour of participants, i.e. the choice between fully
monotone and non-monotone categories. However, a preference for monotone cate-
gories might have subtler effects on behaviour, for instance determining preferences
among the non-monotonic categories.
In the following chapter, I develop a Bayesian model to explore the effects of a
preference for monotonicity on categorization behaviour. Having an explicit model
of categorization will allow the analysis of more complex categorization data, and
therefore of subtler patterns in the behaviour of participants.
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Figure 4.6: The plot shows participants’ responses for experiment 3. For each partic-
ipant, the figure shows the stimulus that was presented as belonging to the category
(Selected) in translucent blue (transparency α = 0.5), as well as the stimuli selected
by the participants (Responses) in green. The order of the stimuli was randomly
flipped across participants, but the stimuli are brought back to the same order in
the plot. The monotonic categories are the ones that go up to the maximum (e.g.
second row in plot of similarity condition) or the minimum (e.g. last row in plot of
property condition) of the scale. No evidence was found that participants were more
likely to pick the monotonic category in the property condition than in the similarity
condition.
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Figure 4.7: Summary plots for experiment 3. The left plot shows the number of
participant that picked monotonic and non-monotonic by condition. The right plot




Bayesian modelling and more
experiments
In the previous chapter, I discussed three experiments aiming to test the hypothesis
that thinking in a scalar way induces a preference for monotonicity. The data did
not support the hypothesis. However, it prompted the realization that even if the
hypothesis is true, the resulting pattern in the data might be subtler than the statis-
tical model used above is capable of detecting. Therefore, in this chapter I present
a more sophisticated cognitive Bayesian model of categorization (section 5.1), and
then wrap around it a statistical Bayesian model capable of fitting experimental data
(section 5.2). Finally, I present three experiments and the results of model fitting on
the data (sections 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5). While the experimental data does not support
the hypothesis, the process of developing a model and analysing the data deepens
our understanding of what predictions the theory is making exactly, and what is
difficult about testing them.
5.1 A cognitive model of categorization
The aim of this section is to define a family H of probability densities h modelling,
at the computational level of analysis, the portion of the participants’ cognitive
apparatus causing the behaviour that is measured in the experiment. Once a set of
parameters modelling cognitive variables and observations are specified, H produces
a distribution over possible behaviours. The next section embeds H in a Bayesian
model that can be used to fit experimental data directly.
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H models the following situation. An individual πi observes a set Σi of n stimuli:
{σi,j}nj=1 ⊆ Σ, where Σ is the set of all stimuli in the experiment. The stimuli in
Σi are presented to πi as belonging to some unknown category c. Based on Σi, πi
calculates a posterior probability distribution f(κ|Σi) over possible categories κ ∈ K.
The distribution f(κ|Σi) encodes the probability that πi attributes to each possible
category being c, after having observed the stimuli Σi sampled from c. Crucially, f
does not have to depend only on Σi, but can also depend on πi’s cognitive biases.
Ultimately, πi’s biases are what the model will try to estimate. Finally, πi uses
f(κ|Σi) to guess whether other stimuli also belong to c. More specifically, she accepts
a stimulus σ as belonging to the same category that produced Σi with a probability
h(σ | Σi), which I call the acceptance probability.
Various aspects of the model need to be specified. First of all, what belongs to
the set K of possible categories. Secondly, how πi finds the posterior distribution
f(κ|Σi). Lastly, how f(κ|Σi) determines the πi’s behaviour as encoded in h(σ | Σi).
I address these three questions in turn.
5.1.1 Set of categories
The first question is how to define the set of possible categories K considered by
πi. I assume that πi knows the underlying set of possible stimuli Σ. In the case of
the experiment, the participants know what the stimuli are because they are always
visible on screen. Σ is not an unstructured set, but rather a finite totally ordered
set {σi}|Σ|i=1, where σi ≤Σ σj iff i ≤ j.1 The order relation reflects the fact that while
there is a discrete number of experimental stimuli, the stimuli are designed to show
an underlying continuous, gradual change. While the is no natural direction to this
gradual change, so as not to strongly afford a scalar interpretation, a total order can
encode which stimuli are closer together with respect to the change.
The categories are sets of stimuli, i.e. subsets of Σ. One natural way of defining
the set of all possible categories K is as the set of subsets of Σ, the powerset P(Σ).
Any combination of stimuli would then count as a category. This way of defining K
has the advantage of being natural and not making assumptions about the category
that participants entertain. However, having P(Σ) as the set of categories poses a
computational problem. The number of possible categories increases exponentially
with the number of stimuli, as there are 2|Σ| categories. This would make fitting
1I omit the subscript of the order relation when it is clear from the context.
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experimental data to the Bayesian model impractical. A solution to this problem
is to choose a smaller set of categories. This is not as problematic as it might
first seem, as it is a priori plausible that some categories are not considered by
participants. Examples of likely ignored categories include the category of alternate
stimuli {σi ∈ Σ | i mod 2 = 0} and the category of extremes {σ1, σ|Σ|}. Based on
this consideration, I assume that not all possible sets of stimuli need to be considered
by the model, i.e. K ⊂ P(Σ).
Exactly which subset of P(Σ) can be assumed to be considered by the participant?
In line with previous literature2, I define K as the set of convex sets of stimuli.
Convexity here is defined as follows:
Definition 9. A subset B of a totally ordered set Ω = (O,≤Ω) is convex iff for all
b1, b2, b3 ∈ Ω if b1, b3 ∈ B and b1 ≤Ω b2 ≤Ω b3 then b2 ∈ B.
Note that this definition exploits the choice above to make Σ a totally ordered set.
The set of convex categories contains 1
2
(|Σ|+ 1)|Σ| categories.3 While the number of
all categories increases exponentially with |Σ|, the number of convex categories only
increases quadratically, which solves the computational problem mentioned above.
A final advantage of choosing convexity as the criterion for including a category
in K is that the set of convex categories contains all monotonic categories, and
can therefore be used to test a preference for monotonicity. To show that the set
of convex categories contains all monotonic categories, it needs to be shown that
monotonicity implies convexity. Assume ad absurdum that a category κ is monotone
but not convex. Then there are three stimuli b1, b2, b3 such that (1) b1, b2 ∈ κ, (2)
b1 ≤ b2 ≤ b3, and (3) b2 6∈ κ . κ is either monotone increasing or decreasing. If it
2See the discussion of convexity in conceptual spaces from chapter 2.
3To see why, note that each non-empty convex category can be defined as the set of points
between and including its two extremes σi and σj (with i, j ≤ |Σ|), in two equivalent ways: (σi, σj)
and (σj , σi). The case where i = j is the case of a category consisting of a single stimulus.



















is the number of r-sized sets out of n elements with repetitions, and I have used the
equivalence n! = n(n− 1)!.
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is increasing, since b1 ∈ κ and b1 ≤ b2, b2 ∈ κ. Since this contradicts assumption
(3), κ must be monotone decreasing. Then, since b3 ∈ κ and b2 ≤ b3, b2 ∈ κ. This
generates a contradiction. Therefore, κ must be convex. The left plot of figure 5.1
shows the convex categories for a set of 7 stimuli.
5.1.2 Posterior distribution over categories
As discussed above, f(κ|Σi) is the probability distribution over categories of agent
πi after observing a set of stimuli Σi sampled from κ. I assume that πi is a Bayesian
agent and calculates4 the posterior probability by applying Bayes’ theorem:
f(κ | Σi) =
p(Σi | κ)p(κ)∑
κj∈K p(Σi | κj)p(κj)
(5.1)
Where p(Σi | κ), the likelihood, is a conditional distribution over observations Σi
given that the observed stimuli are being sampled from a category κ, and p(κ), the
prior, is the probability that πi attributes to a category κ before observing any data.
I explore prior and likelihood in turn.
Agent’s prior
Some categories might be preferred by πi over other categories, independently of
the observed data. These preferences, which I will call biases, can be modelled as
parameters that increase the prior probability of certain hypotheses over others.
The biases of πi might in principle favour any aspect of the category to be guessed.
However, here I focus on two biases. Firstly, a bias PMi (P reference for Monotonic)
for monotonicity, which is the parameter that I ultimately want to estimate from the
experimental data. Secondly, a bias PLi (P reference for Large) for larger or smaller
categories than would be expected by likelihood alone.
The preference for monotonic categories is modelled because the present aim is
ultimately to evaluate the parameter in the two experimental conditions. On the
other hand, the reason for adding a preference for large categories is slightly subtler.
As we will see, both PM and PL affect the size of the categories that agents tend to
infer. Assuming no PL is equivalent, as we will see, to assuming a fixed value of PL
4The model in this section is meant as a computational, rather than algorithmic level theory, in
Marr, Ullman, and Poggio (2010)’s levels of analysis. I do not make claims about how the quantities
in this section are computed or implemented.
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for all agents. If different agents have in fact varying preferences for category size,
a model with PM but without PL would attempt to explain all variation across
agents in terms of PM alone. As we will see below, this might introduce a bias
in the estimation of PM . To prevent this from happening, I model PL explicitly.
Other aspects of agents’ cognition might influence behaviour in a way that biases
the estimation of PM , a problem to which we return below.
The prior of participant πi is then p(κ) = p(κ|PMi, PLi). I assume that the two
biases act independently on the preference for a category, and I factorize the prior
as the (renormalized) product of two density functions:
p(κ) ∝ p(κ|PMi)p(κ|PLi) (5.2)
Note that if a category is certain according to one bias, it will be certain for πi
independently of the the (dis)preference coming from the other bias. To see why,
consider that if p(κj|PMi) = 1, then p(κl 6=j|PMi) = 0, which means as just shown
that every category but κj will be a priori impossible for πi, leaving κj as the only
option. This is under the assumption that the agent does not have contradictory
biases, i.e. assuming that p(κj | PLi) is not also 0.
PMi, the preference for monotonic categories of agent i, is a single parameter
bounded in [0, 1]. PMi defines a distribution over categories as follows:
p(κ|PMi = α) ∝ α1mon(κ) + (1− α)(1− 1mon(κ)) (5.3)
where 1mon is the indicator function which equals 1 when its argument is a monotone
category and 0 otherwise.5 It is worth noting some intuitive features of this way of
modelling the bias for monotonicity. First, the bias for monotonic categories increases
strictly monotonically as PMi increases. This ensures that no two values of PMi
convey the same information about the preference for monotonicity. Second, when
PMi = 0, monotonic categories are a priori impossible. Third, when PMi = 1, it is
a priori certain that the true category will be monotonic. Finally, when PMi = 0.5,
πi has no a priori preference for either monotonic or non-monotonic categories.
The second bias I implement in the model is the bias for category sizes, PLi. The
size of a category is the number of stimuli it contains. PLi is defined in (−∞,∞),
5In the following, I use the 1 notation in two more ways. When p is an expression that is true
or false, 1p is 1 if p is false and 0 otherwise. If c is a set, 1c(a) is 1 if a ∈ c and 0 otherwise. The
context will make it clear how 1 is meant in each case.
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and influences the prior probability of categories as follows:
p(κ|PLj = β) ∝ eβ|κ| (5.4)
Note that the cardinality function can be used on a category because categories
are sets of stimuli.6 Bigger categories have an advantage over smaller categories if
PLi > 0, a disadvantage if PLi < 0, and neither if PLi = 0.
Likelihood based on the size principle
The likelihood p(Σi | κ) of a set of observations Σi given a category κ to infer is the
probability that that κ would have produced Σi. The likelihood therefore depends
on how categories produce data. There are two main alternatives, weak and strong
sampling (Navarro, Dry, & Lee, 2012). In weak sampling, the likelihood simply
expresses whether the data is compatible or not with κ. Therefore, the likelihood
function under weak sampling is:
p(Σi | κ) ∝ 1(Σi ∈ κ) (5.5)
As a consequence, all hypotheses that are fully compatible with the data will have
the same probability.
In strong sampling, on the other hand, two hypotheses that contain all the ob-
served stimuli can still end up having different probabilities. This is because the
assumed data generating process is different from weak sampling. In strong sam-
pling, the stimuli are sampled with uniform probability from the category. Therefore,
the probability of a specific stimulus being picked depends on the size of the cate-
gory. The large the category, the smaller the probability that a specific stimulus in
it will be sampled. This behaviour is described by the likelihood function for strong
6The symbol κ is somewhat ambiguous, referring to the event of κ is the true category when it
appears as the argument of a probability density function, and referring to a set of stimuli otherwise.
The context should clarify what is meant in each case.
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sampling:
p(Σi | κ) =
∏
σi,j∈Σi
 1|κ| if σi,j ∈ κ0 if σi,j 6∈ κ (5.6)




where 1(Σi ⊆ κ) is 1 if all the observations belong to the category and 0 otherwise.
The consequence of strong sampling is that among the categories that are fully
compatible with the stimuli, smaller categories are preferred over larger categories
(right plot of figure 5.1). This captures the intuition that it would be a remarkable
coincidence for observations to cluster in a certain portion of the stimuli space, if the
category covers a larger portion. This phenomenon is called the size principle. There
is empirical evidence that people assume that the observed data is strongly sampled
in categorization tasks.7 Therefore, I assume strong sampling in the Bayesian model.
5.1.3 Using posterior to categorize stimuli
In the previous section, I presented a model of how an agent πi forms a posterior
probability distribution f(κ | Σi) over all the possible categories K after having
observed data Σi coming from the true category. The last component missing for a
full specification of the model is h(σ | Σi), which describes how πi uses the posterior
distribution to categorize stimuli as belonging to the category or not. h is a function
of both the participant’s sampling style, which determines how she chooses a cate-
gory given the posterior f , and the production error. I first discuss three possible
sampling styles, MAP (Maximum A Posteriori) sampling, proportional sampling,
and hypothesis averaging, and finally turn to production error.
The first type of sampling style I discuss is the MAP. A MAP sampler simply
picks the hypothesis with the highest posterior probability. Therefore, once a MAP
sampler has picked an hypothesis her behaviour is fully determined. Short of pro-
duction error, she will accept or reject a given stimulus as belonging to the category
iff it belongs to the picked category. In the model presented in the last sections, a
MAP πi with PM = 0.5 and PL = 0 (i.e. a uniform prior) will always pick the
smallest among the hypotheses that contain all the observed stimuli Σi. This can be
7See Tenenbaum and Griffiths (2001) for a classic discussion of the size principle and related
approaches.
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Figure 5.1: The left plot shows all convex categories for a space of 7 stimuli. The
monotonic categories are green. The right plot shows the convex categories com-
patible with observations {2, 4}. The color indicates the likelihood of each category
producing the observed data, under the strong sampling hypothesis. Importantly,
larger categories have a lower likelihood.
proved in the following way.8 Call κs and κn two hypotheses such that 1(Σi ⊆ κs),
1(Σi ⊆ κn), and |κs| < |κn|. As defined in equation 5.6, p(Σi | κs) = 1|κs||Σi| and
p(Σi | κn) = 1|κn||Σi| . The posterior probabilities for κs and κn are then, from equation
5.1:










Since I assumed a uniform prior and therefore p(κs) = p(κn), the proportion between





























since by assumption |κs| < |κn| and Σi is non-empty. Since the posterior proba-
bility of a category strictly decreases with its size, the smallest category will have
the highest posterior probability. Note that the smallest category compatible with
the observed stimuli is unique, consisting of all and only the stimuli between the
greatest and the smallest observed stimuli. The smallest category compatible with
the observations will then necessarily be sampled unless prior preferences for other
categories counterbalance the advantage of smallness coming from the likelihood. In
sum, the MAP categorization strategy, without taking production error into account,
can described as:
p(Accepting σ|Σi) = 1(min(Σi) ≤ σ ≤ max(Σi))
The second type of sampling strategy is to sample a category with a probability
proportional to its posterior probability for πi. This is in reality not a single strategy,
but a family of strategies, parameterized by the frequency of sampling. It is useful to
distinguish between stable sampling, where πi samples once and keeps the sampled
category, and unstable sampling, where πi samples a new category every time she
is asked to categorize a stimulus. This is an important difference if the participant
is asked to categorize the same stimulus repeatedly. If she is an unstable sampler,
she will in the long term categorize stimuli as belonging to the true category in a







Equation 5.1.3 can be seen as the expected probability of categorizing a stimulus
as belonging to the category—i.e. 1 if the stimulus belongs to the sampled category
and 0 otherwise—under the posterior over categories f . If she is a stable sampler,
she will always give the same answer, modulo production error.
The third strategy, hypothesis averaging, has πi average the probability of a stim-
ulus across all hypotheses, and accept a stimulus according to the averaged probabil-
ity. Behaviourally, hypothesis averaging is indistinguishable from unstable sampling,
and it can also be described by equation 5.1.3. However, there is a conceptual dif-
ference between the two strategies. While in unstable sampling a specific category
is picked, and therefore at least until the successive sampling event πi accepts the
sampled category as the true category, in hypothesis averaging πi never commits
herself to any specific category. Since this difference is not important for the model’s
aim, i.e. capturing differences in behaviour caused by a preference for monotonicity,
I do not take a stance on whether unstable sampling or hypothesis averaging is best.
In the following, I describe the participants’ behaviour with equation 5.1.3. A final
feature of the sampling strategies that is worth noticing is that πi’s judgement of
whether a stimulus belongs or not to the category is independent of the choice on
the other stimuli, conditional on the posterior f(κ | Σi).
Up to this point, πi is modelled as a perfectly rational agent that applies her
probabilistic machinery without errors. However, perfect rationality is an implausi-
ble assumption when dealing with data produced by real participants. I therefore
introduce a parameter PEi (P roduction Error) for the error in production. The
production error is implemented as a function g : [0,∞) × [0, 1] → [0, 1] from PEi
and the perfectly rational probability of accepting a stimulus as described in 5.1.3
to the real, noisy probability of accepting the stimulus. For instance, imagine that
for some value y of PEi, g(y, 0.5) = 0.0. This would mean that if the participant
should in theory accept some stimulus with probability 0.5 according to the model
above, she will actually always reject the stimulus, i.e. accept it with probability 0.
Note that I assume that the production error is independent of the specific stimulus
to categorize, given the probability of the stimulus prior to applying the production
error. While this assumption might not be completely accurate, it greatly simplifies
the estimation of PEi from the data.
I define the function that applies a production error to the probabilities as follows:
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g(y, x) = x+ (
1
1 + e−y
− 0.5)(1− 2x) (5.8)
Visually, this is a straight line rotating around the point (0.5, 0.5), and having slope
1 when PEi = 0 and tending towards slope 0 as PEi →∞. Function g has various
intuitive features. First, g is monotonically increasing with respect to the second
argument, for any value of the first argument. Second, when PEi = 0, g(0, x) = x
for all x ∈ [0, 1]. This means that if the PEi parameter is 0 there is no production
error, as g leaves the input probabilities unchanged. Third, as limy→∞ g(y, x) = 0.5
for all x ∈ [0, 1]. This means that as PEi increases, the categorization behaviour
depends less and less on the observations, but rather becomes maximally entropic—
agents decide whether to include stimuli in the category at chance. Fourth, for all
values y of PEi, g(y, 0.5) = 0.5. This means that the production error by itself does
not introduce a bias towards accepting or rejecting a stimulus as belonging to the
category. Figure 5.2 shows the relation between input and output probabilities for
various values of PEi.
Note that production error complicates the connection between MAP, stable,
and unstable samplers. Without production error, if πi gave different responses
when queried about a given stimulus, πi could not be a MAP or stable sampler.
However, if the production error is > 0, πi might give different responses about
the same stimulus even with a stable or MAP sampling strategy. Therefore, even
after observing different responses for the same stimulus, none of the three sampling
strategies can be excluded in principle. The data still gives information about which
type of samplers participants are.
It is worth mentioning an alternative approach to modelling error, where noise
is introduced in the participant’s estimation of the likelihood of the data rather
than in the categorization itself. Noise in likelihood estimation would cause noise in
the distribution over categories, and therefore in the posterior. This in turn would
influence the categorization behaviour. A possible implementation of noise in the
likelihood would be to make the likelihood function tend to 0.5 for every set of data
as the noise increases. Disregarding the contribution of the prior, a large amount
of noise would therefore determine a more uniform distribution over categories. In
production, this implies that stimuli contained in more categories would tend to be
accepted more often. The stimuli contained in more categories are the central stimuli
in the scale. In sum, a great noise in the likelihood would increase the probability
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Figure 5.2: Error function g(PEi, x) as defined in equation 5.8 for various combina-
tions of x and PEi. When PEi = 0, g(PEi, x) = x. As PEi increases, g(PEi, x)
becomes more uniform across xs. However, g(PEi, x) always has value 0.5.
of accepting stimuli that are central on the scale. This effect does not track what
we intuitively consider noise in the model, and is less interpretable than the noise
in production we implement. Therefore, I did not add noise in the estimation of the
likelihood.
5.1.4 Getting a feeling for the model
The last few sections presented a model of categorization behaviour. In this section,
I consider what the model predicts for various combinations of parameters, to make
sure that the model works as intended. The first thing to notice is that the closest
a stimulus is to any of the stimuli in Σi, the more likely it is that si will accept it
as belonging to c. Moreover, the more stimuli are observed, the steeper h decreases
around the observed stimuli (See top left plot in figure 5.3). This behaviour comes
from the assumption of strong sampling encoded in equation 5.6, and is independent
from the prior.
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The parameters PMi and PLi can model a large variety of behaviours (See top
right plot in figure 5.3). A high preference for monotonicity leads to an overall
increase in the probability of accepting stimuli around the observed stimuli. The
increase is moreover asymmetrical, namely it is steeper in the direction of the clos-
est border. A high preference for large categories also increases the probability of
accepting stimuli that were not observed as belonging to the category, but does not
privilege the scale’s extreme that is closest to the observations. Very high and very
low levels of PLi lead to πi that tend to accept every stimulus or reject every stimulus
except for the observed ones respectively (see bottom left plot in figure 5.3). There-
fore, the PMi parameter cannot influence the data produced by a participant with
extreme levels of PLi, making it impossible to estimate a value for PMi. Finally, the
PEi parameter regulates the amount of production noise for πi. When PEi → ∞,
πi becomes equally likely to accept and reject each stimulus (bottom right plot in
figure 5.3).
5.2 Embedding the cognitive model in a statistical
model
The previous section presented a cognitive model of how a preference for monotonic-
ity might influence categorization behaviour. The aim of developing this model was
to analyse behavioural data produced in a categorization experiment similar to the
three experiments presented above. In order to use it to analyse experimental data,
the cognitive model has to be embedded in a statistical model.
Statistical Bayesian models are slightly different from the Bayesian models we
encountered in previous chapters, where the aim was to model learners attempting
to learn a language. In the Bayesian model I develop in this section, the posterior is
over experimental hypotheses and the data is the participant’s data. In our case, the
posterior will over over values of PM , PL, and PE for each participant, as well as
parameters describing how those values are distributed in the population of partici-
pants. The likelihood component of the Bayesian update is defined by a behavioural
model of the participants, which was developed in the last section. The prior com-
ponent encodes, in a conservative way, expectations about hypotheses previous to
observing the experimental data. I first explain the functioning of Bayesian models
in general and then develop a Bayesian model to estimate a preference for monotone
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Figure 5.3: Probability of πi accepting each stimulus (lines) given the observations
(dots). Each line has the same color as the corresponding dots. The dotted line
indicates h(σ | Σi) = 0.5. In the plots in the top row, each coloured line shows the
probability of accepting each stimulus given the observations indicated by the dots
with the same colour as the line. In the bottom row, the color indicates varying
values of the parameters. Top left: h(σ | Σi) for two cardinalities of Σi with uniform
prior over categories. The more stimuli are observed, the steeper the decrease in
probability of accepting a stimulus as it gets further away from the observed stimuli.
Top right: Effects of high values of PMi and PLi. A higher preference for mono-
tonic categories confers an advantage to stimuli towards the scale’s extreme that is
closest to the observed stimuli. Bottom left: Effects of different values of PLi in the
[−0.8, 0.8] interval. As PLi → −∞, πi only accepts the stimuli between the greatest
and the lowest observed stimuli as belonging to the category. As PLi →∞, πi tends
to accept all stimuli as belonging to the category. Bottom right: Effect of different
values of the production error parameter PEi on the categorization behaviour. The
shown values range in the [0.0, 2.0] interval. As PEi → ∞, πi accepts or rejects all
stimuli with probability 0.5.
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categories from the data.
5.2.1 A toy Bayesian model
Understanding the notation and main idea
Suppose we are interested in the growth of carrots in two different types of ground.
We plant n carrots in one type of ground (type 0) and n carrots in another type
(type 1), at a certain point we harvest them and measure their sizes Yi (where i is
the index of the carrot). We are interested in whether the carrots grew more in one
ground type than the other type. In other words, we are interested in whether there
is a difference between the mean carrot growths α0 and α1.
The Bayesian approach to this estimation problem is not to answer the question
based on a single statistic, e.g. the maximum likelihood estimate of the difference
between the growth rate in the two ground, or the probability of observing the
observed difference between the mean carrot growths assuming that there is no dif-
ference between the true means. Rather, in a Bayesian approach a whole posterior
distribution over differences is found. The question of whether we should accept or
deny that there is a difference between the grounds can then be answered by taking
into account the posterior distribution over differences and possibly other practical
considerations.
We would like to find a posterior distribution over relevant uncertain aspects of
the world. Two uncertain aspects of carrot growth are relevant for the estimation
problem at hand. First, there is uncertainty about the mean growth for each type of
ground. Second, there is uncertainty coming from the fact that not all carrots within
each ground type are identical to each other. Therefore, the variation in growth also
has to be estimated. To simplify, we assume that the variance in growth rate is
identical for the two ground. In sum, we want a joint posterior distribution over
combinations of mean growth and growth variance. This is encoded in the following
model:
Yi ∼ N (µi, σ) (5.9)
µi = αGROUND[i] (5.10)
αj ∼ HN (1) for j = 0, 1 (5.11)
σ ∼ HN (1) (5.12)
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Where, again, i is an index over carrots, Yi is the size of carrot i at harvest, and
GROUND[i] ∈ {0, 1} is the ground where carrot i grew. HN indicates the half-
normal distribution, parameterized by a scale parameter. Understanding the nota-
tion for this model will be important to understand the model in the next section.
First of all, a ∼ b says that a random variable a is distributed according to some
distribution b. Distribution b might be a parametric distribution, meaning that to
uniquely specify a distribution the value of some parameters has to be fixed. Suppose
for instance that b = b(c). Then, c is the parameter, and depending on the value
of c a might be distributed in different ways. The value of c might be known, or c
might itself be a random variable. Line 5.9 is an example of the latter case. Yi is
distributed according to N (µi, σ). N is the normal distribution parameterized by
a mean parameter µi and a variance parameter σ. µi is the mean size of carrot i,
and σ is the variance of all carrot sizes. Crucially, µi is itself a random variable,
distributed as described on line 5.11.
Note that there as many random variables Yi as there are carrots. This indicates
that each individual carrot’s size, and not only the mean carrot size of each ground
type, is a random variable. It is prima facie unclear what it means for the size of a
single carrot to have a distribution. Since the size has been observed, the distribution
is not expressing uncertainty about the carrot’s size. One interpretation is that line
5.9 describes the process that generates the carrot size, which is inherently stochastic.
A Bayesian model like the one above is said to encode a generative model of how the
data is produced. The generative model describes the relevant portion of the world
with a combination of stochastic (e.g. 5.9) and deterministic (e.g. 5.10) functions.
The fact that there is a random mean parameter for each individual carrot seems
in contrast with the fact that we are interested in estimating parameters across car-
rots. The solution to this apparent contradiction is in line 5.10, which connects the
mean growth parameters of the individual carrots. This allows a parameter value to
be shared by a group of carrots. To see how, consider the following example. Assume
that carrots 4 and 43 both belongs to ground 0, i.e. GROUND[4] = GROUND[43] =
0. By line 5.10, µ4 and µ43 equal αGROUND[4] = αGROUND[43] = α0. In other words,
the mean sizes of carrots 4 and 43 will be identical and equal to α0. In short, line 5.10
imposes that the mean growths of the single carrots be identical within each ground
type, so that the realization of each µ variable gives information about the value
of the other µ variables in the same ground type through the relevant α variable.
The model above is therefore equivalent to the following model, where the distribu-
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tion of individual carrots’ heights are parameterized directly by the population level
parameters:
Yi ∼ N (µGROUND[i], σ)
αj ∼ HN (0, 1) for j = 0, 1
σ ∼ HN (0, 1)
In the following, we use both of these notations depending on which one is clearer
in the context.
The expression “for j = 0, 1” on line 5.11 is a way to compactly express the
distribution of multiple indexed random variables. Therefore, the model above is
equivalent to:
Yi ∼ N (µi, σ)
µi = αGROUND[i]
α0 ∼ HN (0, 1)
α1 ∼ HN (0, 1)
σ ∼ HN (0, 1)
Writing the distribution of indexed variables for the individual indices can become
impractical when the index takes on many values.
Not only the prior distribution parameters, but also the families are chosen based
on prior knowledge. For instance, the halfnormal distribution HN is chosen for
the prior over means because of the prior knowledge that sizes cannot be negative.
In theory, the carrot sizes in line 5.11 also cannot be negative, but we know that
carrot sizes are far enough from 0 and have a variance small enough that a normal
distribution is a good approximation.
Bayesian models are generative models of how the world produces data. When
specifying a Bayesian model, we encode our expectations about how the world pro-
duces data before the data is observed. These expectations are encoded both in the
model itself, e.g. the choice of distributions, the conditional dependencies, and in the
values of the prior distribution parameters. In complex models, it can be difficult to
see from the model specification what the prior distributions look like. Therefore, it
is part of a Bayesian statistical analysis pipeline to plot the predictions of a model
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based on the chosen prior probabilities, a process called prior predictive checks. Prior
predictive checks are possible because Bayesian models are generative models, i.e.
they encode a way of producing data. A prior predictive check for the carrot height
model with the prior specified in 5.12 and 5.11 is plotted in the left plot of figure
5.4.
Model fitting and hypothesis testing
Once a generative model has been specified, the model parameters can be fit to the
data, giving a posterior distribution over parameter values. I show an example of
this procedure in figure 5.4. First, artificial carrot data is produced by simulating
growth with known parameter values. Then, the model is fit to the artificial data
to obtain a posterior distribution over parameters values. The posterior is not given
in parameteric form. Instead, the fitting algorithm returns a set of samples from
the unknown posterior (The fitting algorithm is described in much more detail in
section 5.2.5). If enough samples are drawn, various statistics can be calculated on
the samples that closely approximate the ones that would have been calculated from
the true posterior. Once an approximated posterior is obtained, a first check that
the fitting was successful is to simulate artificial data, which should look roughly like
the observed data. This process is called the posterior predictive check. Figure 5.5
shows posterior predictive checks for the carrot growth model fitted on the simulated
data.
Once the model is fit to the simulated carrot growth data and posterior samples
for the mean parameters in the two ground types are obtained, the original question
is still not answered. Does one ground type produce on average bigger carrots than
the other type? While the question cannot be answered with complete certainty, the
posterior can help answer it to a chosen level of credibility. To reiterate, the question
is whether the difference between two means is different or not from 0. To answer this
question, a convenient property of posterior distributions can be exploited. Namely,
posterior samples of a function of the estimated variables can be obtained simply by
applying the function to the posterior samples. This means in practice that we can
obtain the posterior of the difference between two variables by taking the difference
of the variables for each posterior sample. We can therefore easily estimate the
posterior over differences between mean carrot growth in the two ground types. As
a final step, we can consider the hypothesis that there is a difference between the
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Figure 5.4: Top: prior predictive checks. The histograms show a variety of mean
parameters drawn from the prior. An observation is drawn from a normal distribu-
tion with the sampled mean and variance parameter. The rugplots show the single
observations for each ground type (red for ground 0 and blue for ground 1). The
prior simulated data can get values that are known to be impossible, for instance
negative carrot sizes in the plot. However, the crucial requirement is that the prior
can accommodate a variety of parameter values. Bottom: The rugplot shows the
simulated observations. The dashed lines show the true distribution that the data
are sampled from. The filled histograms show the estimate for the mean parameter
of each ground type. Note that the estimations are mostly close to the true means.
two ground types confirmed if the value 0 does not lie in the 95% Highest Posterior
Density (HPD) interval. The HPD interval is the shortest interval containing 95%
of the mass of the posterior distribution. Figure 5.6 shows the posterior distribution
over differences between ground types along with the 95% HPD interval. We discuss
how to test an hypothesis in the context of Bayesian modelling in more detail below
in section 5.2.3.
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Figure 5.5: Posterior predictive checks for the carrot size model. Each plot shows
a dataset of carrot heights for the two ground types. The simulated heights are
produced by the Bayesian generative model specified above with the parameter values
of the posterior distribution.
This section introduced some fundamental concepts and notation for understand-
ing Bayesian models. We turn next to developing a statistical model to analyse the
experimental data by exploiting the cognitive model developed above.
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Figure 5.6: Posterior distribution over differences µ1 − µ0 between the two ground
types along with the 95% HPD interval.
5.2.2 Statistical model for categorization data
In this section, I develop a model to fit to experimental data from new experiments,
presented below. The design of the new experiments is similar to the first three
experiments presented above. The new experiment has same two conditions as in
the experiments presented in chapter 4, a similarity and a property condition. The
training phase is, from the point of view of the statistical model, identical (more
details on the differences below). The crucial difference is in the testing phase.
While in the previous experiments participants had to either select a category by
click-and-drag or by picking one of two options, in the experiments below participants
are shown a series of stimuli and asked to categorize them individually.
From a modelling point of view, the response variable αi,j is the number of times
a participant πi judged that a presented stimulus j belongs to the category, out
of the total number of times they were asked ωi,j. The predictor variables are the
condition k (which equals 0 for the similarity and 1 for the property condition), the
stimuli presented as belonging to the category that the participant should infer Σi,
and ωi,j. The relation between predictor and response variables for each participant
is determined by the cognitive model developed in section 5.1 and the estimated
parameters.
Posteriors are estimated for variables both at the level of individual participants
and at the population level. Seven population-level parameters are estimated:
1. The first four are the mean θh and variance δh of the population-level logit-
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normal distribution over PM for each condition h (the logit-normal distribution
is described in more detail below). The (logit-)preference for monotonicity of
each participant πi in condition h is drawn from the distribution N (θh, δh).
2. The fifth and sixth parameter are the mean µPL and variance σPL of the
population-level distribution of PL. The preference for large hypotheses PLi
for each participant is drawn from N (µPL, σPL). Note that I assume that PL
is distributed identically in the two conditions.
3. The seventh and last population-level parameter is the variance σPE of a
population-level distribution over production errors. The production errors
of the individual participants are drawn from HN (σPE).
At the level of single participants, a posterior distribution is found for PMi, PLi,
and PEi. The bottom level is the level of single judgements by each participant (line
5.13). At the bottom level, participants’ judgements are distributed binomially. The
binomial distribution has two parameters, a success probability parameter p and a
number of trials parameter n. In the model, n corresponds to the number of times
that the participant was asked to categorize that stimulus ωi,j. The p parameter for
stimulus j and participant i is the probability φi,j of i accepting j as belonging to
the category, as described by the cognitive model developed in the previous section.
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The full model specification is as follows:
αi,j ∼ Binomial(ωi,j, φi,j) (5.13)
φi,j = h(σj|Σi, PLi, PMi, PEi) (5.14)
PLi ∼ N (µPL, σPL) (5.15)
PEi ∼ HN (σPE) (5.16)
PMi = logit
−1(ηi) (5.17)
ηi ∼ N (µPMi , σPMi ) (5.18)
µPMi = θCONDITION[i] (5.19)
σPMi = δCONDITION[i] (5.20)
µPL ∼ N (0, 2) (5.21)
σPL ∼ HN (2) (5.22)
σPE ∼ Γ(1, 2) (5.23)
θh ∼ N (0, 1.5) for h = 0, 1 (5.24)
δh ∼ HN (1) for h = 0, 1 (5.25)
Where I have called the standard deviation parameters σ, superscripted by the
specific parameter they describe. Since three parameters are fit for each participant
and seven parameters at the population level, if 80 participants are run a total of
247 parameters is fit. In traditional non-hierarchical statistics, it would be difficult
to justify fitting such a large number of parameters with few datapoints. However,
in hierarchical models the value of population-level parameters informs the plausi-
ble values of each individual parameter, and the total tendencies of individual-level
parameters inform the population-level estimation. Sharing information across pa-
rameters at different levels reduces the effective number of estimated parameters.
Priors and prior predictive distribution
I defined a prior over the seven population-level parameters. The priors over pa-
rameters at the population level are called hyperpriors, because sampling from them
produces priors over lower-level parameters. While hyperpriors can be used to encode
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Figure 5.7: Hyperprior parameters for PL. The left plot shows the hyperprior
distribution over µPL and σPL. Some values are sampled for both of them (dots).
Each combination of sampled values defines a population-level distribution over PL,
from which the PL parameter of individual participants is drawn. The left plot
shows the distribution corresponding to the color-coded dots sampled in the right
plot. For example, the sampled mean and variance parameter indicated by the blue
dot define the blue population-level distribution (arrows).
domain specific knowledge about the modelled phenomenon, we use them simply to
help model convergence. Therefore, we define regularizing hyperpriors whose purpose
is mainly to exclude values that would produce nonsensical behaviour. Visualizing
the effects of specific hyperprior parameters on predicted individual behaviour is dif-
ficult, because the impact of an hyperprior parameter depends on the value of the
other variables. It is however possible to get an idea by considering typical values
that the model parameters take according to the hyperprior parameters.
The hyperprior over µPL, the mean of the population-level distribution of PLis,
is a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 2. The hyperprior over σPL is a
halfnormal distribution with variance parameter 2. A single sample from these two
hyperprior distributions defines one population-level distribution over preferences for
large categories. Therefore, a posterior over values for µPL and σPL is a posterior
over possible population-level distributions of the PL parameter. Figure 5.7 shows
the defined hyperprior distributions for µPL and σPL (left) as well as some typical
population-level distributions sampled from them (right).
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Figure 5.8: Hyperprior parameters for PE. The left plot shows the hyperprior
distribution over σPE. Like in figure 5.7, each combination of sampled values defines
a population-level distribution over PE, from which the PE parameter of individual
participants is drawn. The left plot shows the distribution corresponding to the
color-coded dots sampled in the right plot. This is illustrated in the blue case by an
arrow.
Even small variations in PL have a substantial effect on behaviour, e.g. -0.1 and
0.1. Therefore, most of the population-level distributions over PLi produced by the
hyperprior specified above will put a lot of probability mass on implausible values
for PL. However, this is not a problem in practice. Since the effect of variations
in PL is very characteristic, the data makes extreme values of PL very unlikely.
Therefore, even a very wide hyperprior for PL will be overcome by the likelihood.
This is confirmed by the posterior distribution for the participants below, which are
sharply peaked around 0.
The next distribution to consider is the hyperprior distribution over variances
σPE of population-level distributions of production errors. The variances σPE have
a Γ(1, 2) distribution parameterized by α and β. When greater values of σPE are
sampled, the resulting population-level distribution over PE puts more mass on
higher levels of PE. The choice of a halfnormal distribution encodes the assumption
that the production error should be assumed to be as little as possible, so that
explanatory priority is given to a preference for monotonicity or large categories.
The final hyperprior parameters to consider are parameters defining distribution
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over means and variances of population-level distributions over PM . The process of
obtaining samples of the parameter of interest is in this case slightly more complex.
Rather than sampling the parameters of a population-level distribution directly, the
parameter is sampled in logit space and then transformed to the relevant parameter
space (figure 5.9). This means that the population-level distributions over mono-
tonicity parameters are logit-normal distributions. The reason for this choice are ex-
plained in details in section 5.2.5. The logit-normal distribution, which has support
in (0, 1), is very flexible. Depending on the values of its parameters, logit-normals
can be unimodal distributions highly concentrated on any point of the unit interval
or with a large spread, corresponding to populations that vary little or that vary a
lot with respect to their preference for monotonic hypotheses. When the variance is
large enough, logit-normals can also be bimodal with two peaks at the extremes of
the support. The bimodal case corresponds to a population where individuals tend
to have extreme preferences, but vary in terms of whether they prefer or disprefer
monotonic hypotheses.
Importantly, the mean of the logit-normal distribution is not the same as the
logit−1 of the mean of the normal source. In the experiment’s preregistered analysis,
we test for a difference between the means of the normal source. However, this might
introduce a bias in the test, because differences between means near 0 in the logit
space are further away in the bounded space than differences far away from 0.
There is an asymmetry between the estimation of strong preferences and strong
dispreferences for monotonicity. Most of the categories are non-monotonic. There-
fore, a strong influence of monotone categories leads to behaviour that is influenced
by only a small proportion of all categories. Such behaviour can be very character-
istic. On the other hand, a strong dispreference for monotone categories will only
have a small effect on behaviour, since monotone categories have a small influence to
begin with. As an analogy, consider a cloth merchant who sells cloths of very many
different colors and who is trying to figure out whether a particular buyer likes red
cloth. If the buyer repeatedly buys red cloths, it will be easy for the merchant to
determine the buyer’s taste. On the other hand, consider the same merchant trying
to figure out whether a buyer dislikes red cloths. The buyer repeatedly purchases
cloth from the merchant, and never picks red cloth. However, since the merchant
offers cloth of many colors, the buyer’s behaviour could be the result of chance rather
than a dislike of red. It will then be much harder for the merchant to establish the
buyer’s taste.
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Figure 5.9: Hyperprior parameters for PM . The dots and lines are color coded
as in figure 5.7. Two parameters θPM and δPM are drawn from the hyperprior
distributions (left plot), and determine population-level distributions over the logit of
the PM parameter (center plot). Drawing samples from the logit(PM) distribution
and then applying the inverse logit, logit−1, results in samples from the population-
level distribution over PM (right plot).
Once the hyperprior parameters are specified for all the population-level variables,
the joint effect of the chosen hyperparameter values can be observed by repeating the
following process. First, sample a parameter for the population-level distribution for
all such distributions. Then, sample individual-level parameters from the population-
level distributions. Lastly, calculate the behaviour of the sampled individual. In the
case of the present model, participants’ behaviour depends on the probability of
the participant accepting each stimulus conditional on the precategorized observed
stimuli. The results of this individual-level prior predictive distributions are shown
in figure 5.10. The figure shows that the chosen hyperprior parameter values are
compatible with a large variety of participants behaviour. The hyperpriors are com-
patible both with participants that tend to accept most stimuli and with participants
that tend to accept only stimuli very closed to the observed stimuli. As the number
of observed stimuli increases (left to right), the same hyperprior distribution predicts
a sharper average decrease of acceptance probabilities around the observed stimuli.
This follows from the cognitive model as visualized in 5.3. Moreover, the model is
compatible with a great variability of production errors, displayed by the varying
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Figure 5.10: Effects of specified hyperprior parameters on individual participants’
behaviour. The black dots show the stimuli observed by a participant. Each blue
line shows the participant’s acceptance probability for a set of parameters sampled
from a population-level distribution, whose parameters were itself samples from the
specified hyperprior distributions. As the plot shows, the prior is compatible with a
great variety of acceptance probabilities, and therefore participant behaviour. While
for some combination of parameters the acceptance probabilities decrease rapidly for
stimuli away from the observations, for other parameters the acceptance probability
is high for all stimuli.
probability of excluding the precategorized stimuli from the category.
5.2.3 The ROPE test
In this section, I discuss the hypothesis-testing strategy that I use for the experi-
ments in the next sections. This strategy is not based on model comparison. Rather,
I check if a difference of 0 between conditions is in the set of most probable hypothe-
ses. If it is, the null hypothesis is maintained. If it is not, the null hypothesis
is rejected and the alternative hypothesis—that there is a difference between the
conditions—accepted. The problem is how to develop this intuitive strategy into a
precise algorithm for hypothesis testing. I discuss the ROPE test as explained in
Kruschke (2018) as one such algorithm.
The ROPE test consists of a comparison between two intervals in the parameter of
interest, the region of practical equivalence (ROPE) and the HPD interval discussed
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above. The ROPE is the set of points that are practically equivalent to the null
hypothesis. I use the 95% HPD interval in the following. When comparing HPD
interval and ROPE, three cases are possible. If the ROPE lies completely outside
of the HPD interval, the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis
accepted, in the way that is consistent with the side of the HPD that ROPE lies on.
If the ROPE falls wholly within the HPD interval, the null hypothesis is maintained.
If neither is true and there is a partial overlap, judgement is suspended until more
data is available. It is clear then that the ROPE test solves the problem of testing
a sharp hypothesis by having the null hypothesis be a set of point with non-zero
probability mass, by assuming that the hypothesis of interest is not a unique value
but rather a (possibly small) interval.
The alternative hypothesis concerns a difference between two population-level
means, namely the means of the preference for monotonicity in the similarity and
property conditions, which I called µPM,0 and µPM,1 respectively. The ROPE and
HPD intervals are intervals on the space of differences µPM,0−µPM,1. The sharp null
hypothesis is the point 0 on this scale, while the corresponding alternative hypothesis
is the space minus the point of difference 0. To obtain posterior samples from the
space of differences, the fact that a function of a parameter’s posterior samples
gives samples from the posterior over the function’s parameters is exploited. First,
I calculate the posterior distribution over differences between the population-level
means over PM in the two conditions across all the S posterior samples:
{µsPM,0 − µsPM,1}Ss=1
The 95% HPD interval has to be calculated from posterior samples. Determining
the ROPE interval is harder, for two reasons. First, as discussed above, the same
difference between PMs causes different amount of changes in behaviour for different
parts of the scale. Second, it is unclear what practical equivalence means in the
present context.9 I consider the limit where the ROPE becomes the sharp null
hypothesis. This will turn out to not matter for accepting the alternative hypothesis,
as in the experiments below the sharp hypothesis will always be contained within
the HPD interval. Therefore, depending on the size of the ROPE, either the null
hypothesis can be accepted or judgement can be suspended.
9This also makes it difficult to embed the hypothesis testing strategy in a Bayesian decision
theory framework, in particular because there is no obvious way of specify a loss function.
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To work with the bounded space in which the model is formulated, it is important
to discuss a complication coming from a parameter transformation in the statistical
model on line 5.17, which we already mentioned in section 5.2.2:
PMi = logit
−1(ηi)
Here, to determine the PM value for participant i we take the inverse logit of a sam-
pled parameter ηi. The test will be based on comparison of intervals that are sensitive
to transformations of the space, and therefore we have to be careful. The PM pa-
rameter of each participant is not sampled directly from a distribution bounded in
[0, 1], but rather first sampled from a normal distribution and then transformed.
The individual-level PM parameters are distributed as logit-normal distributions.
For hypothesis testing, we are not interested in the difference between the means of
the normal sources in the two conditions, but rather in the difference between the
means of the logit-normal distributions in the two conditions. As discussed above,
the mean of a logit-normal is in general different from the logit of the mean of the
relative normal. Moreover, there is no closed way of calculating the relation between
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The last line is a quasi-Monte Carlo approximation of the preceding integral, where
the function is evaluated at a grid of K many point of the unit interval.10 Φ−1 is
called the quantile function. Note that equation 5.28 is much more efficient than the
10The approximation, without justification, is reported in the wikipedia page “Logit-Normal
Distribution” (2019). An explanation of the formula for a slightly simpler case can be found in
Does a Univariate Random Variable’s Mean Always Equal the Integral of Its Quantile Function?
(n.d.).
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simpler way of estimating the logit-normal mean by drawing samples from the normal
source, transforming them, and finally taking their mean. While failing to make the
adjustment between the mean of the normal source and the mean of the logit-normal
can introduce a bias in principle, this bias is too small to make a difference for the
experiments below.
Other approaches beyond the ROPE test could be used in this context. One pos-
sibility is to develop models encoding the null and alternative hypotheses, and then
to test them in terms of their predictive accuracy for out-of-sample data. I did not
use this method for computational reasons as well as the unclear connection between
the truth of a model and its predictive accuracy. A second approach is Bayes factor
calculation, which I also rejected for computational reasons and its high sensitivity
to prior choices. The ROPE method has a computational advantage over the other
methods. Pareto-Smoothed Importance Sampling (PSIS-LOO) (Vehtari, Simpson,
Gelman, Yao, & Gabry, 2019) requires fitting two models, one encoding the null
hypothesis and one encoding the alternative hypothesis. Leave-One-Out Cross Vali-
dation (LOO-CV) (Vehtari, Gelman, & Gabry, 2017) requires fitting multiple model,
as many as there are units in the data (at the chosen level of the hierarchy). On the
other hand, the ROPE test only requires fitting one model, the one corresponding
to the alternative hypothesis in the PSIS-LOO method. The computational advan-
tage of the ROPE method makes it especially apt for complex hierarchical Bayesian
models, for which a single fit to the data can take hours or days.
5.2.4 Model checks on simulated data
The main task of a statistical Bayesian model is to find a posterior distribution
expressing the uncertainty about parameter values after observing experimental data.
We cannot determine how good the Bayesian model in combination with the real
data is at recovering the true parameters, because the true value of the parameters
is unknown. However, we can determine if the model is capable of recovering the
true value of the parameters with some accuracy by simulating data with known
parameters, and using the model to try to recover the parameter values. This can
be done in various ways. If the model is not too computationally expensive, the
parameter space can be explored exhaustively with respect to the model’s ability to
recover the parameters. Unfortunately, the model presented in this chapter is too
complex to explore the parameter space. Therefore, I use simulations of real data
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to check two qualitative facts about the model. The first is that the model can
consistently pick up on a difference between conditions when the true population-
level PM means are different, and confirm the alternative hypothesis according to
the ROPE test picked above. The second fact about the model I check is that the
model can consistently pick up on the lack of difference between conditions when
there is no difference.
I simulated datasets with a true difference between conditions and datasets with
no true difference between conditions. Figure 5.11 shows the results of this process.
Overall, the stimulated check shows that the model fitting plus hypothesis testing
procedure we picked are capable of low rates of both type I and type II error. How-
ever, this is obviously dependent on the number of participants and true magnitude
of the difference between the conditions.
5.2.5 Solving computational problems
The model is coded with PyMC3, a Python implementation of Hamiltonian Monte
Carlo (HMC) algorithms and related tools for Bayesian statistics. HMC is an al-
gorithm for obtaining sample from a distribution that is too complex to be dealt
with analytically or is only known up to a normalization parameter. This is partic-
ularly useful in the context of Bayesian modelling, because often the normalization
parameter of Bayesian models is not known. Classical Monte Carlo sampling al-
gorithms, such as Metropolis-Hastings, propose new points according to a proposal
distribution, and accept them or reject them as a function of their unnormalized
probability density. However, the strategy of proposing new points by sampling a
proposal distribution becomes less efficient as the dimensionality of the parameter
space increases. For a point in a highly dimensional parameter space, the probabil-
ity density only increases in a very specific direction, meaning that most proposals
will be rejected. HMC solves this problem by exploiting geometrical properties of
the parameter space and distribution beyond simply comparing its density at pairs
of points. More specifically, HMC runs a physical simulation of a particle moving
without friction in the parameter space. The height of the particle is proportional
to the posterior density, and HMC keeps track of its kinetic and potential energy.11
An important method in the specification of hierarchical Bayesian models is repa-
rameterization. Reparameterization changes the way that the density is expressed
11A much more detailed discussion of HMC can be found in Betancourt (2018).
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Figure 5.11: The plot shows the posteriors over differences between the population
level means over the PM parameter. The posterior difference is displayed for both
untransformed and inverse-logit space. The top plots show the posterior of models
fitted on simulated data, where the true parameters were as follows: (1) 160 par-
ticipants, (2) 36 stimuli, (3) µPL = −0.001, (4) σPL = 0.005, (5) PMi ∼ B(20, 20)
for condition 0 and ∼ B(20, 3) for condition 1, (6) σPE = 0.4, (7) 20 judgements
were simulated for each participant, (8) shown stimuli were at least 9 stimuli away
from the border, and (9) participants were shown at most 5 categorized stimuli. The
error rate of applying the ROPE test for the top left plot (i.e. failing to accept the
null hypothesis) is about 0.06, and about 0.05 for the top right. The bottom plots
show the fit to data simulated with the same parameter except that all participants’
PM was distributed as B(7, 7). The error rate for the bottom left simulations (i.e.
accepting the alternative hypothesis when the null hypothesis is true) is about 0.02,
and it is 0.0 for the bottom right plot. More in general, the plot shows that the
model is capable of testing the intended phenomenon.
in terms of input parameters, and can modify the gradient of the posterior density
function over the parameters space. I discuss an instance were reparameterization
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was needed when developing and testing the model above. Since HMC exploits the
curvature of the posterior density function in the parameter space, zones of high
curvature can lead to divergent samples. This happens when the curvature of the
posterior density function is so steep that numerical approximation of the physical
system that the HMC algorithm approximates breaks down, returning results that
do not have a meaningful physical interpretation.12 The generated samples therefore
have to be rejected. Rejecting sample means that a part of the parameter space is
not being explored, causing the Markov Chain to stop being ergodic and introducing
a bias in the estimation. A solution to the problem of divergent samples is to repa-
rameterize the model to ensure that the change is nowhere too steep for the HMC
to explore.
A related source of divergences requiring reparameterization is extreme corre-
lation between parameters. High correlation can create so-called funnels in the
parameter space, where the posterior density becomes extremely concentrated in
a high-dimensional thin tube which is hard to access and explore. In practice, a
standard way to change the geometry of the parameter space by reparameterization
when we are dealing with normal distributions is non-centered parameterization.
Mean and variance are decorrelated when sampling from a normal distribution by
exploiting the following equivalence:
f(x | µ, σ2) = µ+ σ2f(x | 0, 1) (5.29)
where f is the density function of the normal distribution. It follows from equation
5.29 that in the following model X and Y are distributed identically:
X ∼ N (µ, σ2) (5.30)
Y = µ+ σ2z (5.31)
z ∼ N (0, 1) (5.32)
When sampling Y , µ, σ2 and a standard normal distribution can be sampled in-
dependently and then combined. While the exact mechanism by which the HMC
algorithm is helped by the non-centered parameterization is beyond the scope of the
present discussion, it is easy to see how non-centered parameterization might help
HMC. The parameter space that HMC has to explore is different when sampling X
12More specifically, the total amount of energy (kinetic plus potential) is not conserved.
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as opposed to Y . When sampling X, the HMC algorithm has to navigate a space
consisting of a mean parameter and a variance parameter. When sampling Y , the
space consist of the mean, the variance, and z which has to be sampled itself.
A problem with non-centered parameterization is that it can only be done with
some distribution, such as those parameterized by location and scale. Ideally, we
would want to apply non-centered parameterization to the population-level mean
over PM , which cannot be done directly as PM is bound in the [0, 1] interval.
To work around the problem, I transform the bounded space of monotonicity into
an unbounded space with the logit transformation. While parameters are always
implicitly transformed by PyMC3 so that they have no boundaries, I do it explicitly
to code the parameters in a non-centered way.
Before reparameterizing the normal distributions, every fit of the model to the
data of the fourth experiment, introduced below, had a few hundred divergences.
Reparameterizing solved the problem, leaving at most 5 divergences per model fit.
The normal distributions in the model were reparameterized all together. Therefore,
it is possible that reparameterizing the PM mean parameter did not help with the
convergence issues. However, fitting the model is too computationally expensive to
study the effects of reparameterizing only some of the distributions.
One last technical issues that is worth discussing is that of the Jacobian adjust-
ment. Jacobian adjustments are much discussed in manuals and forums, with users
being often confused about whether a specific model needs it. The present model
does not, despite the inverse-logit transformation of the population-level PM param-
eter. In general terms, assume we have a vector-valued function f : Rn → Rm. The
Jacobian of f is the determinant of a matrix containing all of f ’s partial derivatives,
i.e. the derivatives of every input component with respect to every output compo-
nent.13 Intuitively, the Jacobian encodes the infinitesimal amount of change of each
output component in response to changes in each input component. For a scalar
valued function of a single parameter, i.e. if f : R→ R, the Jacobian reduces simply
to the absolute value of the derivative of f .
Assume that we want to work with a random variable X defined as a continuous
and monotonic f : R → R transformation of another random variable Y , so that
13The word “Jacobian” is also used for the matrix itself rather than its determinant. In a Bayesian
modelling context however this interpretation is less frequent.
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X = f(Y ). Moreover, we know the distribution pY of variable Y . Then:




The second element of the product is the Jacobian14 of the inverse transformation
f−1. Therefore, the Jacobian adjustment allows us to know the density of a trans-
formed variable at a specific point in the parameter space as a function of the distri-
bution of the untransformed variable. Why is this important for sampling? Consider
the following statement:
logit(X) ∼ N (0, 1) (5.34)
Here, we are giving a distribution to a transformation of a variable, rather than to
a variable directly. A way to evaluate the density of X, which we are interested in,
is to use equation 5.34:
pX(x) = f(logit
−1(x) | 0, 1)
∣∣∣∣ ddx logit−1(x)
∣∣∣∣ (5.35)
where f is the density function of the normal distribution. Note that without the
Jacobian adjustment, the function over the space of x would not be integrate to 1
since x is still the parameter of integration, and therefore would not be a density
function: ∫ ∞
−∞
f(logit−1(x) | 0, 1)dx 6=
∫ ∞
−∞
f(x | 0, 1)dx (5.36)
On the other hand, if the sampling happens the following way there is no need
for a Jacobian adjustment:
X = logit−1(Y ) (5.37)
Y ∼ N (0, 1) (5.38)
In this case, a distribution is not being given to a transformed parameter directly.
Rather, a parameter is being sampled, and then the resulting sample is transformed
into the new space. The STAN reference manual (Development Team, 2017, p. 291)
explains this difference in the following passage:
A transformation samples a parameter, then transforms it, whereas a
14I am using a one-dimensional example for simplicity and because the example in the model
presented in this chapter is one-dimensional.
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change of variables transforms a parameter, then samples it. Only the
latter requires a Jacobian adjustment.
The model above only contains a parameter transformation, but not a change of
variable. Therefore, no Jacobian adjustment is needed.
5.3 Experiment 4: Rich categorization data
In the last chapter, I presented three experiments that tried to test whether thinking
in terms of a scalar property would induce a preference for monotonic categories. The
experiments presented in the last chapter did not find support for this hypothesis.
I concluded that, under the assumption that the hypothesis is true, the lack of
evidence could be explained by the fact that the chosen combination of experimental
design and statistical analysis was incapable of capturing the relevant differences in
behaviour. Therefore, I developed a much more sophisticated statistical model to
quantify subtler patterns in the data. In the rest of this chapter, I present three
experiments that are designed to produce data that can be analysed by the Bayesian
model developed above.
5.3.1 Materials and Methods
Participants
The same mode of recruitment, participation, and restrictions apply as in the previ-
ous experiments. Participants were be paid £0.75 for the experiment, which lasted
about 5 minutes. Data for a total of 77 participants was collected, 37 in the property
condition and 40 in the similarity condition.
Materials and Stimuli
Stimuli are identical to the ones in experiment 3 (see figure 4.5).
Procedure
This experiment is similar to the ones presented in the last chapter. Like the previ-
ous experiments, it contains two conditions, each featuring a domain of objects. One
domain is the appropriate domain for scalar categories: the objects in this domain
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are related with respect to an order. The other domain is not structured according
to an order, and objects in this second domain are compared to each other using
distance to each other in terms of similarity. The experiment tests the hypothesis
that participants have a higher preference for monotone categories in a conceptual
domain if the domain is mentally structured by a scalar property rather than simi-
larity relations. I predict that participants show a greater preference for monotone
categories in the property than in the similarity condition.
The fourth experiment differs from the third experiment in some details of the
phrasing of the instruction. Moreover, the plants do not become bigger when hovered
over. This is because the plants were large enough to be seen clearly. The main
differences are in the testing phase. The participants see between 1 and 4 (inclusive)
randomly picked stimuli, surrounded by a red box. Participants are told that the
aliens use the word “ ” to refer to the boxed plants. “ ” is used so
that the word does not afford an interpretation as an adjective or a noun. While in
the third experiment participants were asked to pick between two categories, in this
experiment participants are asked to categorize individual stimuli. The testing phase
consists of a series of trials where participants are asked whether the aliens would
use the word to refer to other stimuli. For more details on the phrasing of
the instructions, see flowchart of experiment four in D.4.
Like in the previous experiments, participants filled out a post-test questionnaire,
in which they are asked for any feedback they might have about the experiment, and
what their criterion was for judging whether a stimulus belonged to the category or
not.
5.3.2 Results
The raw data from the fourth experiment is shown in figure 5.12. The data is very
rich, so it is difficult to see whether there is an effect just by visualizing the raw data.
The data was fitted with the Bayesian model described in the previous section. In
this and the following runs of the Bayesian HMC sampler, 5000 samples were taken
in one chain for each fit after a burn-in of 5000 samples. Convergence was checked
visually from the shape of the traces, which after initial convergence moved in the
same range of the parameter space and with constant variance in the step size. Figure
5.13 shows the 95% HPD interval for the population-level monotonicity preference
mean in the bounded and unbounded space. In both cases, a difference of 0 is within
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Figure 5.12: Plots visualizing the raw data from the fourth experiment. The
plots on the left column show the stimuli that were presented to each participant
as belonging to the category, where each row is a single participant. The rows are
ordered by the mean of the pre-categorized stimuli: near the bottom are participants
that observed stimuli more on the left of the scale. The plots on the right column
show the proportion of times that each stimulus was accepted as belonging to the
category. The white points correspond to stimuli that a participant was not asked
about. Roughly, a comparison between the left and the right plot shows that the
accepted categories tend to be close to the pre-categorized stimuli.
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Figure 5.13: Plots visualizing the posterior distribution, given the data from the
fourth experiment, over the population-level parameter determining the mean pref-
erence for monotonicity in each condition. High level of µPM0 means for instance
that the distribution over monotonicity preferences in the similarity condition has a
high mean. Despite a tendency towards the direction of the alternative hypothesis,
in the right plot 0 is contained in the 95% HPD interval. Therefore, the ROPE test
says either that the null hypothesis should be maintained or that judgement should
be suspended, depending on the size of the ROPE. Note that the samples of µPM0
and µPM1 are correlated. Depending on the values taken by other parameters, they
both tend to be large or small together. This implies that the plot on the left is
not sufficient to evaluate whether there a difference between the conditions. The
sample-wise differences between conditions have to be considered. The correlation
between the µPM parameters is a consequence of the assumption that while the two
conditions differ with respect to preference for monotonicity, they do not with re-
spect to the other parameters. This assumption could be given up, at the cost of
more parameters and therefore greater risk of overfitting the data.
the 95% HPD interval and therefore the null hypothesis is maintained.
A last check that is worth performing on the model is its prediction of partici-
pant’s categorization behaviour for untested stimuli. Figure 5.14 shows the posterior
probability of participants accepting each stimulus as belonging to the category.
While the way that PM and PL affect behaviour is not easy to see, it is clear that
the model is to some extent tracking participants’ noisiness in categorizing stimuli
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Figure 5.14: The plot show the posterior distribution over the probability of accept-
ing each stimulus as belonging to the category for four participants, along with 95%
HPD interval. For each participant, the plot also shows the posterior distribution
over their individual-level parameters. The plot also shows which stimuli the par-
ticipants saw as pre-categorized, which stimuli they were asked to categorize, and
whether they accepted them or rejected them. The stimuli that the participants
were asked about are stacked vertically.
with the PE parameter.
205
Figure 5.15: The plot shows the posterior densities for the population level pa-
rameters that do not concern the preference for monotonicity, given the data from
experiment 4.
5.3.3 Discussion
While the posterior density over the difference between conditions shows a slight
tendency in the direction of the alternative hypothesis, this tendency is not strong
enough to reject the hypothesis according to the chosen inference criterion. There-
fore, I do not accept the alternative hypothesis based on the data from the fifth
experiment. Beside fitting the parameters relating to monotonicity, the Bayesian
model also fit other population-level parameters, which are assumed to not vary
across conditions. These are shown in figure 5.15.
One worry about the model that is worth mentioning is that noisy participants,
who accept or reject stimuli randomly, might introduce a lot of noise in the estima-
tion of the population-level parameters. However, the Bayesian model is capable of
dealing with this. If the acceptance behaviour is hard to explain given the population-
level parameters, the model explains it in terms of production error. This plays two
different roles in the estimation process. Consider first the view from the top of
the hierarchy down. If the estimated production error for a participant is high, the
other individual-level parameters cannot influence much the calculated acceptance
probabilities, which will tend to be around 0.5 for all values of the other parameters.
This means that the estimation of the underlying pre-error acceptance probabilities
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are free to vary without becoming much more incompatible with the data, and will
be mostly informed by the population-level distributions. The estimated pre-error
acceptance probabilities of a clearly error-prone participant will therefore have high
variance. If the estimated production error is small, the underlying pre-error accep-
tance probabilities will have a large impact on the acceptance probabilities when the
error is included. The other view is from the bottom of the hierarchy up. If the mean
production error of a participant is high, it is more difficult to estimate the value of
the other parameters for the participant, and this means in turn that that partic-
ipant’s data has less influence in the inference of the population-level distribution.
This mechanism allows the Bayesian model to automatically penalize data coming
from noisy participants. The relation between the posterior density over production
error and probability of accepting the stimuli are shown in figure 5.16.
5.4 Experiment 5: Adding an affordance for scalar
interpretation
Like in the series of experiments presented in the previous chapter, a natural variation
of the experimental design is a change in the stimuli. While various versions of the
stimuli were tested in the first three experiments, the data cannot be analysed with
the Bayesian model except for in an exploratory way. Therefore, in experiment 5
we change the stimuli to increase affordance for scalarity. A possible problem with
the stimuli of experiment 3 and 4 (see figure 4.5) is that there is nothing about
the stimuli themselves that affords a scalar interpretation. The participants’ only
pressure towards a scalar way of thinking about the stimuli comes from the story of
what causes the stimuli to change, namely the amount of blagardium.
5.4.1 Materials and Methods
Participants
Conditions and modes of recruitment are identical to the previous experiment. Data
was collected for a total of 80 participants, 39 in the property condition and 41 in
the similarity condition.
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Figure 5.16: The plot shows the interaction between the estimated production error
and the estimated probability of accepting a stimulus as belonging to the unknown
category with and without error. The data is from two participants from the fourth
experiment. The top plot shows the posterior densities over the production error for
two participants, one with a high mean error and one with a low mean error. The
bottom plots show the posterior means and 95% HPD interval of the two participants
accepting each stimulus in the category, before and after applying the production
error. Crucially, higher estimates of production error lead to more variance in the
estimate of the probability of accepting a stimulus before the error disturbance is
applied. This is shown by the fact that the 95% HPD intervals for the pre-error
estimates in the left plot are much larger than in the right plot.
Materials and Stimuli
The only different from experiment 4 is the set of stimuli. To create a stronger
affordance to interpret the stimuli as organized in a scalar way, we add two scalar
features, namely border thickness and fill colour’s saturation. The new stimuli are
displayed in figure 5.17.
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Figure 5.17: Stimuli for the fifth experiment, arranged in four rows for ease of
visualization. The stimuli consist of 36 images of alien plants.
Procedure
The training and testing phases are identical to the fourth experiment with respect
to structure and instructions. To summarise, the two conditions vary with respect to
the framing of the stimuli. In the similarity condition, the attention of the participant
is drawn to how similar or different the stimuli are to one another. In the property
condition, the attention of the participant is drawn to the position of the stimuli in
an order. Besides the noise coming from random sampling, participants vary with
respect to (1) the condition they are tested in, (2) which stimuli they observe when
they are familiarized with the stimuli, (3) which stimuli they are shown as example
of the category to be inferred, (4) which stimuli they are asked to categorize as
belonging or not to the category, (5) the order of the stimuli shown on the screen.
The order of the stimuli on the screen is randomized across participants. The 14
sets of stimuli presented in the training phase are picked randomly. In the testing
phase, each participant sees a random number between 1 and 4 (included) of stimuli
presented as belonging to the category. The categorized stimuli are also picked
randomly, with the restriction that they are not within 9 (included) of the most
extreme stimuli on the scale. The 20 stimuli that the participants are asked to
categorize are also picked randomly. For more details on the instructions and look
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of the experiment, see flowchart D.5.
5.4.2 Results
The raw data for the fifth experiment is shown in figure 5.18. The results of the
ROPE test are shown in figure 5.19. A difference of 0 is contained in the 95% HPD
interval, and therefore according to the chosen test the alternative hypothesis cannot
be accepted. Moreover, the posterior does not show a tendency in the direction of
the alternative hypothesis. The posterior for the other population-level parameters is
displayed in figure 5.20. The posterior distributions for some individual participants
are shown in figure 5.21.
5.5 Experiment 6: Different stimuli across condi-
tions
In the experiments presented above, the stimuli were identical across conditions.
This was to prevent noise in the way participants’ behaviour differed across the two
conditions, and particularly noise in the difference between conditions determined
by features of the stimuli not involving scalarity. However, using different stimuli
across conditions has the advantage that different affordances can be created in the
two conditions. Specifically, it is possible to show stimuli without a clear order in the
similarity condition and intuitively ordered stimuli in the property conditions. In the
sixth experiment, I try to reach a balance between the advantages and disadvantages
of using different stimuli in the two conditions. Specifically, I use stimuli that differ
minimally across the two conditions while still affording different interpretations.
Participants
The data collection procedure is identical to the previous preregistration, with the
only difference that the experiment lasts 2.5 minutes and participants will be paid
$0.40. The data was collected for 163 participants, 92 in the property condition and
71 in the similarity condition.
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Figure 5.18: Visualization of the raw data of the fifth experiment. For an explanation
of the plot, see figure 5.12.
Materials and Stimuli
The set of stimuli is the most substantial difference to the previous experiments.
The stimuli are generated procedurally, and are different in the two conditions. In
the order condition, there is something about the stimuli themselves that makes
them ordered, namely the number of “petals”, which varies monotonically, either
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Figure 5.19: Plots visualizing the posteriors over monotonicity, along with 95%
HPD interval, for the data from the fifth experiment. For more on how to interpret
the plot, see figure 5.13.
Figure 5.20: Plots visualizing the posterior densities over population-level param-
eters given the data from the fifth experiment. See figure 5.15 for same plot with
data from the fourth experiment.
always increasing or always decreasing. In the distance conditions, the number of
petals both increases and decreases when going through the stimuli (see the stimuli
in figure 5.22). Both sets of stimuli have pivotal stimuli with 2, 4, 5, and 6 petals.
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Figure 5.21: For explanation of this plot see figure 5.14.
The number of petals for the pivotal stimuli was chosen so that it was possible for all
the stimuli in both conditions to have vertical symmetry. In both conditions, these
four pivots are placed in different orders and 5 new stimuli are created between any
two adjacent pivots by interpolation. In the order condition, the order is 2, 4, 5, 6.
In the distance condition, the order is 2, 5, 4, 6.
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Figure 5.22: Stimuli for property condition (top) and similarity condition (bottom)
of the sixth experiment, arranged in two rows for visualization purposes.
Procedure
The study design is similar to the fifth experiment, except for the following differ-
ences. First, the training phase is reduced to two screens, the first one giving the
context and the second one to familiarize the participants with the stimuli. Second,
the set of stimuli is different from the previous experiment, and there are 19 rather
than 36 stimuli. Third, the instructions refer to the stimuli as “crystals” rather
than “plants”. Randomization is the same as previous preregistration, with the only
difference that the categorized stimuli are not within 3 (included) stimuli from the
border, rather than 9. This change is motivated by the fact that the set of stimuli
is smaller than in the previous experiment. For more details on the instructions and
look of the experiment, see flowchart D.6.
5.5.1 Results
Raw data for the sixth experiment is visualized in figure 5.23. The results of the
ROPE test are shown in figure 5.24. A difference of 0 is included in the 95% HPD
interval, and therefore the alternative hypothesis cannot be accepted according to
the chosen hypothesis testing method. Figure 5.25 shows the posterior densities for
the other population-level parameters. Note that while the posterior densities of the
fourth and fifth experiments closely resembled each other, they are quite different
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from the posterior densities of the sixth experiment. The likely cause for this is the
fact that the set of stimuli in the sixth experiment is different. Note that the value
of the parameter for preference for large categories does not, by itself, have a clear
interpretation. Instead, its interpretation is relative to a particular set of stimuli,
making the difference between posterior densities less strange than it might seem at
first. The intuitively reasonable posterior distributions over acceptance probability
for some participants shown in figure 5.26 provide further confirmation that the
model is working.
5.6 Discussion
The experiments did not confirm the hypothesis that thinking in terms of scales
causes a preference for monotonic over other categories. Does this mean that the
hypothesis should be rejected? As always, statistical modelling alone cannot an-
swer a theoretical question. There are reasons for thinking that, despite the lack
of evidence from the experiments, scalarity causes a preference for monotonicity in
learning. First of all, as discussed in section 1.2 the deep ties between monotonic-
ity and scalarity are not manifested only in the semantics of gradable adjectives,
but also of quantifiers. Second, previous research indicates that learning has a role
to play in the evolution of quantificational monotonicity (section 1.3). Third, the
theoretical considerations developed in the introduction give a mechanism for the
way monotonicity might be caused by learning. Fourth, the evolutionary model pre-
sented in chapter 3 offers an elegant picture of the way a preference for monotonicity
in learning might cause monotonicity to spread. Lastly, the models show that even
a small bias for monotonicity might suffice to cause monotonicity to spread. Such a
bias might be difficult to measure in experimental data. These considerations moti-
vate further experimental research on the relation between scale based thinking and
monotonicity.
Various possible variations on the design above might be implemented to explore
further the relation between learning and monotonicity. A first possibility is to
change the stimuli. If the stimuli are identical in the two conditions, they have to
be capable of affording both a scalar and a distance-based interpretation, depending
on the framing story. It is hard to strike a balance with respect to the difference
affordances, for the following reason. A perceptually simple property cannot be
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chosen as the dimension of stimuli variation—e.g. size or brightness—because there
will usually be a pre-existing English category that might bias the category guessing
behaviour. Therefore, stimuli will have to vary with respect to multiple properties.
However, the multidimensional variation cannot be a linear combination of one-
dimensional variations, or it will be possible to encode all change with any one of
the dimensions. For instance, if the stimuli constantly increase in both height and
brightness, any way of dividing the stimuli in convex sets will be encodable in terms
of heights alone and in terms of brightness alone. The set of stimuli has to explore
a non-linear15 arc of a multidimensional feature space. However, such complicated
patterns are difficult for participants to learn without extensive experience.
A second possible variation of the experiment is to use sets of stimuli that vary
across conditions in a substantial way, as opposed to the relatively small variations
of the sixth experiment. For instance, a stimulus set that is obviously scalar could be
used in the property condition and highly-dimensional stimuli in the similarity condi-
tion. The problem with using very different sets of stimuli is the model’s assumption
that the parameters other than PM have the same distribution for both conditions.
Using very different stimuli would invalidate this assumption, particularly for the
PL parameter. A possible fix is to fit a population-level distributions for PL for
each condition. However, doing so would make it harder for the model to distinguish
between the effects of the preference for monotonicity and large categories.
A third possibility is to not show participants the scale throughout the experi-
ment, but rather to let them infer it from observations of the single stimuli. This
might force them to encode the stimuli, and this encoding is what is predicted to
make a difference in the experiment. I did not do this because it might be very
difficult for participants to infer the structure of the scale just by observing the
stimuli.
Lastly, the simplest change would be to use a smaller set of stimuli. Since the
number of convex categories increases faster than the number of monotonic categories
as the number of stimuli increases, a smaller set of stimuli implies a greater proportion
of monotonic categories. A greater proportion of monotonic categories would mean
that a preference for monotonicity would have a greater effect on behaviour. In
principle, simulations on artificial data could be run with different number of stimuli
to check what the optimal proportion between monotonic and convex categories is
15To be more specific, the arc has to be non-monotonic in every dimension to avoid the possibility
that every convex category can be reduced to any of the space’s dimensions.
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for inferring the true preference for monotonicity.
The Bayesian model could also be extended in exciting directions. In the cur-
rent state, the model fits a parameters for monotonicity, trying to model to some
extent the scale-based way of thinking discussed in the introduction. However, the
model disregards some of the complexities of the distance-based way of thinking. In
particular, the affordance provoked by salient stimuli—the “perfect” shapes like the
circle—to be the prototypes of the category to be guessed is not modelled. Ignoring
this aspect of prototype-based categorization strategies might have an impact on
estimation. For instance, if a perfect shape exists near the border, it might cause
participants to extend a category to include stimuli closer to the border, which the
Bayesian model above might interpret as a preference for monotonicity. We tried to
avoid this happening by disallowing pre-categorized stimuli too close to the border.
An advantage of modelling the affordances given by salient stimuli would thus be
the possibility of showing pre-categorized stimuli close to the border. The Bayesian
model might be particularly helped in estimating a preference for monotonicity by
how close to the border the pre-categorized stimuli have to be before participants
guess a fully monotone category.
A second consequence of prototype-based thinking would be its interaction with
the size of the guessed categories. In a scale with fewer stimuli that afford a pro-
totype interpretation, the guessed categories will tend on average to be larger in a
distance-based way of thinking. This is important because an unmodelled factor that
interacts with the size of guessed categories might cause a bias in the estimation of
the preference for large categories, which itself interacts with the estimation of the
preference for monotonic categories.
The theoretical work presented in the introduction makes further empirical pre-
dictions that could be tested, allowing to go beyond minor manipulations to the
current design and model. I mention two. First of all, a difference in the acceptabil-
ity of overlaps between categories is predicted. If prototype-based categories form
Voronoi tessellations, overlap between categories should be mostly excluded. On
the other hand, if scalar categories are coded in terms of a binary order relation,
overlaps should be relatively acceptable. A possible difficulty with testing this pre-
diction comes from pragmatics. For instance, in a director-matcher task the director
observes a stimulus and sends a signal representing a category to the matcher, who
then picks among a set of possible stimuli. If overlapping categories are available,
the director will always tend to pick the smaller ones among the ones that contain
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the observed stimulus, calculating a scalar implicature. Therefore, the behaviour for
overlapping categories will end up being similar as the behaviour for non-overlapping
categories.
A second empirical prediction made by the theory in the introduction is that
non-convex double-bounded categories should be equally complex to learn as con-
vex double-bounded categories for scale-based categorization, but they should be
harder to learn for prototype-based categorization. This follows from the fact that
in scale-based categories a non-convex double-bounded category and a convex double-
bounded category both require memorizing two thresholds plus one bit of informa-
tion. On the other hand, in prototype-based categorization a convex double-bounded
category requires two prototypes, while a non-convex double-bounded category re-
quires three. A difficulty with this approach is the exponential increase in the number
of possible categories as the number of bounds increases. This increase, barring other
simplifying assumptions, might make it impossible to fit a Bayesian model to the
data.
This chapter presented a computational way to detect preferences for mono-
tonicity in category learning from rich categorization data. While the results did
not confirm the hypothesis, tests on simulated data shows that the model is capable
of recovering the true parameters. The approach presented above can be extended
in multiple exciting directions which I leave for future work. In the next chapter, I
move to a different universal of scalar semantics, namely extremeness.
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Figure 5.23: Visualization of the raw data of the sixth experiment. For an explana-
tion of the plot, see figure 5.12.
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Figure 5.24: Plots visualizing the posteriors over monotonicity, along with 95%
HPD interval, for the data from the sixth experiment. For more on how to interpret
the plot, see figure 5.13.
Figure 5.25: Plots visualizing the posterior densities over population-level param-
eters given the data from the sixth experiment. See figure 5.15 and 5.20 for same
plot with data from previous experiments.
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Modelling the evolution of
absolute thresholds
In chapter 1, I presented previous work on the evolution of extreme categories, and
identified two gaps. First, most previous work focussed on the role of communication
in the evolution of extremeness. Second, most previous work considered categories
that were close to extreme—in the sense of extremeness discussed in this thesis—
rather than truly extreme. In this chapter, I examine cultural transmission as a
possible cause for the evolution of extreme transitions.
To support this picture of the evolution of extreme transitions, I develop a com-
putational model of cultural transmission and use of gradable adjectives based on
previous work on pragmatic communication. Similarly to chapter 3, I combine an
Iterated Learning (IL) model of cultural evolution (Kirby et al., 2014, 2015) with a
Rational Speech Act (RSA) model of pragmatic communication (Goodman & Frank,
2016). The conclusion of the model in this chapter is that extreme categories can
emerge often from a pure pressure from cultural transmission. I start in section




6.1.1 Model of pragmatic communication
As I argued above in section 1.3.2, an explicit model of pragmatic slack is needed
to model the evolution of adjectival semantics. Pragmatic slack, which I explain in
more detail below, is the usage of categories to refer to individuals outside of their
extension, as long as the literally inappropriate usage does not make difference for
practical purposes. I implement such a model in the RSA framework. Similarly to the
RSA models in chapter 3, a pragmatic receiver L1 receives an utterance s ∈ S with
a known meaning and finds a posterior distribution over world states, pL1(w|s, ...)
(where “...” represents any further semantic or contextual parameter that might
influence the interpretation of the signal). L1 calculates the posterior assuming that
the signal has been produced by a rational, cooperating sender S1. More specifically,
L1 imagines a scenario where S1 has perceived the real world state w and picked a
signal that tends to be as helpful as possible to a literal receiver L0. Helpfulness is
quantified by a utility function UL0(s, w, ...), and S1’s choice of signal is modelled by






The intuition behind this function is that the more useful an utterance is, the more
likely it is that S1 will produce it. The strength of this tendency is controlled by
α; the greater the α, the stronger the tendency. In the limit of α = 0, the choice is
uniform across signals. For α =∞, S1 always picks the most useful signal. Finally,
L0 is a literal receiver, who calculates a posterior over world states assuming simply
that the signal is true.
The language of the agents in the model has three signals: sσ (silence), s+ (a
positive polarity adjective), and s− (a negative polarity adjective). Each adjective
conveys that the real observed degree do falls in a certain part of the relevant scale.
sσ leaves the position unspecified, and is compatible with the whole scale. s+ conveys
that do is greater on the scale than a value θ+. s− conveys that do is lower on the
scale than a value θ−. Assume that the literal receiver and the pragmatic receiver
have accurate priors about the distribution of degrees in the world, and that this
distribution is f(d).
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L0’s posterior over degrees after receiving a signal is calculated as follows:




















. In practice, L0 renormalizes its prior over the portion of the
scale compatible with the received signal, i.e. the whole scale for silence, degrees
above θ+ for s+, and degrees below θ− for s−.
The rational sender calculates the utility of a signal after observing a degree based
on L0’s posterior. Following previous literature (Franke, 2014), the utility of a signal
is calculated as a function of the expected distance between the degree observed by
S1 and the degree that L0 guesses:










. The intuitive meaning of this formula is that the
smaller the expected distance between S1’s observation and L0’s guess after sending
a signal s, the greater the utility of s. How much greater? This is regulated by
the λ parameters. For each signal, as its corresponding λ parameter increases, the
importance of minimizing the expected distance also increases, and therefore the
pragmatic slack decreases.1 S1 picks a signal according to eq. 6.1.
Finally, the pragmatic receiver L1 simply does Bayesian inference to define a
posterior over degrees given its prior over degrees and S1’s pragmatic behaviour:
pL1(d|si, ~θ, ~λ, α) ∝ pS1(si|d, ~θ, ~λ, α)f(d) (6.6)
In the models below, f is a uniform distribution in the [0, 1] interval. This assumption
allows simplifications that make the model computationally much less expensive, but
1Note that limθ+→1 UL0(s+|do, ~θ, ~λ) = e−λ+(do−1)
2
. This is intuitively right because when the
threshold of s+ is at 1, the receiver always guesses the scale’s maximum. For similar reasons,




could be lifted in future research. α is set to 4.
This models inherits from Franke (2014) the prediction that signals can be used
to refer to degrees outside of the literal extension, a phenomenon known as pragmatic
slack (Lasersohn, 1999). A real example of pragmatic slack is the literally false but
pragmatically apt usage of “full” for recipients that are less than completely full (Fig
6.1, top row). Pragmatic slack is a crucial aspect of the phenomenon at hand. Short
of considerations about the finite precision of the human perceptual system, absolute
adjectives refer to single points of a continuous scale, which is a set of measure zero
for a continuous distribution. Therefore, a degree sampled from the scale will (almost
surely) fall outside of the absolute adjective’s extension. Literal language users, who
only produce adjectives that contain the observed degree, would (almost surely) never
have an occasion to use an absolute adjective. Absolute adjectives would perform
poorly in communication, and language learners would not have any occasion to
acquire them. Pragmatic slack is therefore a prerequisite for absolute adjectives to
stand a chance to evolve.
A second phenomenon that is captured by the RSA model is the fact that the
amount of pragmatic slack varies in different contexts. For instance, the same metal
rod might count as straight in a construction site but not in a clocks factory. The
amount of pragmatic slack is regulated by the parameter λi; the higher λi, the smaller
the slack, the closer a degree outside of si’s extension has to be to the θi for senders
to use si (Fig 6.1, bottom row). Therefore, by changing the value of λi, different
pragmatic slacks can be obtained.
In the model, I assume that extreme thresholds are fixed at the semantic level
and are in that respect different from relative adjectives (Qing & Franke, 2014a).2
This is in contrast with a view according to which the extreme threshold of absolute
adjectives is determined by the context (Lassiter & Goodman, 2013). I assume this
picture and leave implications of the model under a different picture to future work.
6.1.2 Learning from pragmatic data
A learner in the model observes data produced by a rational sender and tries to infer
the unobserved sender’s semantic parameters θ+and θ−. The data D consists of a
set of n tuples 〈oi, si〉, where oi is the ith degree observed by the sender and si is the
signal sent by the sender to refer to oi.
2See Aparicio et al. (2016) for an overview.
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Figure 6.1: The Rational Speech Act model of pragmatic communication with “full”
and “empty”, i.e. with θ+ = 1 and θ− = 0. All x-axes are the scale’s degrees. Top
row: Utilities, rational sender and rational receiver with α = 4, λσ = 2, λ+ = λ− =
60. Bottom row: Effect of variation of λ parameters on production behaviour. The
left plot shows the effect of changing λ0 as λ+ = λ− = 15. As λ+ increases, silence
is used less and less even for central degrees. The right plot shows variations of
λ+, λ− with λσ = 2. As λ+, λ− increase, less pragmatic slack for “full” and “empty”
is allowed. The colorbar shows the relation between color lightness and value for all
colors.
The learners in the model are Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) agents, meaning
that they pick the combination of parameters that has the greatest posterior proba-
bility given the observed data. There are two reasons for using MAP agents. First,
sampling from the posterior distribution would be computationally more expensive
than finding the MAP. Since the model is already computationally intensive, using
sample agents would make the model prohibitively slow. Second, and more impor-
tantly, sample agents will (almost surely) not sample an extreme category. This
is because extreme categories cover a part of the parameter space with measure 0,
namely the four individual points where the transitions are at 0 or 1. Since extreme
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categories are often observed in natural language, we can infer that learners cannot
be samplers in acquiring them. MAP is a natural alternative option that allows for
extremeness to occur.
Since the MAP cannot be found analytically and the posterior over language
parameters can be multimodal, I used the sampling-based basin-hopping algorithm
(Wales & Doye, 1997) to find the language parameters that maximise the probabil-
ity of the learner’s observations. Basin-hopping is an algorithm to find the global
minimum of a function by drawing successive samples. The algorithm is particularly
useful when the function to optimize is multimodal, and the point of interest is the
global maximum. The algorithm is based on an iterative process of finding a local
minimum, and then introducing noise to attempt to enter the basin of attraction of
another local minimum. The algorithm is displayed in algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Basin-hopping
1: function Basin-hopping
2: x1 ← Random() . Random initialization
3: i← 1
4: while STOP is false do . STOP is some stopping condition
5: y ← Perturb(xi) . Find a point by perturbing the present minimum
6: xi+1 ← LocalOptim(y) . Perform local optimization from y
7: if f(xi+1) < f(xi) then





In order to check that the model is behaving as intended, it is instructive to
observe that the more datapoints are observed by the learner, the more accurate the
guess of the parent’s language becomes. This is visualized in figure 6.2 for a variety
of parameter combinations.
6.2 Results
I simulate chains of IL for various combinations of parameters. Each chain consists
of 10000 generations of single agents. As the results in figure 6.3 show, signals with
extreme thresholds evolve more often than would happen by chance.
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Figure 6.2: Languages learned by agents (blue dots) after various numbers of ob-
servations and combinations of parameters given the true language (red dots). λ
determines the amount of pragmatic slack for the different signals. Relative lan-
guages are the ones where the thresholds do not lie on an extreme of the scale. In
the plot relative languages have σ+ = σ− = 0.5. The transitions of extreme lan-
guages, on the other hand, are at the scale’s extrema. The main result from the plot
is that, as expected, learners that observe more production data on average guess
the teacher’s language more accurately.
Two observations can be drawn from the results about how parameter values
influence the tendency of extreme languages to emerge. Firstly, more observations
lead to fewer extreme meanings evolving. Secondly, greater values of all λ parameters,
i.e. less pragmatic slack, lead to fewer extreme meanings evolving.
More information about the behaviour of the IL chains can be obtained by com-
paring the parent (figure 6.4) and children (figure 6.5) languages of extreme languages
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Figure 6.3: Results of IL model for various combinations of numbers of learner
observations and values of the λ parameters. The color indicates the proportion
of all learned meanings that are extreme, where extreme means that the transition
happens at 1 or 0. When the λ parameters take smaller values, i.e. when there is a
high level of pragmatic slack, up to half of all meanings are extreme.
for combinations of parameters that produces a high or a low proportion of extreme
languages. This comparison shows that combinations of parameters that develop
a high proportion of extreme meanings are the ones where the estimation of the
language is noisier.
6.3 Conclusions
At this stage, it is unclear why extreme meanings evolve often in a pure Iterated
Learning condition. A prima facie possible reason for the stability of extreme thresh-
olds in the cultural evolution of language is that they produce very characteristic
data. In other words, a learner observing data produced by extreme thresholds will
have an easier time learning it accurately than if the language had been produced
by non-extreme thresholds. Once a population stumbles upon an extreme language,
the language will be transmitted with high fidelity and will tend to persist in the
population over time. However, this hypothesis is contradicted by the observation
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Figure 6.4: In all plots, the x-axis is the position of the threshold for the positive
signal, and the y-axis is the position of the threshold for the negative signal. Top
row: languages of the teachers whose learners acquired at least one extreme meaning,
for a combination of λ parameters that produced a higher proportion of extreme lan-
guages. Bottom row: languages of the teachers whose learners acquired at least one
extreme meaning, for a combination of parameters that produced a lower proportion
of extreme languages. Each column of plots (indicated by color) corresponds to a
different extreme meaning acquired by the learner. For instance, the first column
(blue) shows the languages of teachers whose learners acquired a positive signal with
a threshold at the scale’s minimum (Θ+ = 0). The figure shows that extreme lan-
guages do not tend to have almost-extreme parents more often for the combination
of parameters that produced a high proportion of extreme languages.
that learners with extreme-language teachers do not end up closer to their teacher’s
extreme language in combinations of parameters that produce a high proportion of
extreme languages. Further, the average distance between two successive languages
for a parameter setting that produced a relatively high proportion of extreme lan-
guages (λ+,−,σ = 1, with α = 4 and 50 observations) is greater (≈ 0.334) than the
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Figure 6.5: Top row: languages of the learners whose teachers acquired at least
one extreme meaning, for a combination of λ parameters that produced a higher
proportion of extreme languages. Bottom row: languages of the learners whose
teachers acquired at least one extreme meaning, for a combination of parameters
that produced a lower proportion of extreme languages. See figure 6.4 for more
information.
average distance between successive languages with a combination of parameter val-
ues that produced few extreme languages (λ0,1,2 = 50, with an average distance of
≈ 0.18). Understanding the reason for the tendency towards extremeness is made
more difficult by the complex inference of RSA agents. I leave further exploration of
the model to future work.
The model presented in this chapter could be extended in various ways. First,
direct selection for communicative accuracy could be implemented. Communicative
accuracy might have the effect of keeping the languages more stable across gener-
ations, and pragmatic agents could use extreme languages without losing in terms
of communicative accuracy. However, selection for communicative accuracy would
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require a population of multiple agents, which would be computationally more ex-
pensive.
A second possible extension of the model considers more complex languages, es-
pecially in combination with a pressure for communicative success, to study whether
patterns observed in real languages emerge. A language in the present model con-
sists of two signals of opposite polarity, plus silence. However, more signals could be
introduced, therefore having multiple signals of the same polarity.
Another extension would be to consider non-uniform prior over degrees. In the
present model, the uniform prior over the unit segment corresponds to an open
scale, i.e. a distribution with significant probability mass at two extremes. Such
distributions generally give rise to two extreme antonyms. Other distributions could
be implemented that correspond to half-open (significant probability mass on only
one of the extremes) and open (little mass at the extremes) scales.
Finally, one the inaccuracies of the model is that thresholds, even when non-
extreme, are crisp. Vagueness could be introduced in the model via uncertainty
of the agents about the distribution of the property in the population. This could
be implemented as a hyperprior over the parameters of the prior distribution over
property, similarly to (Zhao & Cremers, n.d.).
In this chapter, I made two contributions to the literature. First, I built on previ-
ous work on pragmatic communication to provide a computational model where the
cultural evolution of crisp extreme thresholds can be studied, because extreme cat-
egories are sometimes used to refer to non-extreme observations. Second, I showed
that even without an explicit pressure from a cognitive bias, extremeness can evolve
more often than it would by chance. This advantage might combine with cogni-
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Modelling the evolution of
quantificational monotonicity
7.1 Introduction
While natural languages show great variability, there are features that they all appear
to share. Linguists call these features linguistic universals. Universals have been
found at all levels of linguistic structure: phonological, syntactic, and semantic.1
Some universals might follow from constraints on what humans are physically capable
of doing. For instance, there is no language whose prosody requires the production
of ultrasounds. The reasons for other universals are harder to understand, leading
to multiple proposed explanations.
One well-supported claim is that at least some universals are to be explained in
terms of learnability. 2 More precisely, it is easier to learn a language that satisfies
the universal than it is to learn a language that does not satisfy the universal,
and this difference in the complexity of acquisition causes languages that satisfy
universals to spread. In the case of universals of lexical semantics such as the one we
focus on below, the learnability explanation says that lexical entries whose meaning
satisfies the universal are easier to learn, and therefore more likely to be lexicalized.
Complicated meanings can be obtained through complex grammatical constructions
and compositional interpretation thereof.
The learnability explanation is an empirical, causal claim about the origins of
1For some examples see, respectively, Hyman (2008), Newmeyer (2008), and Barwise and Cooper
(1981).
2See, e.g., Steinert-Threlkeld (2019), Piantadosi et al. (2012), and Peters and Westerst̊ahl (2008).
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linguistic universals. One way to support the learnability explanation for a specific
universal is to provide a model of learning that is cognitively realistic and on which
expressions that satisfy the universal are indeed easier to learn.
Finding an appropriate model of learning can however only partially explain
a linguistic universal. Learnability is a fact about individual cognition, while a
universal is a feature of a whole language. A second challenge consists in connecting
these two levels, showing the effects of learnability on emerging language structure.
This is the so-called problem of linkage.3
Iterated learning (IL) is a method that addresses the problem of linkage. In IL,
parents teach children their language, who teach the next generation their language,
and so on and so forth. The crucial insight of IL is that learning is not an inert process
in cultural evolution, since the languages of a cultural child and its cultural parent
are generally slightly different. The changes caused by learning are not random, but
rather tend to be guided by the learner’s cognitive biases. As a consequence, over
time languages adapt better and better to the agents’ cognitive biases. Learnability
can then affect the frequency of different traits.4
Previous work has addressed the learnability challenge by showing that quanti-
fiers, responsive predicates, and color terms that satisfy certain semantic universals
are easier to learn for neural networks.5 In this paper, we address the problem of link-
age by building an iterated learning model of the evolution of the semantic structure
of quantifiers. In particular, we will use neural networks as our agents and standard
gradient descent as the learning method inside the context of iterated learning. The
next section briefly reviews the theory of generalized quantification and the universal
of monotonicity. After that, the following section presents the model of cognition
and the iterated learning model, as well as an information-theoretic measure of the
degree of monotonicity of a quantifier. Experiments with this model and their re-
sults are presented in the following section. Results are discussed in the final section,
along with possible future directions.
3The problem of linkage was introduced in Kirby (1999).
4See, e.g., Tamariz and Kirby (2016); Culbertson and Kirby (2016); Kirby et al. (2008) for discus-
sions of the way individual cognition is reflected in language structure through IL and experimental
evidence supporting the connection.
5See, respectively, Steinert-Threlkeld and Szymanik (2018); Steinert-Threlkeld (2019); Steinert-
Threlkeld and Szymanik (2020).
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7.2 Quantifiers and monotonicity
Determiners are expressions that take a common noun as an argument and return a
Noun Phrase. Determiners can be grammatically simple—e.g. some, few, most—or
complex—e.g. fewer than three or at most five.6 Determiners express generalized
quantifiers.7 (Monadic) Generalized quantifiers are properties of sets of subsets of
a domain of discourse. The generalized quantifiers expressed by natural language
determiners are of type 〈1, 1〉, i.e. properties of exactly two sets. Equivalently, a
quantifier of type 〈1, 1〉 takes (the characteristic function of) a set A and returns a
function from (the characteristic function of) a set B to truth values. A is the left
argument and B the right argument of the quantifier. For instance, the sentence
“most As are B” is true if and only if the number of As that are B (cardinality of
the intersection of A and B, i.e., |A ∩B|) is greater than the number of As that are
not Bs (i.e., |A−B|), i.e.:
JmostK = {(A,B) : |A ∩B| > |A \B|}
Various universals have been proposed about which generalized quantifiers are
expressed by simple determiners. In the following, we focus on the monotonicity
universal proposed by Barwise and Cooper (1981). This says that all simple deter-
miners across all languages express monotone quantifiers. A quantifier is monotone
iff it is upward monotone or downward monotone. A quantifier Q is upward mono-
tone [downward monotone] iff for any three sets A, B and B′, if Q(A)(B) and B ⊆ B′
[B′ ⊆ B] then Q(A)(B′). As an example, consider the upward monotone quantifier
JmostK. Assume that the sentence “Most cats sleep” is true and that everything that
sleeps is alive, i.e. JsleepK ⊆ JaliveK. The monotonicity of JmostK ensures then that
“Most cats are alive” is true.
Monotonicity is an interesting universal because it is easy to imagine non-monotone
quantifiers. Examples of non-monotone quantifiers abound among the meanings of
complex determiners: “an even/odd number of” or “exactly 2”, etc. The com-
monness of non-monotonicity among complex quantifiers makes the lack of simple
non-monotone quantifiers especially puzzling and in need of an explanation. Previ-
6Exactly how to draw the distinction between simple and complex and whether, for instance,
most is simple or complex, do not matter for present purposes.
7For more information on generalized quantifier theory from linguistic, computational, and cog-
nitive perspectives, see also Peters and Westerst̊ahl (2008) and Szymanik (2016).
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ous work proposed to explain the universal of monotonicity in terms of the greater
learnability of monotone quantifiers.
Steinert-Threlkeld and Szymanik (2018) propose to use neural networks in this
context. A neural network is a computational device that can learn to approximate
functions by observing tuples of inputs and relevant outputs, and progressively min-
imizing a suitably defined distance between the true output and the network’s own
prediction. In the case of a quantifier, the input is a structure where the relevant
sets are specified and the output is 1 iff the structure verifies the quantifier and 0
otherwise. In practice, given a structure the neural network outputs a probability
that can be interpreted as confidence that the structure verifies the quantifier.
Data about how fast neural networks learn different kinds of quantifiers was pro-
duced with the following algorithms. First, two quantifiers are picked such that one
satisfies the universal and the other does not. Then, the two quantifiers are taught
to a neural network until it has accurately learned them. The crucial information
is how long on average it takes neural networks to accurately learn quantifiers that
satisfy the universal compared to ones that do not. Various universals were tested in
this way. In the case of monotonicity, the data was produced both for a downward
monotone and for an upward monotone quantifier. The neural networks were strik-
ingly faster at learning monotone compared to non-monotone quantifiers. Figure 7.1
shows an example.
As discussed above, knowing that meanings with certain features can be learned
more easily only goes some of the way in explaining the features’ universality across
various languages. A full explanation also needs to show that the structure can and
eventually will be reached by processes of cultural evolution. In the rest of this paper,
we develop an iterated learning model of the cultural evolution of quantifiers that




IL models start with two groups of randomly initialized agents, the first and second
generations. Each agent in the first generation—the cultural parent—is associated
with one agent in the second generation—the cultural child. A set of linguistic
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Figure 7.1: Learning curves on a neural network for the monotone at least 4 (blue)
versus at least 6 or at most 2 (red). The x-axis is number of training steps; the
y-axis is accuracy (percentage correct) on a test set of examples the network has not
yet seen. This was Figure 4 in Steinert-Threlkeld and Szymanik (2019).
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production data is generated for each cultural parent and used as input for the
cultural child. The cultural child tries to approximate its cultural parent’s language.
In the following step, the process is repeated with agents in the second generation
as cultural parents and the new agents in a third generation as cultural children.
The cultural transmission process is iterated for some number of generations. Each
cultural family line is called a chain of IL.
Crucially, the agents do not learn their parent’s language perfectly. There can be
various reasons for this. First, there can be a bottleneck in learning. This happens
when the learner does not observe everything that is needed to perfectly reconstruct
the language, and therefore has to guess some aspects of it. The number of data
points given to the learners is fixed for all generations and agents and is called the
bottleneck size. A second reason is that the agent might not have perfect memory
or perfect reasoning abilities, and might therefore learn a language that does not
perfectly conform to the given data. In this case, the more rational the agent, the
closer the learned language will be to the teacher’s language. A third reason is that
the cultural parents might produce language in a way that is stochastic rather than
deterministic. This can make the language harder to approximate and impossible
to learn perfectly. For instance, a cultural parent might pick among the signals
compatible with a certain observation according to a categorical distribution. The
cultural child would need to infer the parameters of the distribution, a task which
cannot in general be accomplished perfectly with a finite number of observations.
The changes introduced by each learner accumulate over generations. Since these
changes are not completely random, but rather tend to be consistent across agents,
the languages tend to change in the same way over time in different chains. In
sum, IL is a way to study how the cognitive system of the learners determine which
languages one should expect to see spoken in a population of such agents. The crucial
individual level components of an IL model are the set of possible languages, and
the way the agents learn them. We now explain these two components in turn.
7.3.2 Model of models, quantifiers, and language
Since the focus is on the evolution of monotonicity, we simplify the language model
by assuming that the quantifiers are conservative and extensional.8 This amounts
8These, next to monotonicity, are two prominent semantic universals distinguishing natural
language quantifiers from all logically possible quantifiers. Extensionality means that extending or
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to saying that the truth value of each quantifier only depends on the elements in
A and A ∩ B, and not on A ∪B or B \ A. Therefore, the truth of any quantifier
depends only on which of the elements of A are also elements of B, and which are
not. Assuming conservativity and extensionality both reduces the number of possible
quantifiers that agents can speak and simplifies the model of each quantifier, since
only A and A∩B need to be encoded. Moreover, we assume that the left argument
of the quantifiers is fixed to some set A with cardinality n.
Assuming conservativity/extensionality and a fixed set A, we can represent the
part of the world—called a model—that is relevant to determining the truth value of
a quantifier as a bit vector of a fixed length n. Each element of the model represents
an object in A. Each element has value 1 iff the object corresponding to that bit is
also an element of B, and 0 otherwise. For instance, the vector [ 0, 1, 1 ] would model
a situation where A = {o1, o2, o3} and o2, o3 ∈ B. The set of models is the set of all
binary strings of length n, i.e. the set of possible relations between a fixed A and any
possible B. We call M ′ a submodel of a model M iff M ′ is 0 everywhere where M is
0. For instance, [ 0, 1, 1, 0, 0 ] is a submodel of [ 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 ]. Note that each model is
a submodel of itself.
We represent a quantifier as a function from models to single bits. An example
of a quantifier is Q(x) = 1 if
∑n
i=1 xi > 2 otherwise 0, meaning “more than two”.
Since for A of size n there are 2n different models, each quantifier is a 2n-sized bit
vector. Each element of the quantifier vector corresponds to a model and has value
1 iff the model verifies the quantifier and 0 otherwise.
To see how this works in practice, consider a set A of size 3. There are 8 possible
ways in which any other set B can overlap with A. Each of these is modelled as a
bit vector of size 3. For instance, [ 0, 1, 1 ] says that the second and third object of
A are also elements of B, but the first is not. The English expression “all As are
B” is modelled by a bit vector of size 8 that has value 1 at the index corresponding
to the model [ 1, 1, 1 ] and 0 otherwise. If the models are ordered lexicographically9
and the last model is therefore [ 1, 1, 1 ], then the quantifier corresponds to the vector
shrinking the universe of discourse has no effect on the truth-value of the quantifier sentence as
long as the left and right arguments are unchanged. Conservativity means that only the part of B
that is common to A matters for the truth-value of the sentences. In other words, the elements in
B \ A can be safely ignored when determining the truth-value. See Peters and Westerst̊ahl (2008)
for definitions.
9In that case, lexicographic order is the dictionary order over sequences of letters from the
alphabet {0, 1) with 0 preceding 1 in the order.
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[ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1 ]. We call a quantifier degenerate if and only if it corresponds to a
vector of identical elements, 0s or 1s. A degenerate quantifier corresponds intuitively
to a quantifier that is true or false of every model.
Each agent encodes a single quantifier. Agents do not encode the quantifiers
directly. Rather, given a model they produce a truth value by using a neural network.
The next two sections clarify the connection between the neural networks and the
agent’s behaviour.
7.3.3 Neural Networks
Because of the aforementioned learnability results of Steinert-Threlkeld and Szy-
manik (2018), the agents that make up the generations in our iterated learning setup
are neural networks. Each network has n input neurons (one for each bit of a vector
corresponding to a model) and one output neuron (how probable it thinks that the
true output is a 1), with two hidden layers of 16 neurons each. We made this choice
so that the networks had enough expressive power to represent many quantifiers,
including complex ones. Future work will analyze the effect of architecture choices
on the results presented below. The networks and learning, which will be described
in the next section, were implemented in PyTorch.10
Such a network learns from input/output pairs using a fancier version of gradient
descent called Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2017). The network receives a number of true
input/output pairs, which it iterates over in small batches. For each batch, it guesses
the correct outputs for the inputs, and then updates its parameters (weights and
biases connecting the neurons) in such a way that its future outputs are guaranteed to
be closer to the truth.11 Because this style of learning is fairly gradual, we introduce
one more parameter to our simulations, namely number of epochs : this is how many
times the network processes its training set in each generation. In other words, the
network sees a portion of its parent’s language, as determined by bottleneck size, but
gets to learn from that portion number-of-epochs times.12
10http://pytorch.org
11For general introductions, see Nielsen (2015); Goodfellow, Bengio, and Courville (2016).
12In some experimental literature — for example, Carr, Smith, Culbertson, and Simon (2018) —
this is also referred to as exposures.
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7.3.4 Model of the agents
Each agent plays two roles in an IL simulation. The first role is to learn a language
given data from the previous generation. The second role is to produce data used to
teach to the following generation. To produce this data, the agent is prompted with
randomly chosen models.
In the learning phase, each agent receives learning data consisting of a set of
tuples 〈model, judgment〉. The judgment is a single bit expressing whether the
quantifier used by the agent is compatible or not with the model. This data is used
to train the agent’s neural network as described in the previous subsection.
Production works as follows. The agent feeds an observed model to its neural
network. The neural network returns a number in the [0, 1] interval. Then, the
agent rounds the number and returns it. The returned number expresses whether
the agent’s quantifier is compatible or not with the model that the agent observed.
The production behaviour is deterministic, since an agent always produces the same
bit given the same model.
Prompted with a string of 1s and 0s, agents produce a 1 or 0. The former models
a state of the world, the latter models the compatibility of the agent’s quantifier with
the world state. However, nothing in the simulation implies that neural networks are
interpreting 1 and 0 as True and False respectively in their input and output. There-
fore, the output of an agent under-determines which quantifier the agent speaks, even
when the output for all models is known. For instance, an agent that returns 1 for
input [ 0, 0, 1, 1 ] can be interpreted as accepting the model where B = {o3, o4} (if 1 is
interpreted as True in the model and in the quantifier), as rejecting the model where
B = {o3, o4} (if 1 is interpreted as False in the quantifier and True in the models), as
accepting the model where B = {o1, o2} (if 1 is interpreted as True in the quantifier
and False in the models), or as rejecting the model where B = {o1, o2} (if 1 is in-
terpreted as False in the quantifier and the models). Crucially, the interpretation of
the bits has to be consistent across the models and across the quantifier judgments.
Therefore, each agent can be interpreted as speaking four quantifiers, depending on
whether 1 and 0 are interpreted as meaning true or false in the models and in the
agent’s output. We discuss below how we deal with underdeterminacy when it might
make a difference to the interpretation of the results.
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7.3.5 Measures of monotonicity
Figure 7.2: Kernel Density Estimation of the distribution of degrees of monotonicity
from a sample of 300 completely random quantifiers and 300 random neural network
agents. The x-axis is the measure of monotonicity we describe in the main text.
According to the standard definition, monotonicity is a binary property. A pos-
sible way of analyzing the results would be to find the proportion of monotone lan-
guages in every generation. However, some quantifiers are intuitively more monotone
than other quantifiers. For instance, consider the three quantifiers “some”, “between
3 and 5” and “an even number of”. While “some” is monotone and the other two
quantifiers are not, intuitively “an even number of” is the least monotone of the
three. To track finer changes in monotonicity level over time, we define a graded
measure of monotonicity.
We measure monotonicity in information-theoretic terms as the proportion of
uncertainty in the output of a quantifier that is removed after knowing that there is
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a submodel where the quantifier is true (i.e. a 1). For a perfectly (upward) monotone
quantifier Q, if a model M has a submodel to which the quantifier assigns 1 then
Q will assign 1 to M . Therefore, for a monotone quantifier all the uncertainty is
removed and the measure has value 1.
More formally, first define the random variables 1Q and 1
≺
Q on the space of possi-
ble models as follows. 1Q is the value that Q assigns to the model M . 1
≺
Q is whether
a model has a submodel that the quantifier considers true (assigns 1 to). The entropy
of 1Q, H(1Q), quantifies the uncertainty about what truth value Q will assign to a
model. The conditional entropy H(1Q | 1≺Q) quantifies the uncertainty about what
Q will assign to a model, given that one knows whether the model has a submodel
that Q considers true (assigns 1 to). H(1Q | 1≺Q) is minimized (attains value 0) for
a perfectly monotone quantifier: if you know that a model has a true submodel, and
the quantifier is upward monotone, you know the truth value of that model. The
difference between the entropy and the conditional entropy between these variables




This measures how much information 1≺Q provides about 1Q. For a perfectly mono-
tone quantifier, H(1Q|1≺Q) = 0, and so I(1Q;1≺Q) = H(1Q). In other words: for a
monotone quantifier, knowing which models have a true sub-model provides as much
information as knowing the entire quantifier.
While this roughly captures what we want from a measure of monotonicity, it
needs to be normalized to form a degree that applies across quantifiers, since 0 ≤
I(1Q;1
≺
Q) ≤ H(1Q). We do this by dividing by H(1Q), moving the upper bound to












To see how this measure tracks intuitions, consider the previous mentioned quan-
tifiers “some”, “between 3 and 5” and “an even number of”. “Some” gets mono-
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tonicity 1.0, because knowing whether a model has a submodel that verifies “some”
eliminates all uncertainty about the truth of the model. Recall that each agent can
be interpreted as instantiating any of four quantifiers, which can be monotone to dif-
ferent degrees. This raises the question of which of the four degrees of monotonicity
should be considered in the analysis of the results. The monotonicity of an agent’s
language is the highest among the degrees of the quantifiers compatible with the
agent’s language. For instance, an agent whose quantifier is “between 3 and 5” has
degree 0.7517 and one with “an even number of” has degree 0.001.
We compare the results of the simulation to the distribution of the measure in
randomly generated quantifiers. There are two different random distributions of
quantifiers. On the one hand, there are the quantifiers instantiated by randomly ini-
tialized agents. On the other hand, there are the quantifiers sampled uniformly from
the space of possible quantifiers. These two distributions are depicted in Figure 7.2.
While the completely random quantifiers have a narrower distribution, both types
of random distribution are very skewed towards low degree of monotonicity. This
makes sense: monotonicity is a relatively rare property, and so should not be ex-
pected to appear randomly. We now turn to the results, showing that higher degrees
do emerge via iterated learning.
7.3.6 Materials
For our experiments, we used a fixed model size of 10 (which, recall, is also the size of
the input to the agents), with 10 agents in each generation, and varied the bottleneck
size (200, 512, 715, 1024) and number of epochs (4 and 8). For each setting of those
two parameters, we ran 20 trials.
The code, data, and instructions for running experiments may be found at
https://github.com/thelogicalgrammar/NeuralNetIteratedQuantifiers.
7.4 Results
The first result is that monotone quantifiers evolve consistently and rapidly for some
values of the simulation parameters. More specifically, the evolution of monotonicity
depends on the bottleneck size and the number of epochs, i.e. how much of the
parent’s language is observed by the cultural child. See Figure 7.3 for the results. If
the networks get too much input, they learn the quantifier accurately and change is
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Figure 7.3: The simulation was ran 20 times for each combination of bottleneck size
and number of epochs in a population of 10 agents and a maximum model size of 10.
The plot shows how the average monotonicity level across all languages changes over
300 generations. Convergence to monotonicity depends on how much the learners’
neural networks are trained, which itself depends on the number of epochs and
the bottleneck size. With small bottleneck and few epochs, monotonicity does not
evolve. With a bigger bottleneck size and more training epochs, monotone languages
become widespread. However, increasing the training data further tends to impede
the development of monotone languages.
very slow. If the networks get too little input, the learning has little effect and no
pattern emerges. If languages are somewhat stable across generations, but enough
variation is allowed by not over-training the cultural children, monotonicity evolves.
A second result is that the monotone quantifiers that emerge are in large part
non degenerate. In Bayesian models that include a prior for simplicity, degenerate
languages become widespread under pure IL (Kirby et al., 2015). Here, however,
degenerate quantifiers are a small minority (about 0.005% of all quantifiers).
The third result is that most non-degenerate monotone quantifiers fall in one of
a few types. About 79% of the perfectly monotone quantifiers show the following
pattern: there is some index i such that the quantifier—call it Qi—assigns 1 to a
model iff the model is 1 at i (or an equivalent pattern obtained by switching 0 and
1 uniformly in the models and/or in the quantifier). Qi is true iff oi, the object
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represented by index i, belongs to the set B.13. Therefore Qi(A) functions like a
proper noun for oi. Just like “Anna is human” is true iff Anna belongs to the set of
humans, “Qi(A) is B” is true iff oi belongs to the set B.
For other monotone quantifiers Q{j,k}, there are two indices j, k (with j 6= k)
such that Q{j,k} assigns 1 to a model iff the model has value 1 at both j and k (or,
again, an equivalent patterns obtained by switching 0 and 1 in the models and/or
in the quantifier). Q{j,k} is true iff B contains two specific elements of A, and false
otherwise.14 It can be interpreted as the conjunction of two proper nouns. Like
“Anna and Rob are human” is true iff Anna is human and Rob is human, “Q{j,k}(A)
is B” is true iff oj is B and ok is B.
7.5 Discussion
The results we presented support the learnability account of the origins of semantic
universals of quantification. While previous work compared quantifiers satisfying
semantic universals to quantifiers that do not, we have presented a model where
the former are selected out of all of the possible quantifiers by a process of cultural
evolution. Moreover, the preference for monotone quantifiers is not a consequence
of an explicitly coded bias for simplicity, but rather of an independently motivated,
biologically plausible model of learning. The results therefore suggest that not only
are monotone quantifiers easier to learn, but they are also widespread in language
because of their learnability.
This model can be straightforwardly extended in various ways. The agents judged
their quantifier compatible with a given model simply by rounding the output of their
neural network. An alternative to this is for the agents to accept a model with a
probability proportional to the network’s output. Such so-called sample agents do not
straightforwardly instantiate a quantifier, since they can produce inconsistent output
when repeatedly prompted with the same model. However, preliminary results have
shown that neural networks are capable of doing statistical learning : given enough
data, they approximate not just whether their parents tend to reject or accept a
13In set-theoretic terms, Qi is a principal ultrafilter If U is a finite non-empty set, a set F is a
principal ultrafilter on U if there is an a ∈ U such that F = {B ∈ P(U)|a ∈ B}. In the present
model, Qi is (the characteristic function of) a principal ultrafilter on B because it it contains every
subset of B that contains i.
14These are called in set-theoretic terms principal filters. They are not principal ultrafilters
because their truth depends on more than one element.
250
model, but also the probability of acceptance.
While the quantifiers that emerge from our experiment are monotone, they are
unnatural in certain respects. For instance, the proper-name-like quantifiers that
emerge are not quantitative, i.e. their truth value depends not simply on the number
of 1s and 0s, but on the identity of particular elements.15
To try and explain the emergence of quantifiers which are both monotone and
quantitative, it might be necessary to make it more difficult for the networks to rely
on the identity of particular objects by, for instance, shuffling the order of models
in the parent and the teacher’s inputs. Another pressure that might contribute
to shape the meaning of quantifiers comes from communication (Kirby et al., 2015).
While some semantic universals of quantification might have an advantage in cultural
evolution because they conform well with learning biases, other universals might
evolve because they lead to more successful communication. Therefore, combining
iterated learning with a pressure for accurate communication might help more natural
quantifiers emerge. We leave all of these exciting possibilities to future work.
15See Steinert-Threlkeld and Szymanik (2018) for the definition of and motivation for quan-
tity, which generalizes the isomorphism/permutation constraint in generalized quantifier theory as





In caminu s’acconzat su garrigu1
Sardinian saying
In this thesis, I have tried to combine different sources of evidence to study
the evolution of two universals of scalar semantics, monotonicity and extremeness.
One problem with combining theoretical, experimental, and modelling work is that
the different approaches might push in different directions. This is to some extent
what happened: while the theoretical work in chapter 2 and the modelling work in
chapter 3 pointed in the same direction, i.e. transitions-based encoding as the basis
for monotonicity, the experimental results of chapters 4 and 5 did not provide support
for the same picture. The picture was then made more complex by the results in
chapter 7, which showed that a general model of learning without a pressure for
communicative accuracy does indeed result in monotonic quantifiers evolving, but
not necessarily degenerate ones. Finally, chapter 6 was an initial exploration of
how cultural transmission might influence the evolution of extreme categories, and
it is not yet clear how this interacts with the mechanisms that create a pressure for
extremeness discussed in section 1.3.
Despite the complexity of the emerging picture, some general lessons can be drawn
from the work presented in this thesis. Chapter 1 identified two universals of the
semantics of scalar language, namely monotonicity and extremeness, and reviewed
previous discussion of them in the literature. The conclusion of the discussion is
that there is no unified account of monotonicity across different grammatical classes
1One balances the weight along the way.
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(e.g. gradable adjectives and quantifiers), and previous accounts of the evolution of
extremeness mainly focus on approximate rather than true extremeness and com-
munication rather than learning. These gaps in the literature provided questions for
the rest of the thesis.
Assuming that language evolution is guided in part by pressures coming from
cognition, in chapter 2 I developed a simple account of the cognitive roots of scalar
categorization based on conceptual spaces theory. I argued that a classical picture
of categorization in conceptual spaces, based on prototypes, is unsuitable for mod-
elling scalar categories. I proposed an alternative picture based on transitions which
addresses the issues that arose with a prototype-bases picture. The picture of scalar
categorization based on transitions offers a natural measure of the complexity of
different categories as the number of transitions needed to encode them.
In chapter 3, I developed further the implications of the theory developed in
chapter 2. I proposed, based on modelling results, that the evolution of monotonicity
follows from a combination of two pressures, namely a pressure for simplicity com-
ing from iterated cultural transmission and a pressure for communicative accuracy
coming from usage. Crucially, in order for these two pressures to combine in such a
way that monotonic categories evolve, the language users have to be pragmatically
skilful.
In chapter 4, I presented results from three category-learning experiments that
attempted to test the measure of complexity developed in chapter 2 and used in
the models in chapter 3. The results were inconclusive, and I identified a possible
problem in the fact that the design could not capture small enough differences in the
behaviour of participants across conditions.
In order to make the analysis more sensitive to differences in behavioural patterns,
I run three more experiments that produced much richer behavioural data. The ex-
periments are presented in chapter 5. In order to analyse the more complex data, I
developed a hierarchical Bayesian model wrapped around a cognitive model of cate-
gorization that was designed to capture the participants’ preferences for monotonic
categories. The results of the latter three experiments were also inconclusive.
In chapter 6, I turned to the other universal of scalar semantics that was identified
and discussed in chapter 1, namely extremeness. I show that even without assuming
a cognitive bias in favour of extreme categories, extremeness can evolve purely due
to cultural transmission. This work provides a basis for future analyses of the role
of learning in the evolution of extremeness.
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Finally, in chapter 7, written in collaboration with Shane Steinert-Threlkeld and
Jakub Szymanik, we show for the more complex semantic space of quantifiers that
monotonicity can emerge from IL and the general purpose learning model of neural
networks.
Much work remains to be done to understand the origins of the universals of
scalarity, and disentangle the contribution of different pressures on their evolution.
In this thesis, I have focussed on gradable adjectives, which constitute the simplest
example of scalar categories, and on quantifiers. However, other grammatical classes
express scalar categories. One promising approach for instance would be to apply the
work presented in this thesis to modal semantics. Modal expressions have been ar-
gued to require a scalar semantics (Lassiter, 2016; Santorio & Romoli, 2017; Klecha,
2014), or to be implicitly quantificational (Kratzer, 2012). The complexity of modal
semantics remains an obstacle to developing accounts of its evolution.
Another interesting way to develop the work presented in this thesis further
is to collect evidence to assess the commonness of the two discussed universals of
monotonicity and extremeness cross-linguistically. While much evidence exists for
the monotonicity of quantifiers cross-linguistically, more evidence is needed for the
monotonicity of gradable adjectives. Moreover, more data is needed on the propor-
tion of extreme categories cross-linguistically.
A third direction for future research on the evolution of scalar universals is to
develop new experiments. The picture that I argued for in chapter 2 implies that
scalar categories expressed by gradable adjectives have a particularly simple mental
representation, which lends itself to cognitive Bayesian modelling in the style of chap-
ter 5. As opposed to adjectival scales, quantifiers use scales with a complex internal
structure, which is reflected in their complex mental representations. However, it is
crucial to distinguish between the simplicity biases that emerge once a scale such as
the scale of proportions is given (e.g. a bias for monotonicity) and the biases that
are involved in constituting the scale in the first place (e.g. bias for independence of





Proof for lemma 1:
Proof. Consider the case where x < y, f(x) = true, and f(y) = false. The proof for
the other cases are similar. Call a the greatest element in the domain such that f is
true for all q with x < q < a. a has to be lower than y, otherwise y would be a point
x < y < a where f is false, which contradicts the definition of a. a can be true or
false. If a is false, then a counts as a false transition from true to false. If a is true,
by definition of a there have to be points greater than a where f is false. Call b a
point such that f is false for all q with a < q < b. a is then a true transition from
true to false.
Proof for lemma 2:
Proof. Assume by contradiction that they are both true transitions from true to
false, and assume t1 is the smaller of the two. The proofs for the other cases are
similar. By definition 2, there is some y > t1 such that all points a with t1 < a ≤ y
evaluate to false, and there is some x ≤ t2 such that all points b with x ≤ b ≤ t2
evaluate to true. Since x is false, y is true, and x < y, by lemma 1 there has to be
a transition between x and y. This contradicts the assumption that t1 and t2 are
adjacent.
Proof for lemma 3:
Proof. First show that if f is monotonic, then it has one of fewer transitions. Assume
by contradiction that f has exactly two distinct transitions t1 and t2 but is monotonic.
A proof for a function with more than two transitions can be obtained by simply
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considering any two adjacent transitions. Since we assumed that the domain is
totally ordered and there are countably many transitions, we can call t1 the lowest of
the two. Assume that t1 is a transition from true to false, with the proof for the other
cases being similar. Since t2 is the only other transition, t1 and t2 are adjacent. By
lemma 2, transition t2 has to be from false to true. Call a any of the points ≤ t1 that
evaluates to true, b any point between t1 and t2 that is false, and c any point t2 ≥
that is true. The existence of a, b, and c is guaranteed by the definition of transition.
Note that a < b and f(a) < f(b), implying that f cannot be monotonic decreasing.
Moreover, b < c and f(b) > f(c), implying that the function cannot be monotone
increasing. Therefore, f cannot be monotonic, contradicting the assumption.
Next show that if f is non-monotonic, then f has at least two transitions. Since
f is non-monotonic, it is neither monotone increasing nor monotone decreasing.
Therefore, there are some x, y in the domain such that x ≤ y and f(x) > f(y), and
some z, w such that z ≤ w and f(z) < f(w).1 Since f(x) > f(y), the truth value at
x is different from the truth value at y. By lemma 1, there has to be a transition
between x and y. Therefore, f cannot have zero transitions. A similar argument
shows that there has to a transition between z and w. Therefore, f has to have at
least two transitions.
Proof for lemma 4:
Proof. Index the transitions with integers, so that they can be called t1, . . . , tn, such
that consecutive integers correspond to adjacent transitions. This is possible because
we assumed there are countably many transitions and that their order is known. By
lemma 2, for any index j the types of transition tj+1 and of transition tj−1, if they
exist, can be inferred from the type of transition tj. By assumption, the type of
some transition ti is known. Therefore, the transition type can be inferred for all
indices.
Proof for lemma 5:
Proof. Assume that f and g have both a transition from false to true. The proof
for the other type is similar. Moreover, assume that the transition of f , tf , is lower
than or equal to the transition of g, tg. The case where tg ≤ tf is similar. We want
to show that f includes g. Assume by contradiction that there is a point x where f
1From a logical point of view, since the definition of monotonicity says that for all x, y, P (x, y)→
Q(x, q), its negation says that for some x, y, P (x, y) ∧ ¬Q(x, y).
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is false but g true, which is the negation of the assertion that f includes g. f has
to be true everywhere above tf , otherwise by lemma 1 f would have two have two
transitions, contradicting the assumption. Therefore, x ≤ tf . By the definition of
transition from false to true, there are points y such that y ≤ tg and g(y) = false. In
sum, x < y ≤ tg. Since g(x) 6= g(y), g has a transition between x and y by lemma






Algorithm 2 Category selection in experiment 2 in pseudo-code
1: function SelectCategories
2: maxIndex← 35 . There are 36 stims but indexing starts at 0
3: distBorders← Unif(6, 12) . Uniform excludes max
4: pickedId← Unif(distBorders,maxIndex+ 1−DistBorders)
5: if pickedId < maxIndex− pickedId then
6: pickedExtreme← 0 . Picked stim is closer to min than max of scale





12: distCloseBorder ← Unif(0, 3) . Distance of internal border from pickedId
13: if pickedExtreme = 0 then
14: monList← Range(0, pickedId+ 1 + distCloseBorder)
15: else
16: monList← Range(pickedId− distCloseBorder,maxIndex+ 1)
17: end if . At this point a monotone list is defined
18: center ← pickedId+ Unif(−1, 2)
19: size← Len(monList)
20: startNonMon← center − (size/2) . Position of internal border
21: if size is even then
22: if RandBool() then





28: nonMonList← RangeLength(startNonMon, size+ 1)
29: return [monList, nonMonList, pickedId]
30: end function
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Algorithm 3 Category selection in experiment 3 in pseudo-code
1: function SelectCategories
2: cat← RandChoice([B,C])
3: if cat = B then
4: prototypeId← 13
5: pickedId← Unif(10, 14)
6: monInternalBorder ← selectedId+ 2
7: monList← Range(0,monInternalBorder + 1)
8: nonMonList← Range(9, 18)
9: else
10: prototypeId← 22
11: pickedId← Unif(22, 26)
12: monInternalBorder ← selectedId− 2
13: monList← Range(monInternalBorder, 36)
14: nonMonList← Range(18, 27)
15: end if





Efficient calculation of the utility
Assuming that the prior over degrees p is uniform allows a simplification of the utility
function that significantly improves performance. First, consider the utility of silence
(u0) for the literal listener L0 given that the rational speaker S1 has observed degree















Variable substitution x =
√


















































































































This expression can be calculated much more efficiently than the original expres-
sion, because there are algorithms to approximate the error function erf. Similar




































Figure D.1: Flowchart for the first experiment.
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Figure D.2: Flowchart for the second experiment.
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Figure D.3: Flowchart for the third experiment.
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Figure D.4: Flowchart for the fourth experiment.
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Figure D.5: Flowchart for the fifth experiment.
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Chater, N., & Vitányi, P. (2003). Simplicity: A unifying principle in cognitive
science? Trends in cognitive sciences , 7 (1), 19–22.
Chemla, E., Buccola, B., & Dautriche, I. (2019, June). Connecting Content and
Logical Words. Journal of Semantics , 36 (3), 531–547. doi: 10.1093/jos/ffz001
Christiansen, M. H., Collins, C., & Edelman, S. (Eds.). (2009). Language Universals.
Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305432.001.0001
Clark, E. V. (1993). The Lexicon in Acquisition (No. 65). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Culbertson, J., & Kirby, S. (2016, January). Simplicity and Specificity in Language:
Domain-General Biases Have Domain-Specific Effects. Frontiers in Psychology ,
6 . doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01964
Culbertson, J., Kirby, S., & Schouwstra, M. (2016). Word Order Universals Reflect
Cognitive Biases: Evidence From Silent Gesture. In The Evolution of Language:
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference (pp. 391–393).
276
Decock, L., Dietz, R., & Douven, I. (2013). Modelling Comparative Concepts in
Conceptual Spaces. In Y. Motomura, A. Butler, & D. Bekki (Eds.), New
Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence (pp. 69–86). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-39931-2 6
Decock, L., & Douven, I. (2014). What Is Graded Membership? Noûs , 48 (4),
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